/* * mod_openssl - openssl support for lighttpd * * Fully-rewritten from original * Copyright(c) 2016 Glenn Strauss gstrauss()gluelogic.com All rights reserved * License: BSD 3-clause (same as lighttpd) */ /* * Note: If session tickets are -not- disabled with * ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd = ("Options" => "-SessionTicket") * mod_openssl rotates server ticket encryption key (STEK) every 8 hours * and keeps the prior two STEKs around, so ticket lifetime is 24 hours. * This is fine for use with a single lighttpd instance, but with multiple * lighttpd workers, no coordinated STEK (server ticket encryption key) * rotation occurs unless ssl.stek-file is defined and maintained (preferred), * or if some external job restarts lighttpd. Restarting lighttpd generates a * new key that is shared by lighttpd workers for the lifetime of the new key. * If the rotation period expires and lighttpd has not been restarted, and if * ssl.stek-file is not in use, then lighttpd workers will generate new * independent keys, making session tickets less effective for session * resumption, since clients have a lower chance for future connections to * reach the same lighttpd worker. However, things will still work, and a new * session will be created if session resumption fails. Admins should plan to * restart lighttpd at least every 8 hours if session tickets are enabled and * multiple lighttpd workers are configured. Since that is likely disruptive, * if multiple lighttpd workers are configured, ssl.stek-file should be * defined and the file maintained externally. */ #include "first.h" #include #include #include "sys-time.h" #include #include #include #include #include /*(not needed)*/ /* correction; needed for: * SSL_load_client_CA_file() * X509_STORE_load_locations() */ /*#define OPENSSL_NO_STDIO*/ #ifndef HAVE_KRB5 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 #define OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 #endif #endif #ifdef BORINGSSL_API_VERSION #undef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO /* for X509_STORE_load_locations() */ #endif #ifdef _WIN32 #include #include #undef OCSP_REQUEST /*(defined in wincrypt.h)*/ #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP #include #endif #ifdef BORINGSSL_API_VERSION #include /* BoringSSL purports to have some OCSP support */ #undef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH #include #endif #endif /* check defines from for experimental ECH support */ #if !defined(SSL_OP_ECH_GREASE) && !defined(SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED) #define OPENSSL_NO_ECH #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH /*#define LIGHTTPD_OPENSSL_ECH_DEBUG*/ /*(ECH developer debug trace)*/ #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) #include #ifndef TLSEXT_TYPE_ech #define TLSEXT_TYPE_ech TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello #endif #ifndef OSSL_ECH_FOR_RETRY #define OSSL_ECH_FOR_RETRY 1 #endif #ifndef SSL_ECH_STATUS_SUCCESS #define SSL_ECH_STATUS_SUCCESS 1 #endif #else #include #endif #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L #include #include #endif #include "base.h" #include "ck.h" #include "fdevent.h" #include "http_date.h" #include "http_header.h" #include "http_kv.h" #include "log.h" #include "plugin.h" #include "sock_addr.h" #ifdef BORINGSSL_API_VERSION #include "base64.h" #endif typedef struct mod_openssl_kp { EVP_PKEY *ssl_pemfile_pkey; X509 *ssl_pemfile_x509; STACK_OF(X509) *ssl_pemfile_chain; buffer *ssl_stapling_der; int refcnt; int8_t must_staple; int8_t self_issued; unix_time64_t ssl_stapling_loadts; unix_time64_t ssl_stapling_nextts; struct mod_openssl_kp *next; } mod_openssl_kp; typedef struct { /* SNI per host: with COMP_SERVER_SOCKET, COMP_HTTP_SCHEME, COMP_HTTP_HOST */ mod_openssl_kp *kp; /* parsed public/private key structures */ const buffer *ssl_pemfile; const buffer *ssl_privkey; const buffer *ssl_stapling_file; unix_time64_t pkey_ts; } plugin_cert; typedef struct { SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx; plugin_cert *pc; mod_openssl_kp *kp; buffer *ech_keydir; uint32_t ech_keydir_refresh_interval; unix_time64_t ech_keydir_refresh_ts; const array *ech_public_hosts; } plugin_ssl_ctx; typedef struct { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names; X509_STORE *store; const char *crl_file; unix_time64_t crl_loadts; } plugin_cacerts; typedef struct { SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx; /* output from network_init_ssl() */ /*(used only during startup; not patched)*/ unsigned char ssl_enabled; /* only interesting for setting up listening sockets. don't use at runtime */ unsigned char ssl_honor_cipher_order; /* determine SSL cipher in server-preferred order, not client-order */ const buffer *ssl_cipher_list; array *ssl_conf_cmd; array *ech_opts; /*(copied from plugin_data for socket ssl_ctx config)*/ plugin_cert *pc; const plugin_cacerts *ssl_ca_file; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ssl_ca_dn_file; const buffer *ssl_ca_crl_file; unsigned char ssl_verifyclient; unsigned char ssl_verifyclient_enforce; unsigned char ssl_verifyclient_depth; unsigned char ssl_read_ahead; } plugin_config_socket; /*(used at startup during configuration)*/ typedef struct { /* SNI per host: w/ COMP_SERVER_SOCKET, COMP_HTTP_SCHEME, COMP_HTTP_HOST */ plugin_cert *pc; const plugin_cacerts *ssl_ca_file; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ssl_ca_dn_file; const buffer *ssl_ca_crl_file; unsigned char ssl_verifyclient; unsigned char ssl_verifyclient_enforce; unsigned char ssl_verifyclient_depth; unsigned char ssl_verifyclient_export_cert; unsigned char ssl_read_ahead; unsigned char ssl_log_noise; const buffer *ssl_verifyclient_username; const buffer *ssl_acme_tls_1; } plugin_config; typedef struct { PLUGIN_DATA; plugin_ssl_ctx **ssl_ctxs; plugin_config defaults; server *srv; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000 || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) array *cafiles; #endif array *ech_only_hosts; const char *ssl_stek_file; } plugin_data; static int ssl_is_init; #ifdef SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS /* openssl 3.0.0 */ static int ktls_enable; #endif /* need assigned p->id for deep access of module handler_ctx for connection * i.e. handler_ctx *hctx = con->plugin_ctx[plugin_data_singleton->id]; */ static plugin_data *plugin_data_singleton; #define LOCAL_SEND_BUFSIZE (16 * 1024) static char *local_send_buffer; static int feature_refresh_certs; static int feature_refresh_crls; typedef struct { SSL *ssl; request_st *r; connection *con; short renegotiations; /* count of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START */ short close_notify; uint8_t alpn; uint8_t ech_only_policy; plugin_config conf; log_error_st *errh; mod_openssl_kp *kp; plugin_cert *ssl_ctx_pc; const array *ech_only_hosts; const array *ech_public_hosts; } handler_ctx; __attribute_cold__ static mod_openssl_kp * mod_openssl_kp_init (void) { mod_openssl_kp * const kp = ck_calloc(1, sizeof(*kp)); kp->refcnt = 1; return kp; } __attribute_cold__ static void mod_openssl_kp_free (mod_openssl_kp *kp) { EVP_PKEY_free(kp->ssl_pemfile_pkey); X509_free(kp->ssl_pemfile_x509); sk_X509_pop_free(kp->ssl_pemfile_chain, X509_free); buffer_free(kp->ssl_stapling_der); free(kp); } static mod_openssl_kp * mod_openssl_kp_acq (plugin_cert *pc) { mod_openssl_kp *kp = pc->kp; ++kp->refcnt; return kp; } static void mod_openssl_kp_rel (mod_openssl_kp *kp) { --kp->refcnt; } static handler_ctx * handler_ctx_init (void) { return ck_calloc(1, sizeof(handler_ctx)); } static void handler_ctx_free (handler_ctx *hctx) { if (hctx->ssl) SSL_free(hctx->ssl); if (hctx->kp) mod_openssl_kp_rel(hctx->kp); free(hctx); } static int mod_openssl_SSL_CTX_use_cert_and_key (SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, plugin_cert *pc, mod_openssl_kp *kp) { /* note: caller is responsible for refcnt on pc->kp; * openssl keeps its own internal refcnt on objects */ UNUSED(pc); /*(used below if openssl < 1.0.2)*/ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000 \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ && !