--- name: public-surface-audit description: >- Scans git-tracked (public) files for operator-private tokens that should live only in gitignored files — real usernames, absolute home paths, companion-store names, company asset names. Reports file:line + matched token + severity, so a public/private split stays clean before publish. Triggered by "public surface audit", "did I leak anything", "check tracked files for private tokens", "private token scan", "public-surface-audit". user-invocable: true allowed-tools: ["Read", "Bash", "Grep", "Glob"] model: sonnet category: Composability Gate --- # public-surface-audit — Operator-Private Token Leak Scan Scans the git-tracked file set (the public surface) for operator-private tokens that were supposed to stay in gitignored files (e.g. `CLAUDE.local.md`, companion store). After a public/private split, a front-door fix is not enough — a leaked username or absolute home path anywhere in the tracked set breaks the "public repo = model-agnostic methodology only" invariant. > While `marketplace-gate` Check 5 answers "is this repo broadly safe to publish?" (API keys, internal > domains, license), `public-surface-audit` answers a narrower question: "did any operator-private > token survive the public/private split into a tracked file?" It scans `git ls-files` only — gitignored > files like `CLAUDE.local.md` are intentionally out of scope (they are the *correct* home for these tokens). ## Triggers - `/public-surface-audit` - `/public-surface-audit --target ` - `/public-surface-audit --json` (machine-parseable verdict for hook-gating — see Step 5) - "Did I leak anything into the public repo?", "public surface audit", "private token scan" - "Check tracked files for private tokens", "is my public/private split clean?" - "Did any operator-private token survive into a tracked file?", "scan before publish" --- ## Scope — Tracked Files Only This skill scans **only `git ls-files`** (committed/staged tracked files). Gitignored files are deliberately excluded — `CLAUDE.local.md`, the companion store, and local session data are the *correct* home for operator-private tokens, so finding them there is not a leak. ```bash REPO_PATH="${ARGUMENTS#--target }" REPO_PATH="${REPO_PATH:-$(pwd)}" git -C "$REPO_PATH" rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || { echo "Not a git repo — public-surface-audit scans git-tracked files only. Aborting."; exit 1; } echo "Target: $REPO_PATH" git -C "$REPO_PATH" ls-files | wc -l | xargs echo "Tracked files:" ``` --- ## Step 1. Pattern List (configurable) The patterns **are themselves operator-private** — your real username and employer name must not be hardcoded *here*, on the public surface, or this skill would leak exactly what it hunts. So the literal values live in a **gitignored source you supply** (`.claude/rules/.public-surface-patterns`, or a section of `CLAUDE.local.md`) — one `severityregex` per line. This SKILL.md carries only placeholders; the scan reads the gitignored file, never literals from this table. The skill dogfoods its own rule. | # | Token class | Severity | Placeholder (real value goes in the gitignored source) | Why private | |:-:|---|:-:|---|---| | 1 | Real username | HIGH | `` | Personal identity — must not appear on public surface | | 2 | Company / employer asset name | HIGH | `` (alternation OK) | Company-confidential, leak-forbidden | | 3 | Operator absolute home path | MED | `/Users/[a-z0-9_-]+/` (generic — carries no literal name) | Machine-bound, leaks username + local layout | | 4 | Companion-store name | LOW | `` | Private companion store — methodology should not name it | | 5 | Operator-private script / handoff name | LOW | ``, `/` | Operator-specific wiring, belongs in `CLAUDE.local.md` | **Severity meaning**: - **HIGH** — real name or company asset. A leak is a confidentiality / identity exposure. Block publish. - **MED** — absolute home path. Leaks username + local filesystem layout; also a portability bug. - **LOW** — companion-store / private-wiring name. Methodology should be model-agnostic; naming a private store is drift, not a confidentiality breach. > **Setup**: put your real values in the gitignored pattern source (one `severityregex` per line); > the scan reads that file, never literals from this SKILL.md. If the source is **absent**, the scan > reports **NOT CONFIGURED** — *not* CLEAN. A missing pattern file must never masquerade as a clean bill > of health (that would be a silent failure: "nothing scanned" misread as "nothing leaked"). To declare > "I genuinely have no private tokens", create the file **empty** — an empty file is an explicit CLEAN, > an absent file is unconfigured. --- ## Step 2. Allowlist (legitimate references) Some tracked files legitimately reference otherwise-private tokens — the scan must not flag these as leaks. Maintain an allowlist of `file path :: token` pairs. A match is suppressed only when **both** the file and the token are on the allowlist row. | Tracked file | Allowed tokens | Reason | |---|---|---| | `.gitignore` | companion-store name, sync-script name | Must name what it ignores | | your sync script (e.g. `scripts/`) | companion-store name, operator-dir names, home path | The sync script's whole job is the companion store | | an