# Agent rules for installing and running opencodex

This file is for an agent **installing, starting, or operating** opencodex on a
user's machine. It is not about contributing to this repository — that is
[`AGENTS.md`](./AGENTS.md), and nothing here concerns you if you are only
reading or changing this codebase.

There is one rule, and it exists because `ocx start` can print a question that
an agent is capable of answering and must not.

For everything else about driving opencodex from a scripted terminal —
installation, `ocx init`, headless flags, exit codes — see the
[Agent Quickstart](https://opencodex.me/getting-started/for-agents/). This file
is only the consent boundary, kept in the installed package so it is readable
offline and without leaving the terminal.

## User-consent actions

Some actions write to the **user's own accounts and identity**, not to this
repository or to their machine's configuration. They sit outside anything an
install or operations task authorizes, and an agent must never perform or
auto-answer them — even when the surrounding task is approved, even when the
credential is sitting right there.

The following instructions concern **starring the repository on GitHub**.

### Do not

- Do **not** run `gh api -X PUT /user/starred/...`, `gh repo star`, or the
  equivalent REST call on the user's behalf.
- Do **not** call `POST /api/github/star` on the management API. It refuses
  agent-driven callers with `403 agent_consent_required`; treat that response as
  the final answer, not as an obstacle to route around.
- Do **not** answer the interactive prompt printed by `ocx start` /
  `ocx service install`. When an agent is detected the prompt is deliberately
  suppressed and its one-time marker left unwritten, so the user still gets the
  real question on their own next run.

### Do

- **Relay it once.** When a start prints the deferral, ask the user in the reply
  that follows *that* start, as a required Yes/No choice they have to answer —
  `Star lidge-jun/opencodex? Yes / No` — near the top of the reply. Not a soft
  aside such as "want to give it a star?", and not tacked onto the end of a long
  message.
- **Ask once, not forever.** An unanswered question settles nothing — silence is
  deferred, never a Yes and never a recorded No. Do not repeat the question in
  later replies or later sessions: the CLI re-arms the deferral at most once per
  opencodex version (never more than once a week), and a later version re-asks
  on its own. Do not decide it yourself in either direction.
- **Let an answer settle it.** Star only on an explicit yes. An explicit no ends
  the matter permanently — do not argue it, re-frame it, or raise it again
  later.

### Telemetry

Anonymous daily usage telemetry defaults to on only after a human has seen the
disclosure notice (in the GUI or an interactive TTY prompt). An agent must never
enable telemetry or acknowledge the telemetry disclosure on the user's behalf:
`PUT /api/telemetry` and `ocx telemetry enable` refuse agent-driven callers with
`agent_consent_required` (and `ocx telemetry enable` refuses a non-interactive
terminal with `tty_required`), and `ocx config set`/`unset telemetry` refuse every
caller. Opting out (`ocx telemetry disable`, `OCX_TELEMETRY=0` or `DO_NOT_TRACK=1`)
is always permitted.

A public leaderboard profile is a separate user-consent action: it publishes a handle and
daily usage totals under the user's chosen name. An agent must never connect one or answer
its prompt. `POST /api/telemetry/profile` requires a human dashboard session, and
`ocx telemetry profile connect` refuses agent-driven callers with `agent_consent_required`
and non-interactive terminals with `tty_required`. Disconnecting
(`ocx telemetry profile disconnect`), which deletes the profile, is always permitted.

### Google Antigravity sign-in

Signing in to Google Antigravity puts the user's Google account at risk: Google
has disabled Gemini and Antigravity access on accounts used through third-party
tools ("This service has been disabled in this account for violation of Terms of
Service."). Only the account owner can accept that risk. An agent must never:

- pass `--accept-antigravity-risk` to `ocx login`, `ocx account login`, or
  `ocx account import`, or answer their y/N prompt. Agent-driven runs are
  refused with `antigravity_risk_not_acknowledged` whatever the flag says;
  treat that as the final answer.
- send `acknowledgeAntigravityRisk: true` to `POST /api/oauth/login` or
  `POST /api/oauth/accounts/import`, or tick the dashboard dialog's checkbox
  for the user.

Relay the warning and let the user run the command themselves or use the
dashboard. The management API cannot tell an agent holding the admin token from
the CLI, so for that route this rule is the boundary.

## Where things are installed

An agent asked to install, inspect, repair, or remove opencodex needs to know what is written
outside the package directory. Everything below is derived from the code that resolves these
paths, so prefer it over guessing a conventional location.

### State and configuration

One directory holds everything the proxy owns: `$OPENCODEX_HOME` when it is set, otherwise
`~/.opencodex`. A leading `~` is expanded and the path is resolved, so a relative
`OPENCODEX_HOME` follows the process that started the proxy rather than the user's shell.

| Path | What it is |
|---|---|
| `<home>/config.json` | providers, models, accounts, routing — the file `ocx init` writes |
| `<home>/admin-api-token` | the management API token the server writes at startup |
| `<home>/service.log` | stdout and stderr of the installed background service |
| `<home>/service-state.json` | which manager installed the service, and on which port |
| `<home>/winsw/` | the native Windows service binary and its XML, when `--native` was used |

Two instances must not share a home: the spend ledger takes a single-writer lock and the second
process is refused, so an independent instance needs its own `OPENCODEX_HOME`.