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) return SSL_CTX_use_cert_and_key(ssl_ctx, kp->ssl_pemfile_x509, kp->ssl_pemfile_pkey, kp->ssl_pemfile_chain, 1); #else #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 \ && (!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL) if (1 != SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ssl_ctx, kp->ssl_pemfile_x509)) return 0; if (kp->ssl_pemfile_chain) SSL_CTX_set1_chain(ssl_ctx, kp->ssl_pemfile_chain); #else if (1 != SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ssl_ctx, pc->ssl_pemfile->ptr)) return 0; #endif if (1 != SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, kp->ssl_pemfile_pkey)) return 0; return SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx); #endif } static int mod_openssl_SSL_use_cert_and_key (SSL *ssl, plugin_cert *pc, mod_openssl_kp *kp) { /* note: caller is responsible for refcnt on pc->kp; * openssl keeps its own internal refcnt on objects */ UNUSED(pc); /*(used below if openssl < 1.0.2)*/ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000 \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ && !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) return SSL_use_cert_and_key(ssl, kp->ssl_pemfile_x509, kp->ssl_pemfile_pkey, kp->ssl_pemfile_chain, 1); #else #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 \ && (!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL) if (1 != SSL_use_certificate(ssl, kp->ssl_pemfile_x509)) return 0; if (kp->ssl_pemfile_chain) SSL_set1_chain(ssl, kp->ssl_pemfile_chain); #else if (1 != SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(ssl, pc->ssl_pemfile->ptr)) return 0; #endif if (1 != SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, kp->ssl_pemfile_pkey)) return 0; return SSL_check_private_key(ssl); #endif } #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket /* ssl/ssl_local.h */ #define TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH 16 #define TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH 32 /* openssl has a huge number of interfaces, but not the most useful; * construct our own session ticket encryption key structure */ typedef struct tlsext_ticket_key_st { unix_time64_t active_ts; /* tickets not issued w/ key until activation ts*/ unix_time64_t expire_ts; /* key not valid after expiration timestamp */ unsigned char tick_key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; unsigned char tick_hmac_key[TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char tick_aes_key[TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH]; } tlsext_ticket_key_t; static tlsext_ticket_key_t session_ticket_keys[4]; static unix_time64_t stek_rotate_ts; static int mod_openssl_session_ticket_key_generate (unix_time64_t active_ts, unix_time64_t expire_ts) { /* openssl RAND_*bytes() functions are called multiple times since the * funcs might have a 32-byte limit on number of bytes returned each call * * (Note: session ticket encryption key generation is not expected to fail) * * 3 keys are stored in session_ticket_keys[] * The 4th element of session_ticket_keys[] is used for STEK construction */ /*(RAND_priv_bytes() not in openssl 1.1.0; introduced in openssl 1.1.1)*/ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10101000L \ || defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) #define RAND_priv_bytes(x,sz) RAND_bytes((x),(sz)) #endif if (RAND_bytes(session_ticket_keys[3].tick_key_name, TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0 || RAND_priv_bytes(session_ticket_keys[3].tick_hmac_key, TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH) <= 0 || RAND_priv_bytes(session_ticket_keys[3].tick_aes_key, TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH) <= 0) return 0; session_ticket_keys[3].active_ts = active_ts; session_ticket_keys[3].expire_ts = expire_ts; return 1; } static void mod_openssl_session_ticket_key_rotate (void) { /* discard oldest key (session_ticket_keys[2]) and put newest key first * 3 keys are stored in session_ticket_keys[0], [1], [2] * session_ticket_keys[3] is used to construct and pass new STEK */ session_ticket_keys[2] = session_ticket_keys[1]; session_ticket_keys[1] = session_ticket_keys[0]; /*memmove(session_ticket_keys+1, session_ticket_keys+0, sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key_t)*2);*/ session_ticket_keys[0] = session_ticket_keys[3]; OPENSSL_cleanse(session_ticket_keys+3, sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key_t)); } static tlsext_ticket_key_t * tlsext_ticket_key_get (void) { const unix_time64_t cur_ts = log_epoch_secs; const int e = sizeof(session_ticket_keys)/sizeof(*session_ticket_keys) - 1; for (int i = 0; i < e; ++i) { if (session_ticket_keys[i].active_ts > cur_ts) continue; if (session_ticket_keys[i].expire_ts < cur_ts) continue; return &session_ticket_keys[i]; } return NULL; } static tlsext_ticket_key_t * tlsext_ticket_key_find (unsigned char key_name[16], int *refresh) { *refresh = 0; const unix_time64_t cur_ts = log_epoch_secs; const int e = sizeof(session_ticket_keys)/sizeof(*session_ticket_keys) - 1; for (int i = 0; i < e; ++i) { if (session_ticket_keys[i].expire_ts < cur_ts) continue; if (0 == memcmp(session_ticket_keys[i].tick_key_name, key_name, 16)) return &session_ticket_keys[i]; if (session_ticket_keys[i].active_ts <= cur_ts) *refresh = 1; /* newer active key is available */ } return NULL; } static void tlsext_ticket_wipe_expired (const unix_time64_t cur_ts) { const int e = sizeof(session_ticket_keys)/sizeof(*session_ticket_keys) - 1; for (int i = 0; i < e; ++i) { if (session_ticket_keys[i].expire_ts != 0 && session_ticket_keys[i].expire_ts < cur_ts) OPENSSL_cleanse(session_ticket_keys+i, sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key_t)); } } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L /* based on reference implementation from openssl 1.1.1g man page * man SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb * but mod_openssl code uses EVP_aes_256_cbc() instead of EVP_aes_128_cbc() */ static int ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb (SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) #else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L */ /* based on reference implementation from openssl 3.0.0 man page * man SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb */ static int ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, EVP_MAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) #endif { UNUSED(s); if (enc) { /* create new session */ tlsext_ticket_key_t *k = tlsext_ticket_key_get(); if (NULL == k) return 0; /* current key does not exist or is not valid */ memcpy(key_name, k->tick_key_name, 16); if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) <= 