install-template rules file | home path, companion-store name | Install template — the install path is its content | | a doc describing the companion-store *pattern* | the `*-be` pattern (no literal store name) | Documents the pattern generically | **Allowlist rule**: a hit on file F matching token T is **suppressed** iff a row exists with file == F and T in that row's allowed tokens. Everything else is reported. Keep the allowlist tight — when in doubt, report and let the user confirm. Genuinely model-agnostic mentions (the `*-be` companion *pattern* without the literal store name) should not require allowlisting because they do not match a literal private token. --- ## Step 3. Scan For each pattern in Step 1, grep the tracked set, then drop allowlisted hits. Do this for **every** pattern row before producing the report — do not stop at the first HIT. **Binary / generated carve-out**: skip binaries. Additionally note (do not auto-suppress) hits inside generated artifacts (e.g. `paper/*.html` exported from a private source) — these are real leaks on the public surface and must be reported, but the fix is "regenerate from a sanitized source," not "edit the HTML by hand." Flag them with a `(generated artifact)` note. > **Detail**: See `SKILL_detail.md §Step3-Scan-Script` — the grep-per-pattern bash implementation, > flag reference (`-n`/`-I`/`-E`) — read when executing this step. --- ## Step 3b. FP Hygiene — Placeholder & Example Exclusion A scan that flags its own placeholders erodes trust. Two **value-shape** classes are never real leaks and are dropped before the report — imported from `gstack-redact`'s canonical-example allowlist, scoped in PSA's direction to the *matched token* (not the whole line, so a real leak sharing a substring still reports): - **Angle-bracket placeholders** — the matched token is itself a placeholder (``, ``, `{project}`). PSA dogfoods these in Step 1; the scan must not report them as leaks. - **Canonical dummy values** — the matched token is a documented example/dummy (`EXAMPLE`, `dummy`, `changeme`, `REDACTED`, `xxxx`, AWS-doc keys like `AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE`). A high-entropy *example* is not a secret. This differs from the Step 2 allowlist: Step 2 suppresses by **file::token legitimacy**, Step 3b by **token value-shape**. Both run — Step 2 then Step 3b. Keep it tight (PSA's "allowlist tight" rule): if a token only *contains* an example substring but is otherwise a real private value, it still reports. > **Detail**: See `SKILL_detail.md §Step3b-FP-Hygiene-Script` — the token-shape-only extraction bash > implementation (never line-level) — read when executing this step. --- ## Step 3c. Ignore-Verification — the gitignore-mistake safeguard (root-cause, runs before Step 4) Steps 3/3b scan what **is** tracked. This step checks the inverse and the upstream cause: a file you *intend* to be private that is **not actually ignored** — the gitignore mistake that becomes tomorrow's tracked leak. For each expected-private path, `git check-ignore -v` reports whether it is ignored **and by which layer** (committed `.gitignore` · local `.git/info/exclude` · global `core.excludesFile`). A path that resolves to no ignore rule is a MISS — surface it before it is ever `git add`ed. - **OK** — ignored; the report names which layer covers it (operator-private files should resolve to `.git/info/exclude` or `.gitignore`, never end up tracked). - **MISS** — exists but no ignore rule covers it → counts as **🟠 MED** in the Step 4 verdict (a latent leak, not yet a breach). - **TRACKED** — already committed: Step 3 scans its *contents*; this also flags it for un-tracking if it was meant to be private. Tracked status is tested **before** ignore status — a file can match an ignore rule yet still be force-added (`git add -f`), the exact ignored-but-committed mechanism behind the PR #109 leak, so TRACKED must win over a false-clean OK. Why this is the safeguard for **gitignore mistakes** (a wrong assumption about what is ignored): `.gitignore` is committed/shared, `.git/info/exclude` is local/personal, and a global `core.excludesFile` ignores across all repos — `git check-ignore -v` is the one command that says *which* rule (if any) applies, so an "I thought it was ignored" error surfaces here instead of in a public PR (the PR #109 class of leak). Diagnostic-only: this step never writes — it reports, the operator adds the ignore rule. > **Detail**: See `SKILL_detail.md §Step3c-Ignore-Verification-Script` — the expected-private-path > enumeration + `git check-ignore`/`git ls-files --error-unmatch` bash implementation, bash/zsh > portability note — read when executing this step. --- ## Step 4. Report Report per-hit `file:line → matched token [class]` grouped by severity, then the overall verdict. **Verdict thresholds** (behavioral — these define the gate): - ⚪ **NOT CONFIGURED** — pattern source absent (nothing scanned — NOT a clean result; set up first) - 🟢 **CLEAN** — pattern source present (incl. empty), 0 HIGH + 0 MED + 0 LOW (after allowlist) - 🟡 **REVIEW** — 0 HIGH + 0 MED, LOW-only (drift, not a breach) - 🔴 **LEAK** — 1+ HIGH or 1+ MED (block publish / fix before commit) > **Detail**: See `SKILL_detail.md §Report-Template` — the full human-report ASCII