### Service files

The background service registers with the platform's own manager, so `ocx service uninstall`
is the supported removal. These are the files it owns:

| Platform | Path |
|---|---|
| macOS (launchd) | `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.opencodex.proxy.plist` |
| Linux (systemd user unit) | `~/.config/systemd/user/opencodex-proxy.service` |
| Windows (Task Scheduler) | a scheduled task named `opencodex-proxy`, with no file of its own |
| Windows (`--native`, WinSW) | `<home>/winsw/` beside the task, never both at once |

A host that has both a Task Scheduler entry and a WinSW service is in a conflicting state;
`ocx service status` reports it and the repair is to uninstall before reinstalling one of them.

### The CLI

`npm install -g --allow-scripts=bun @bitkyc08/opencodex` puts `ocx` on the PATH from npm's global prefix, and the
Bun runtime it needs is bundled inside that package. There is no separate runtime to install and
no WSL layer on Windows.

### The desktop app (beta)

The app is a shell around the same dashboard and carries its own `ocx` sidecar, so installing it
does not replace a CLI installation and does not move the state directory above.

| Platform | Installed at |
|---|---|
| macOS | `/Applications/OpenCodex.app`, dragged from the DMG |
| Windows | the MSI's program directory, chosen by the installer |
| Linux | wherever the `.deb` places it, or the AppImage file the user ran |

Inside the macOS bundle, the sidecar sits beside the app binary in `Contents/MacOS/` and the
widget extension is `Contents/PlugIns/OpenCodexWidget.appex`. Removing the app removes both;
it does not remove `~/.opencodex`, and it does not stop a service installed by the CLI.

Two beta consequences are worth stating before an install: release builds of the macOS app are
signed with a Developer ID and notarized, so macOS shows only its standard confirmation for a
downloaded app (a local build is ad-hoc signed and may need **Open Anyway** in System Settings →
Privacy & Security), and the Windows installer is not code-signed, so SmartScreen warns on it. Neither is a failure to route around by disabling a security setting on
the user's behalf — relay it and let the user decide.

## Why this is a file and not a prompt

The prompt an agent sees is deliberately thin. Printing the full rule on every
start would bury real startup output under a wall of text that only an agent
reads, so the CLI prints one dim line and this file carries the contract.

## Where the enforcement lives

Reading this file is not what makes the boundary hold — the code refuses
agent-driven callers regardless:

- [`src/cli/agent-driven.ts`](./src/cli/agent-driven.ts) — agent detection.
- [`src/cli/star-prompt.ts`](./src/cli/star-prompt.ts) — prompt suppression and
  the one-time marker.
- [`src/server/management/sidebar-routes.ts`](./src/server/management/sidebar-routes.ts)
  — the `403 agent_consent_required` refusal.
- [`src/oauth/antigravity-risk.ts`](./src/oauth/antigravity-risk.ts) — the
  Antigravity acknowledgement, refused for agent-driven CLI runs.

Regression coverage: `tests/server/startup-prompt.test.ts`,
`tests/cli/agent-driven.test.ts`, `tests/server/sidebar-routes.test.ts`,
`tests/oauth/oauth-antigravity-risk.test.ts`.

### Pending Codex account validation

Completing deferred account validation spends model quota. Only a human's
dashboard **Refresh quotas** action authorizes it. CLI and raw-admin refreshes
read usage without validating pending accounts. Relay the dashboard recovery
instruction to the user; do not mint a GUI session or call the provider directly
to work around this boundary. This also applies when operating a headless host.

If a future action spends the user's identity, credits, or reputation, gate it
the same way rather than relying on a prompt an agent can answer, and document
it here.

## Browser and Computer Use plugins: entry point

This is not a consent boundary — it is a routing fact that costs agents real
time when they do not know it, and it belongs here because it applies to an
agent *operating* opencodex rather than changing it.

The Chrome, Browser, and Computer Use plugins run **only** through the
privileged Node REPL tool (`mcp__node_repl__js`). Call it directly. If it is not
in the current tool set, search available tools for `node_repl js` before
concluding anything is unavailable.

These do not work and are not worth attempting:

- `node` / `node -e` importing the plugin's `scripts/browser-client.mjs`. It
  refuses with `Browser use requires privileged node_repl capabilities` — the
  bundle reads `globalThis.nodeRepl` and ships its own `process` shim, both
  injected by the privileged REPL host and by nothing else.
- Filesystem searches for `@oai/sky`. Computer Use injects it at runtime; there
  is no package on disk, so `find` and `mdfind` can only ever come back empty.
- `osascript` / AppleScript / JXA as a substitute for the plugin API.

A failed shell attempt is evidence about the shell, not about plugin
availability.

Smaller local models misroute here for a specific reason worth naming: the
bundled Chrome skill asks an agent not to *mention* the REPL tool in
user-facing prose while simultaneously requiring it to *use* that tool. Both
hold at once. The naming restriction governs what you say to the user; it never
means the tool is off-limits. A model that resolves the tension by avoiding the
tool will exhaust every shell path and then report the plugins as unavailable,
which is what prompted writing this down.