0) return -1; /* insufficient random */ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, k->tick_aes_key, iv); #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, k->tick_hmac_key, sizeof(k->tick_hmac_key), EVP_sha256(), NULL); #else OSSL_PARAM params[] = { OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING, k->tick_hmac_key, sizeof(k->tick_hmac_key)), OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING, "sha256", sizeof("sha256")), OSSL_PARAM_END }; EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx, params); #endif return 1; } else { /* retrieve session */ int refresh; tlsext_ticket_key_t *k = tlsext_ticket_key_find(key_name, &refresh); if (NULL == k) return 0; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, k->tick_hmac_key, sizeof(k->tick_hmac_key), EVP_sha256(), NULL); #else OSSL_PARAM params[] = { OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING, k->tick_hmac_key, sizeof(k->tick_hmac_key)), OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING, "sha256", sizeof("sha256")), OSSL_PARAM_END }; EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx, params); #endif EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, k->tick_aes_key, iv); return refresh ? 2 : 1; /* 'refresh' will trigger issuing new ticket for session * even though the current ticket is still valid */ } } static int mod_openssl_session_ticket_key_file (const char *fn) { /* session ticket encryption key (STEK) * * STEK file should be stored in non-persistent storage, * e.g. /dev/shm/lighttpd/stek-file (in memory) * with appropriate permissions set to keep stek-file from being * read by other users. Where possible, systems should also be * configured without swap. * * admin should schedule an independent job to periodically * generate new STEK up to 3 times during key lifetime * (lighttpd stores up to 3 keys) * * format of binary file is: * 4-byte - format version (always 0; for use if format changes) * 4-byte - activation timestamp * 4-byte - expiration timestamp * 16-byte - session ticket key name * 32-byte - session ticket HMAC encrpytion key * 32-byte - session ticket AES encrpytion key * * STEK file can be created with a command such as: * dd if=/dev/random bs=1 count=80 status=none | \ * perl -e 'print pack("iii",0,time()+300,time()+86400),<>' \ * > STEK-file.$$ && mv STEK-file.$$ STEK-file * * The above delays activation time by 5 mins (+300 sec) to allow file to * be propagated to other machines. (admin must handle this independently) * If STEK generation is performed immediately prior to starting lighttpd, * admin should activate keys immediately (without +300). */ int buf[23]; /* 92 bytes */ int rc = 0; /*(will retry on next check interval upon any error)*/ if (0 != fdevent_load_file_bytes((char *)buf,(off_t)sizeof(buf),0,fn,NULL)) return rc; if (buf[0] == 0) { /*(format version 0)*/ session_ticket_keys[3].active_ts = TIME64_CAST(buf[1]); session_ticket_keys[3].expire_ts = TIME64_CAST(buf[2]); #ifndef __COVERITY__ /* intentional; hide from Coverity Scan */ /* intentionally copy 80 bytes into consecutive arrays * tick_key_name[], tick_hmac_key[], tick_aes_key[] */ memcpy(&session_ticket_keys[3].tick_key_name, buf+3, 80); #endif rc = 1; } OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf)); return rc; } static void mod_openssl_session_ticket_key_check (const plugin_data *p, const unix_time64_t cur_ts) { static unix_time64_t detect_retrograde_ts; if (detect_retrograde_ts > cur_ts && detect_retrograde_ts - cur_ts > 28800) stek_rotate_ts = 0; detect_retrograde_ts = cur_ts; int rotate = 0; if (p->ssl_stek_file) { struct stat st; if (0 == stat(p->ssl_stek_file, &st) && TIME64_CAST(st.st_mtime) > stek_rotate_ts) rotate = mod_openssl_session_ticket_key_file(p->ssl_stek_file); tlsext_ticket_wipe_expired(cur_ts); } else if (cur_ts - 28800 >= stek_rotate_ts || 0 == stek_rotate_ts)/*(8 hrs)*/ rotate = mod_openssl_session_ticket_key_generate(cur_ts, cur_ts+86400); if (rotate) { mod_openssl_session_ticket_key_rotate(); stek_rotate_ts = cur_ts; } } #endif /* TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP #ifndef BORINGSSL_API_VERSION /* BoringSSL suggests using different API */ static int ssl_tlsext_status_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { #ifdef SSL_get_tlsext_status_type if (TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp != SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(ssl)) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; /* ignore if not client OCSP request */ #endif handler_ctx *hctx = (handler_ctx *) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); if (NULL == hctx->kp) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;/*should not happen*/ buffer *ssl_stapling = hctx->kp->ssl_stapling_der; if (NULL == ssl_stapling) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; UNUSED(arg); int len = (int)buffer_clen(ssl_stapling); /* OpenSSL and LibreSSL require copy (BoringSSL, too, if using compat API)*/ uint8_t *ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (NULL == ocsp_resp) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; /* ignore OCSP request if error occurs */ memcpy(ocsp_resp, ssl_stapling->ptr, len); /* (openssl library keeps refcnts on its objects) */ mod_openssl_kp_rel(hctx->kp); hctx->kp = NULL; if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, ocsp_resp, len)) { log_error(hctx->r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: failed to set OCSP response for TLS server name %s: %s", hctx->r->uri.authority.ptr, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); OPENSSL_free(ocsp_resp); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; /* ignore OCSP request if error occurs */ /*return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;*/ } return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH #ifdef LIGHTTPD_OPENSSL_ECH_DEBUG #if !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) static void ech_key_status_trace (server * const srv, OSSL_ECHSTORE * const es) { int numkeys = 0; int ksrv = OSSL_ECHSTORE_num_keys(es, &numkeys); if (ksrv != 1) log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: OSSL_ECHSTORE_num_keys failed (%d)", ksrv); else log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: OSSL_ECHSTORE_num_keys number of keys loaded %d", numkeys); } #endif #endif __attribute_pure__ static const buffer * mod_openssl_refresh_ech_key_is_ech_only(plugin_ssl_ctx * const s, const char * const h, size_t hlen) { /* (similar to mod_openssl_ech_only(), but without hctx) */ const array * const ech_only_hosts = plugin_data_singleton->ech_only_hosts; if (ech_only_hosts) { const data_unset *du = array_get_element_klen(ech_only_hosts, h, hlen); if (du) return &((const data_string *)du)->value; } const array * const ech_public_hosts = s->ech_public_hosts; if (ech_public_hosts && NULL == array_get_element_klen(ech_public_hosts, h, hlen)) { /*(return first host in ech_public_hosts list as public-name)*/ return &ech_public_hosts->data[0]->key; } return NULL; } #define PEM_BEGIN_PKEY "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----" #define PEM_END_PKEY "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----" #define PEM_BEGIN_ECHCONFIG "-----BEGIN ECHCONFIG-----" #define PEM_END_ECHCONFIG "-----END ECHCONFIG-----" #include "sys-dirent.h" static int mod_openssl_refresh_ech_keys_ctx (server * const srv, plugin_ssl_ctx * const s, const unix_time64_t