layout (severity > buckets, allowlist-suppressed line) — read when formatting the Step 4 report. Per HIGH/MED hit, append a one-line prescription: - **HIGH (username/company)** — move the line to `CLAUDE.local.md` (or regenerate the artifact from a sanitized source); never edit-in-place if it is a generated file. - **MED (absolute path)** — replace with a relative path, a `~`-anchored path, or a `{project}` placeholder; absolute home paths are also a portability bug for external clones. - **LOW (companion-store/wiring)** — rephrase to the model-agnostic *pattern* (e.g. "a private companion store" / "the `*-be` companion pattern") instead of the literal name, unless the file is the `.gitignore` / sync script that must name it (allowlist those). **Simplification guard**: 🟢 CLEAN → collapse the report to one line: "public surface clean — 0 private tokens in {N} tracked files (X allowlist-suppressed)." Do not print empty severity buckets. --- ## Step 5. Machine Output (`--json`) — Hook-Gateable Verdict By default PSA prints the Step 4 human report. With `--json`, emit a machine-parseable verdict so a **pre-publish / pre-push hook can gate on counts mechanically** — turning PSA from advisory into enforceable (FH's "enforcement is a hook, not a prompt" principle). Imported from `gstack-redact --json`. > **Detail**: See `SKILL_detail.md §JSON-Schema` — the `--json` output object shape (findings array, > counts, verdict field) — read when emitting or parsing the machine verdict. `verdict` is one of `CLEAN | REVIEW | LEAK | NOT_CONFIGURED` (same thresholds as Step 4). **`verdict` is authoritative — never gate on `counts` alone**: a counts-only check (`HIGH==0 && MED==0`) misreads `NOT_CONFIGURED` (which also has zero counts) as a pass. A caller blocks when `verdict` is `LEAK` **or** `NOT_CONFIGURED` — an unconfigured scan is not a pass (the same silent-failure guard as the human path: absence ≠ CLEAN). --- ## Connected Skills | Situation | Connected skill | |---|---| | Broader pre-publish repo readiness (README, license, API keys) | `/marketplace-gate` (Check 5 Public Safety is the wide net; this skill is the private-token detail) | | A leak is a recurring process gap, not a one-off | log via `field-harvest` → candidate `#rule-candidate` | | Where should the leaked content actually live? | `/asset-placement-gate` (hub vs project vs CLAUDE.local.md) | | Phantom refs / stale links on the same surface | `/phantom-quench` (forward axis — orthogonal to this leak axis) | --- ## External User Environment Adaptation Usable standalone — no hub clone required. - **No companion store / no operator-private tokens** → create the pattern source **empty** to declare this explicitly; the scan then reports CLEAN. Leaving the file *absent* instead yields NOT CONFIGURED (a deliberate distinction — absence is "unknown", not "clean"). The skill is only useful once you have a public/private split to protect. - **No `.gitignore` allowlist needs** → Step 2 allowlist may be empty; every hit is then reported. --- ## Done When ``` Step 1 pattern list confirmed (defaults shown / user-adapted) + Step 2 allowlist applied + Step 3 scan run for every pattern over git ls-files (tracked only — gitignored excluded) + Step 4 report output: per-hit file:line + token + severity, plus overall verdict + "public-surface-audit Complete" declaration output ``` Verdict: **CLEAN** (0 tokens after allowlist) | **REVIEW** (LOW-only — drift, prescriptions noted) | **LEAK** (1+ HIGH or 1+ MED — block publish, prescriptions attached). --- ## Operating Notes - **Tracked-only is the point**: never scan gitignored files. A token in `CLAUDE.local.md` is correct placement, not a leak — scanning it would produce false LEAK verdicts and erode trust in the skill. - **Patterns are data, not code**: the Step 1 table is the configurable surface. A user with a different username/employer/companion-store edits the table; the scan logic is unchanged. - **Generated artifacts are real leaks**: an exported HTML/PDF carrying a username is still a public-surface leak even though hand-editing it is wrong — report it, prescribe "regenerate from sanitized source". - **Allowlist tight, not loose**: when unsure whether a reference is legitimate, report it. A false LEAK the user dismisses is cheaper than a real leak suppressed by an over-broad allowlist. - **Auto-redact deliberately not imported**: `gstack-redact` offers `--auto-redact` (rewrite + diff). PSA's philosophy is *report + prescribe; the human decides where the line goes* — auto-redacting a HIGH (username/company) hit would pre-empt that judgment, and auto-editing a generated artifact is explicitly wrong (regenerate from source). If ever imported, restrict to the MED absolute-home-path class only (mechanically safe: `/Users//` → `~/` or `{project}`), never HIGH, never generated files. --- ## Sister-Asset Provenance Step 3b (FP hygiene) and Step 5 (`--json`) were imported from **garrytan/gstack** `gstack-redact` during a 2026-06-06 sister-asset cross-audit. > **Detail**: See `SKILL_detail.md §Sister-Asset-Provenance` — the full import provenance (source file, > ontology adaptation, orthogonal-coverage rationale, reverse-contribution candidate) — read when tracing > or extending the gstack-redact lineage.