cur_ts) { if (NULL == s->ech_keydir) return 1; if (0 != s->ech_keydir_refresh_ts && s->ech_keydir_refresh_ts + s->ech_keydir_refresh_interval > cur_ts) return 1; /* collect *.ech from s->ech_keydir * order matters, so load into array for predictable ordering * and allow admin to name files with prefixes for desired order * (note: array uses case-insensitive sort) */ array a = { NULL, NULL, 0, 0 }; buffer * const kp = s->ech_keydir; const uint32_t dirlen = buffer_clen(kp); DIR * const dp = opendir(kp->ptr); if (NULL == dp) { log_perror(srv->errh,__FILE__,__LINE__,"%s dir:%s",__func__,kp->ptr); return 0; } unix_time64_t lmod = 0; struct stat st; for (struct dirent *ep; (ep = readdir(dp)); ) { uint32_t nlen = (uint32_t)_D_EXACT_NAMLEN(ep); if (nlen > 4 && 0 == memcmp(ep->d_name+nlen-4, ".ech", 4) && ep->d_name[0] != '.' && 0 == stat(kp->ptr, &st)) { *(array_get_int_ptr(&a, ep->d_name, nlen)) = TIME64_CAST(st.st_mtime) > 1 ? (int)st.st_mtime : 2; if (lmod < TIME64_CAST(st.st_mtime)) lmod = TIME64_CAST(st.st_mtime); } } closedir(dp); if (s->ech_keydir_refresh_ts > lmod) { s->ech_keydir_refresh_ts = cur_ts; array_free_data(&a); return 1; /* no changes since last refresh */ } /* walk sorted list, change array values from mtime to retry config flag */ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < a.used; ++i) { buffer * const n = &a.sorted[i]->key; int *v = &((data_integer *)a.sorted[i])->value; /* (arbitrary convention: allow tag prefix followed by '@' for sort) */ const char *h = strchr(n->ptr, '@'); uint32_t hlen = buffer_clen(n); if (h) hlen -= (uint32_t)(++h - n->ptr); else h = n->ptr; hlen -= (hlen > 8 && 0 == memcmp(h+hlen-8, ".pem", 4)) ? 8 : 4; for (uint32_t j = i+1; j < a.used; ++j) { /* detect if value already converted to retry config flag */ int * const nv = &((data_integer *)a.sorted[j])->value; if (*nv == 0 || *nv == OSSL_ECH_FOR_RETRY) continue; const buffer * const next = &a.sorted[j]->key; const char *nh = strchr(next->ptr, '@'); uint32_t nhlen = buffer_clen(next); if (nh) nhlen -= (uint32_t)(++nh - next->ptr); else nh = next->ptr; nhlen -= (nhlen > 8 && 0 == memcmp(nh+nhlen-8, ".pem", 4)) ? 8 : 4; if (nhlen != hlen || 0 != memcmp(nh, h, hlen)) continue; if (*(unsigned int *)v < *(unsigned int *)nv) { *v = 0; v = nv; } else { ((data_integer *)a.sorted[j])->value = 0; } } /* set retry config flag if newest entry for host and no alternate * fallback host; do not set retry config for older keys */ const buffer * const fallback = mod_openssl_refresh_ech_key_is_ech_only(s, h, hlen); *v = fallback ? 0 : OSSL_ECH_FOR_RETRY; } #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys = SSL_ECH_KEYS_new(); if (keys == NULL) { array_free_data(&a); return 0; } int rc = 1; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < a.used; ++i) { buffer * const n = &a.sorted[i]->key; buffer_append_path_len(kp, BUF_PTR_LEN(n)); /* *.ech */ int rv = 0; off_t dlen = 64*1024;/*(arbitrary limit: 64 KB file; expect < 1 KB)*/ char *data = fdevent_load_file(kp->ptr, &dlen, srv->errh, malloc, free); EVP_HPKE_KEY key; EVP_HPKE_KEY_zero(&key); buffer * const tb = srv->tmp_buf; buffer_clear(tb); do { if (NULL == data) break; char *b, *e; uint32_t len; b = strstr(data, PEM_BEGIN_PKEY); if (NULL == b) break; b += sizeof(PEM_BEGIN_PKEY)-1; if (*b == '\r') ++b; if (*b == '\n') ++b; e = strstr(b, PEM_END_PKEY); if (NULL == e) break; len = (uint32_t)(e - b); buffer_clear(tb); if (NULL == buffer_append_base64_decode(tb,b,len,BASE64_STANDARD)) break; const uint8_t *x = (uint8_t *)tb->ptr; EVP_PKEY *pkey = d2i_AutoPrivateKey(NULL,&x,(long)buffer_clen(tb)); /*(BoringSSL tools/bssl outputs raw pkey; * handle if that output is subsequently base64-encoded raw pkey)*/ /*if (NULL == pkey) break;*/ const EVP_HPKE_KEM * const kem = (pkey == NULL) ? EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256() : EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_X25519 /* NID_X25519 */ ? EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256() : EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC /* NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey */ ? EVP_hpke_p256_hkdf_sha256() : NULL; if (NULL == kem) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); break; } size_t out_len = buffer_clen(tb); /*(large enough)*/ rv = (pkey) ? EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, (uint8_t *)tb->ptr, &out_len) : 1; EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (0 == rv) break; rv = 0; EVP_HPKE_KEY_zero(&key); if (!EVP_HPKE_KEY_init(&key, kem, (uint8_t *)tb->ptr, out_len)) break; ck_memzero(tb->ptr, buffer_clen(tb)); b = strstr(data, PEM_BEGIN_ECHCONFIG); if (NULL == b) break; b += sizeof(PEM_BEGIN_ECHCONFIG)-1; if (*b == '\r') ++b; if (*b == '\n') ++b; e = strstr(b, PEM_END_ECHCONFIG); if (NULL == e) break; len = (uint32_t)(e - b); buffer_clear(tb); if (NULL == buffer_append_base64_decode(tb,b,len,BASE64_STANDARD)) break; /* OpenSSL tool 'openssl ech' ECHConfig begins with 2-byte len; * BoringSSL 'tool/bssl generate-ech' ECHConfig does not */ if (buffer_clen(tb) > 2 && (uint32_t)((tb->ptr[0]<<4)|tb->ptr[1]) == buffer_clen(tb)-2){ memmove(tb->ptr, tb->ptr+2, buffer_clen(tb)-2); buffer_truncate(tb, buffer_clen(tb)-2); } const int is_retry_config = ((data_integer *)a.sorted[i])->value; rv = SSL_ECH_KEYS_add(keys, is_retry_config, (uint8_t *)BUF_PTR_LEN(tb), &key); } while (0); ck_memzero(tb->ptr, buffer_clen(tb)); EVP_HPKE_KEY_cleanup(&key); if (dlen) ck_memzero(data, dlen); free(data); if (0 == rv) { char buf[128]; ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf)); log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s: %s", kp->ptr, buf); rc = 0; } buffer_truncate(kp, dirlen); } if (1 != SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys(s->ssl_ctx, keys)) rc = 0; SSL_ECH_KEYS_free(keys); #else /* !BORINGSSL_API_VERSION */ OSSL_ECHSTORE * const es = OSSL_ECHSTORE_new(NULL, NULL); if (es == NULL) { array_free_data(&a); return 0; } /* load all echconfig files matching *.ech */ int rc = 1; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < a.used; ++i) { buffer * const n = &a.sorted[i]->key; buffer_append_path_len(kp, BUF_PTR_LEN(n)); /* *.ech */ BIO *in = BIO_new_file(kp->ptr, "r"); const int is_retry_config = ((data_integer *)a.sorted[i])->value; if (in != NULL && 1 == OSSL_ECHSTORE_read_pem(es, in, is_retry_config)) { #ifdef LIGHTTPD_OPENSSL_ECH_DEBUG log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: OSSL_ECHSTORE_read_pem() worked for %s", kp->ptr); #endif } else { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: OSSL_ECHSTORE_read_pem() failed for %s", kp->ptr); rc = 0; } BIO_free_all(in); buffer_truncate(kp, dirlen); } if (1 != SSL_CTX_set1_echstore(s->ssl_ctx, es)) rc = 0; #ifdef LIGHTTPD_OPENSSL_ECH_DEBUG else ech_key_status_trace(srv, es); #endif OSSL_ECHSTORE_free(es); #endif /* !BORINGSSL_API_VERSION */ array_free_data(&a); if (1 == rc) s->ech_keydir_refresh_ts = cur_ts; return rc; } static void mod_openssl_refresh_ech_keys (server * const srv, const plugin_data *p, const unix_time64_t cur_ts) { if (NULL != p->ssl_ctxs) { /* refresh ech keys (if not copy of global scope) */ for (uint32_t i = 1; i < srv->config_context->used; ++i) { plugin_ssl_ctx * const s = p->ssl_ctxs[i]; if (s && s != p->ssl_ctxs[0]) mod_openssl_refresh_ech_keys_ctx(srv, s, cur_ts); } /* refresh ech keys from global scope */ if (p->ssl_ctxs[0]) mod_openssl_refresh_ech_keys_ctx(srv, p->ssl_ctxs[0], cur_ts); } } #ifdef LIGHTTPD_OPENSSL_ECH_DEBUG #if !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) __attribute_const__ static const char * ech_status_str (int status) { #define s(x) #x switch (status) { case SSL_ECH_STATUS_BACKEND: return s(SSL_ECH_STATUS_BACKEND); case SSL_ECH_STATUS_GREASE_ECH:return s(SSL_ECH_STATUS_GREASE_ECH); case SSL_ECH_STATUS_GREASE: return s(SSL_ECH_STATUS_GREASE); case SSL_ECH_STATUS_SUCCESS: return s(SSL_ECH_STATUS_SUCCESS); case SSL_ECH_STATUS_FAILED: return s(SSL_ECH_STATUS_FAILED); case SSL_ECH_STATUS_BAD_CALL: return s(SSL_ECH_STATUS_BAD_CALL); case SSL_ECH_STATUS_NOT_TRIED: return s(SSL_ECH_STATUS_NOT_TRIED); case SSL_ECH_STATUS_BAD_NAME: return s(SSL_ECH_STATUS_BAD_NAME); case SSL_ECH_STATUS_NOT_CONFIGURED: return s(SSL_ECH_STATUS_NOT_CONFIGURED); case SSL_ECH_STATUS_FAILED_ECH:return s(SSL_ECH_STATUS_FAILED_ECH); case SSL_ECH_STATUS_FAILED_ECH_BAD_NAME: return s(SL_ECH_STATUS_FAILED_ECH_BAD_NAME); default: return NULL; } #undef s } static void ech_status_trace(request_st *r, SSL *ssl) { char *sni_ech = NULL; char *sni_clr = NULL; int status = SSL_ech_get1_status(ssl, &sni_ech, &sni_clr); const char *str = ech_status_str(status); const char *ech = sni_ech ? sni_ech : ""; const char *clr = sni_clr ? sni_clr : ""; if (str) log_error(r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ech_status: %s sni_clr: %s sni_ech: %s", str, clr, ech); else log_error(r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ech_status: %d sni_clr: %s sni_ech: %s", status, clr, ech); OPENSSL_free(sni_ech); OPENSSL_free(sni_clr); } static unsigned int mod_openssl_ech_cb (SSL * const ssl, const char * const str) { /*(callback is run after successful ECH extension decryption)*/ UNUSED(ssl); UNUSED(str); #ifdef LIGHTTPD_OPENSSL_ECH_DEBUG handler_ctx * const hctx = (handler_ctx *) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); ech_status_trace(hctx->r, ssl); #endif return 1; } #endif /* !BORING_API_VERSION */ #endif /* LIGHTTPD_OPENSSL_ECH_DEBUG */ __attribute_pure__ static const buffer * mod_openssl_ech_only (const handler_ctx * const hctx, const char * const h, size_t hlen) { /* design choice: match host SNI without port * (ech_only_hosts also have port stripped from config string at startup) * (might consider being more precise if sni_ech is canonicalized w/ port * if non-default port) */ const char * const colon = memchr(h, ':', hlen); if (colon) hlen = (size_t)(colon - h); const array * const ech_only_hosts = hctx->ech_only_hosts; const array * const ech_public_hosts = hctx->ech_public_hosts; /*("outer")*/ if (ech_only_hosts) { const data_unset *du = array_get_element_klen(ech_only_hosts, h, hlen); if (du) return &((const data_string *)du)->value; } if (ech_public_hosts && NULL == array_get_element_klen(ech_public_hosts, h, hlen)) { /*(return first host in ech_public_hosts list as public-name)*/ return &ech_public_hosts->data[0]->key; } return NULL; } __attribute_pure__ static int mod_openssl_ech_only_host_match (const char *a, size_t alen, const char *b, size_t blen) { /* compare two host strings * - host strings with port must match exactly * - host strings without port must match exactly * - host string without port must prefix-match host string with port * This comparison tries to do this right thing with regards to what is * generally expected when a port is not provided (for whatever reason), * but does not reject the case where two ECH-only hosts with the same * name, but different ports, are independent rather than the same site */ if (alen == blen) return (0 == memcmp(a, b, alen)); /* chk exact match */ /* make a longer string, b shorter string, and len the prefix len */ size_t len = blen; if (alen < blen) { len = alen; const char *t = b; b = a; a = t; } if (a[len] == ':' && 0 == memcmp(a, b, len)) { for (a += len + 1; light_isdigit(*a); ++a) ; return (*a == '\0'); /* chk prefix match, then port num */ } return 0; } __attribute_cold__ __attribute_noinline__ static handler_t mod_openssl_ech_only_policy_check (request_st * const r, handler_ctx * const hctx) { if (NULL == r->http_host) return HANDLER_GO_ON; /* ignore HTTP/1.0 without Host: header */ char *sni_ech = NULL; char *sni_clr = NULL; handler_t rc = HANDLER_GO_ON; #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) switch (SSL_ech_accepted(hctx->ssl)) #else switch (SSL_ech_get1_status(hctx->ssl, &sni_ech, &sni_clr)) #endif { case SSL_ECH_STATUS_SUCCESS: /* require that request :authority (Host) match SNI in ECH to avoid one * ECH-provided host testing for existence of another ECH-only host. * 'sni_ech' is assumed normalized since ECH decryption succeeded. */ { #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) const char *ech = SSL_get_servername(hctx->ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); #else const char *ech = sni_ech; #endif if (mod_openssl_ech_only_host_match(BUF_PTR_LEN(r->http_host), ech, strlen(ech))) break; } /* allow r->http_host to not match ECH SNI only if * r->http_host is in explicit list of public names (if defined) * (avoid leaking r->http_host is ECH-only; * do not use mod_openssl_ech_only() here) */ if (hctx->ech_public_hosts) { /* (XXX: not done: adjust length to omit :port from r->http_host)*/ if (NULL != array_get_element_klen(hctx->ech_public_hosts, BUF_PTR_LEN(r->http_host))) break; } /* XXX: 421 here exposes that some ECH-only vhosts exist on this server, * though not which virtual hosts. Alternative: fall through to the * default case below? Doing so from here would cause the code below * to use the inner SNI for BoringSSL, and the outer SNI for OpenSSL. * What are we trying to protect? If protecting the contents, then * mod_auth or other authorization mechanisms should be preferred over * hidden ECH-host. If protecting SNI, then that was already done in * the initial ECH, even though to a different vhost. If there is a * super-secret ECH key and ECHConfig for an ECH-only host and that * ECHConfig is not public, but was distributed out-of-band, then we * would not want to expose its existence to a connection which did not * use ECH, or which did use ECH but with ECHConfig from a different * anonymity set instead of the super-secret ECHConfig. * Should we add config option to disable this 421 policy response? */ r->http_status = 421; /* Misdirected Request */ rc = HANDLER_FINISHED; break; /*case SSL_ECH_STATUS_NOT_TRIED:*/ default: if (0 == r->loops_per_request) { /* avoid acknowledging existence of ECH-only host in request * if connection not ECH and some hosts configured ECH-only */ /* always restart request once to minimize timing differences */ /* always attempt to do equivalent work, even if wasteful */ /* always attempt to provide same behavior for authority in * request whether or not it matches cleartext SNI */ /* (r->uri.authority is ECH-only if redo_host *is not* NULL) */ const buffer *redo_host = mod_openssl_ech_only(hctx, BUF_PTR_LEN(&r->uri.authority)); buffer * const http_host = r->http_host; const char *clr = sni_clr ? sni_clr : SSL_get_servername(hctx->ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); if (NULL != clr) { buffer * const tb = r->tmp_buf;/*(normalized in policy checks)*/ buffer_copy_string_len_lc(tb, clr, strlen(clr)); if (0 != http_request_host_policy(tb, r->conf.http_parseopts, 443)){ r->http_status = 400; rc = HANDLER_FINISHED; break; } const buffer * const redo_host_sni = mod_openssl_ech_only(hctx, BUF_PTR_LEN(tb)); redo_host = (NULL != redo_host) ? (NULL == redo_host_sni) ? tb : redo_host_sni : http_host; } else if (NULL == redo_host) redo_host = http_host; /* always copy r->http_host; avoid memcpy UB if copying over self */ buffer_copy_buffer(http_host != redo_host ? http_host : r->tmp_buf, redo_host); /* always normalize port, if not 443 */ const server_socket * const srv_sock = r->con->srv_socket; if (sock_addr_get_port(&srv_sock->addr) != 443) { const char * const colon = strchr(http_host->ptr, ':'); if (colon) buffer_string_set_length(http_host, colon - http_host->ptr); const buffer * const srv_token = srv_sock->srv_token; const size_t o = srv_sock->srv_token_colon; const size_t n = buffer_string_length(srv_token) - o; buffer_append_string_len(http_host, srv_token->ptr+o, n); } ++r->loops_per_request; rc = HANDLER_COMEBACK; } break; } OPENSSL_free(sni_ech); OPENSSL_free(sni_clr); return rc; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECH */ INIT_FUNC(mod_openssl_init) { plugin_data_singleton = (plugin_data *)ck_calloc(1, sizeof(plugin_data)); return plugin_data_singleton; } static int mod_openssl_init_once_openssl (server *srv) { if (ssl_is_init) return 1; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L \ && (!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x2070000fL) OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS |OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS,NULL); OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS |OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS |OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL); #else SSL_load_error_strings(); SSL_library_init(); OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif ssl_is_init = 1; if (0 == RAND_status()) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: not enough entropy in the pool"); return 0; } local_send_buffer = ck_malloc(LOCAL_SEND_BUFSIZE); return 1; } static void mod_openssl_free_openssl (void) { if (!ssl_is_init) return; #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket OPENSSL_cleanse(session_ticket_keys, sizeof(session_ticket_keys)); stek_rotate_ts = 0; #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) /*(OpenSSL libraries handle thread init and deinit) * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1048 */ #else CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_free_strings(); #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); #else ERR_remove_state(0); #endif EVP_cleanup(); #endif free(local_send_buffer); ssl_is_init = 0; } static void mod_openssl_free_plugin_ssl_ctx (plugin_ssl_ctx * const s) { SSL_CTX_free(s->ssl_ctx); if (s->kp) mod_openssl_kp_rel(s->kp); free(s); } static void mod_openssl_free_config (server *srv, plugin_data * const p) { #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000 || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) array_free(p->cafiles); #endif array_free(p->ech_only_hosts); if (NULL != p->ssl_ctxs) { /* free ssl_ctx from $SERVER["socket"] (if not copy of global scope) */ for (uint32_t i = 1; i < srv->config_context->used; ++i) { plugin_ssl_ctx * const s = p->ssl_ctxs[i]; if (s && s != p->ssl_ctxs[0]) mod_openssl_free_plugin_ssl_ctx(s); } /* free ssl_ctx from global scope */ if (p->ssl_ctxs[0]) mod_openssl_free_plugin_ssl_ctx(p->ssl_ctxs[0]); free(p->ssl_ctxs); } if (NULL == p->cvlist) return; /* (init i to 0 if global context; to 1 to skip empty global context) */ for (int i = !p->cvlist[0].v.u2[1], used = p->nconfig; i < used; ++i) { config_plugin_value_t *cpv = p->cvlist + p->cvlist[i].v.u2[0]; for (; -1 != cpv->k_id; ++cpv) { switch (cpv->k_id) { case 0: /* ssl.pemfile */ if (cpv->vtype == T_CONFIG_LOCAL) { plugin_cert *pc = cpv->v.v; mod_openssl_kp *kp = pc->kp; while (kp) { mod_openssl_kp *o = kp; kp = kp->next; mod_openssl_kp_free(o); } free(pc); } break; case 2: /* ssl.ca-file */ if (cpv->vtype == T_CONFIG_LOCAL) { plugin_cacerts *cacerts = cpv->v.v; sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cacerts->names, X509_NAME_free); X509_STORE_free(cacerts->store); free(cacerts); } break; case 3: /* ssl.ca-dn-file */ if (cpv->vtype == T_CONFIG_LOCAL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cpv->v.v, X509_NAME_free); break; default: break; } } } } #ifdef SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS /* openssl 3.0.0 */ #ifdef __linux__ #include /* uname() */ #include "sys-unistd.h" /* read() close() getuid() */ __attribute_cold__ static int mod_tls_linux_has_ktls (void) { /* file in special proc filesystem returns 0 size to stat(), * so unable to use fdevent_load_file() */ static const char file[] = "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_available_ulp"; char buf[1024]; int fd = fdevent_open_cloexec(file, 1, O_RDONLY, 0); if (-1 == fd) return -1; /*(/proc not mounted?)*/ ssize_t rd = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)-1); close(fd); if (-1 == rd) return -1; int has_ktls = 0; if (rd > 0) { buf[rd] = '\0'; char *p = buf; has_ktls = (0 == strncmp(p, "tls", 3) ? (p+=3) : (p = strstr(p, " tls")) ? (p+=4) : NULL) && (*p == ' ' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\0'); } return has_ktls; /* false if kernel tls module not loaded */ } __attribute_cold__ static int mod_tls_linux_modprobe_tls (void) { if (0 == getuid()) { char *argv[3]; *(const char **)&argv[0] = "/usr/sbin/modprobe"; *(const char **)&argv[1] = "tls"; *(const char **)&argv[2] = NULL; pid_t pid = /*(send input and output to /dev/null)*/ fdevent_fork_execve(argv[0], argv, NULL, -1, -1, STDOUT_FILENO, -1); if (pid > 0) fdevent_waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); return mod_tls_linux_has_ktls(); } return 0; } #endif /* __linux__ */ #ifdef __FreeBSD__ #include /* sysctlbyname() */ #endif __attribute_cold__ static int mod_tls_check_kernel_ktls (void) { int has_ktls = 0; #ifdef __linux__ struct utsname uts; if (0 == uname(&uts)) { /* check two or more digit linux major kernel ver or >= kernel 4.13 */ /* (avoid #include for scanf("%d.%d.%d"); limit stdio.h use)*/ const char * const v = uts.release; int rv = v[1] != '.' || v[0]-'0' > 4 || (v[0]-'0' == 4 && v[3] != '.' /*(last 4.x.x was 4.20.x)*/ && (v[2]-'0' > 1 || (v[2]-'0' == 1 && v[3]-'0' >= 3))); if (rv && 0 == (rv = mod_tls_linux_has_ktls())) rv = mod_tls_linux_modprobe_tls(); has_ktls = rv; } #endif #ifdef __FreeBSD__ size_t ktls_sz = sizeof(has_ktls); if (0 != sysctlbyname("kern.ipc.tls.enable", &has_ktls, &ktls_sz, NULL, 0)) { #if 0 /*(not present on kernels < FreeBSD 13 unless backported)*/ log_perror(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "sysctl(\"kern.ipc.tls.enable\")"); #endif has_ktls = -1; } #endif /* has_ktls = 1:enabled; 0:disabled; -1:unable to determine */ return has_ktls; } __attribute_cold__ static void mod_openssl_check_ktls (void) { int rv = mod_tls_check_kernel_ktls(); /* disable ktls if ktls not available or if unable to determine */ ktls_enable = (rv > 0); } #endif /* SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS */ /* use memory from openssl secure heap for temporary buffers, returned storage * (pemfile might contain a private key in addition to certificate chain) * Interfaces similar to those constructed in include/openssl/pem.h for * PEM_read_bio_X509(), except this is named PEM_read_bio_X509_secmem(). * Similar for PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX_secmem(). * * Supporting routine PEM_ASN1_read_bio_secmem() modified from openssl * crypto/pem/pem_oth.c:PEM_ASN1_read_bio(): * uses PEM_bytes_read_bio_secmem() instead of PEM_bytes_read_bio() * uses OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() instead of OPENSSL_free() * * 'man PEM_bytes_read_bio_secmem()' and see NOTES section for more info * PEM_bytes_read_bio_secmem() openssl 1.1.1 or later * OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() openssl 1.1.0g or later * As this comment is being written, only openssl 1.1.1 is actively maintained. * Earlier vers of openssl no longer receive security patches from openssl.org. */ static void * PEM_ASN1_read_bio_secmem(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, BIO *bp, void **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { const unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len = 0; char *ret = NULL; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L \ && !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio_secmem(&data, &len, NULL, name, bp, cb, u)) #else if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, NULL, name, bp, cb, u)) #endif return NULL; p = data; ret = d2i(x, &p, len); #ifndef BORINGSSL_API_VERSION /* missing PEMerr() macro */ if (ret == NULL) #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); #else ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PEM, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); #endif #endif /* boringssl provides OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() in commit * 8a1542fc41b43bdcd67cd341c1d332d2e05e2340 (not yet in a release) * (note: boringssl already calls OPENSSL_cleanse() in OPENSSL_free()) */ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L \ && !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(data, len); #else OPENSSL_cleanse(data, len); OPENSSL_free(data); #endif return ret; } static X509 * PEM_read_bio_X509_secmem(BIO *bp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return PEM_ASN1_read_bio_secmem((d2i_of_void *)d2i_X509, PEM_STRING_X509, bp, (void **)x, cb, u); } static X509 * PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX_secmem(BIO *bp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return PEM_ASN1_read_bio_secmem((d2i_of_void *)d2i_X509_AUX, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED, bp, (void **)x, cb, u); } static int mod_openssl_load_X509_sk (const char *file, log_error_st *errh, STACK_OF(X509) **chain, BIO *in) { STACK_OF(X509) *chain_sk = NULL; for (X509 *ca; (ca = PEM_read_bio_X509_secmem(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)); ) { if (NULL == chain_sk) /*(allocate only if it will not be empty)*/ chain_sk = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!chain_sk || !sk_X509_push(chain_sk, ca)) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: couldn't read X509 certificates from '%s'", file); if (chain_sk) sk_X509_pop_free(chain_sk, X509_free); X509_free(ca); return 0; } } *chain = chain_sk; return 1; } static int mod_openssl_load_X509_STORE (const char *file, log_error_st *errh, X509_STORE **chain, BIO *in) { X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL; for (X509 *ca; (ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)); X509_free(ca)) { if (NULL == chain_store) /*(allocate only if it will not be empty)*/ chain_store = X509_STORE_new(); if (!chain_store || !X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, ca)) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: couldn't read X509 certificates from '%s'", file); if (chain_store) X509_STORE_free(chain_store); X509_free(ca); return 0; } } *chain = chain_store; return 1; } static plugin_cacerts * mod_openssl_load_cacerts (const buffer *ssl_ca_file, log_error_st *errh) { const char *file = ssl_ca_file->ptr; BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (NULL == in) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: BIO_new(BIO_s_file()) failed"); return NULL; } if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: BIO_read_filename('%s') failed", file); BIO_free(in); return NULL; } X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL; if (!mod_openssl_load_X509_STORE(file, errh, &chain_store, in)) { BIO_free(in); return NULL; } BIO_free(in); if (NULL == chain_store) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: ssl.verifyclient.ca-file is empty %s", file); return NULL; } plugin_cacerts *cacerts = ck_malloc(sizeof(plugin_cacerts)); /* (would be more efficient to walk the X509_STORE and build the list, * but this works for now and matches how ssl.ca-dn-file is handled) */ cacerts->names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(file); if (NULL == cacerts->names) { X509_STORE_free(chain_store); free(cacerts); return NULL; } cacerts->store = chain_store; cacerts->crl_file = NULL; cacerts->crl_loadts = 0; return cacerts; } static int mod_openssl_load_cacrls (X509_STORE *store, const char *ssl_ca_crl_file, server *srv) { #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L if (1 != X509_STORE_load_file(store, ssl_ca_crl_file)) #else if (1 != X509_STORE_load_locations(store, ssl_ca_crl_file, NULL)) #endif { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), ssl_ca_crl_file); return 0; } X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); return 1; } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000 \ || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) static int mod_openssl_load_verify_locn (SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, const buffer *b, server *srv) { const char *fn = b->ptr; if (1 == SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ssl_ctx, fn, NULL)) return 1; log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), fn); return 0; } static int mod_openssl_load_ca_files (SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, plugin_data *p, server *srv) { /* load all ssl.ca-files specified in the config into each SSL_CTX */ for (uint32_t i = 0, used = p->cafiles->used; i < used; ++i) { const buffer *b = &((data_string *)p->cafiles->data[i])->value; if (!mod_openssl_load_verify_locn(ssl_ctx, b, srv)) return 0; } return 1; } #endif FREE_FUNC(mod_openssl_free) { plugin_data *p = p_d; if (NULL == p->srv) return; mod_openssl_free_config(p->srv, p); mod_openssl_free_openssl(); } static void mod_openssl_merge_config_cpv (plugin_config * const pconf, const config_plugin_value_t * const cpv) { switch (cpv->k_id) { /* index into static config_plugin_keys_t cpk[] */ case 0: /* ssl.pemfile */ if (cpv->vtype == T_CONFIG_LOCAL) pconf->pc = cpv->v.v; break; case 1: /* ssl.privkey */ break; case 2: /* ssl.ca-file */ if (cpv->vtype == T_CONFIG_LOCAL) pconf->ssl_ca_file = cpv->v.v; break; case 3: /* ssl.ca-dn-file */ if (cpv->vtype == T_CONFIG_LOCAL) pconf->ssl_ca_dn_file = cpv->v.v; break; case 4: /* ssl.ca-crl-file */ pconf->ssl_ca_crl_file = cpv->v.b; break; case 5: /* ssl.read-ahead */ pconf->ssl_read_ahead = (0 != cpv->v.u); break; case 6: /* ssl.disable-client-renegotiation */ /*(ignored; unsafe renegotiation disabled by default)*/ break; case 7: /* ssl.verifyclient.activate */ pconf->ssl_verifyclient = (0 != cpv->v.u); break; case 8: /* ssl.verifyclient.enforce */ pconf->ssl_verifyclient_enforce = (0 != cpv->v.u); break; case 9: /* ssl.verifyclient.depth */ pconf->ssl_verifyclient_depth = (unsigned char)cpv->v.shrt; break; case 10:/* ssl.verifyclient.username */ pconf->ssl_verifyclient_username = cpv->v.b; break; case 11:/* ssl.verifyclient.exportcert */ pconf->ssl_verifyclient_export_cert = (0 != cpv->v.u); break; case 12:/* ssl.acme-tls-1 */ pconf->ssl_acme_tls_1 = cpv->v.b; break; case 13:/* ssl.stapling-file */ break; case 14:/* debug.log-ssl-noise */ pconf->ssl_log_noise = (0 != cpv->v.u); break; #if 0 /*(cpk->k_id remapped in mod_openssl_set_defaults())*/ case 15:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-file */ case 16:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-dn-file */ case 17:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-crl-file */ break; #endif case 18:/* ssl.ech-public-name */ break; default:/* should not happen */ return; } } static void mod_openssl_merge_config(plugin_config * const pconf, const config_plugin_value_t *cpv) { do { mod_openssl_merge_config_cpv(pconf, cpv); } while ((++cpv)->k_id != -1); } static void mod_openssl_patch_config (request_st * const r, plugin_config * const pconf) { plugin_data * const p = plugin_data_singleton; memcpy(pconf, &p->defaults, sizeof(plugin_config)); for (int i = 1, used = p->nconfig; i < used; ++i) { if (config_check_cond(r, (uint32_t)p->cvlist[i].k_id)) mod_openssl_merge_config(pconf, p->cvlist + p->cvlist[i].v.u2[0]); } } static int safer_X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *name, char *buf, size_t sz) { BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (bio) { int len = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, name, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB); BIO_gets(bio, buf, (int)sz); /*(may be truncated if len >= sz)*/ BIO_free(bio); return len; /*return value has similar semantics to that of snprintf()*/ } else { buf[0] = '\0'; return -1; } } static void ssl_info_callback (const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret) { UNUSED(ret); if (0 != (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START)) { handler_ctx *hctx = (handler_ctx *) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); if (hctx->renegotiations >= 0) ++hctx->renegotiations; } #ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION /* https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5721 * "TLSv1.3 unexpected InfoCallback after handshake completed" */ if (0 != (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { /* SSL_version() is valid after initial handshake completed */ if (SSL_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { /* https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/TLS1.3 * "Renegotiation is not possible in a TLSv1.3 connection" */ handler_ctx *hctx = (handler_ctx *) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); hctx->renegotiations = -1; } } #endif } /* https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Manual:SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)#EXAMPLES */ static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { char buf[256]; X509 *err_cert; int err, depth; SSL *ssl; handler_ctx *hctx; err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); /* * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object. */ ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); hctx = (handler_ctx *) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); /* * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition. * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the * additional certificates would be logged. */ if (depth > hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient_depth) { preverify_ok = 0; err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err); } if (preverify_ok && 0 == depth && NULL != hctx->conf.ssl_ca_dn_file) { /* verify that client cert is issued by CA in ssl.ca-dn-file * if both ssl.ca-dn-file and ssl.ca-file were configured */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * const cert_names = hctx->conf.ssl_ca_dn_file; X509_NAME *issuer; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); #else err_cert = ctx->current_cert; #endif if (NULL == err_cert) return !hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient_enforce; issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert); #if 0 /*(?desirable/undesirable to have cert_names sorted?)*/ if (-1 != sk_X509_NAME_find(cert_names, issuer)) return preverify_ok; /* match */ #else for (int i = 0, len = sk_X509_NAME_num(cert_names); i < len; ++i) { if (0 == X509_NAME_cmp(sk_X509_NAME_value(cert_names, i), issuer)) return preverify_ok; /* match */ } #endif preverify_ok = 0; err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err); } if (preverify_ok) { return preverify_ok; } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); #else err_cert = ctx->current_cert; #endif if (NULL == err_cert) return !hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient_enforce; safer_X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),buf,sizeof(buf)); log_error_st *errh = hctx->r->conf.errh; log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:subject=%s", err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf); /* * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use * it for something special */ if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY || err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) { safer_X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert),buf,sizeof(buf)); log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: issuer=%s", buf); } return !hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient_enforce; } enum { MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_HTTP11 = 1 ,MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_HTTP10 = 2 ,MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_H2 = 3 ,MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_ACME_TLS_1 = 4 }; static int mod_openssl_cert_cb (SSL *ssl, void *arg) { handler_ctx *hctx = (handler_ctx *) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); plugin_cert *pc = hctx->conf.pc; UNUSED(arg); if (hctx->alpn == MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_ACME_TLS_1) return 1; if (!pc) { /* x509/pkey available <=> pemfile was set <=> pemfile got patched: * so this should never happen, unless you nest $SERVER["socket"] */ log_error(hctx->r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: no certificate/private key for TLS server name \"%s\". " "$SERVER[\"socket\"] should not be nested in other conditions.", hctx->r->uri.authority.ptr); return 0; } /* reuse cert chain/privkey assigned to ssl_ctx where cert matches */ if (hctx->ssl_ctx_pc && buffer_is_equal(hctx->ssl_ctx_pc->ssl_pemfile, pc->ssl_pemfile)) { hctx->kp = mod_openssl_kp_acq(hctx->ssl_ctx_pc); } else { hctx->kp = mod_openssl_kp_acq(pc); #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 \ && (!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL) if (hctx->kp->ssl_pemfile_chain) { } #if !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) /* (missing SSL_set1_chain_cert_store() and SSL_build_cert_chain()) */ else if (hctx->conf.ssl_ca_file && !hctx->kp->self_issued) { /* preserve legacy behavior whereby openssl will reuse CAs trusted for * certificate verification (set by SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations() in * SSL_CTX) in order to build certificate chain for server certificate * sent to client */ if (1 != SSL_use_certificate(ssl, hctx->kp->ssl_pemfile_x509)) { log_error(hctx->r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: failed to set certificate for TLS server name %s: %s", hctx->r->uri.authority.ptr, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return 0; } SSL_set1_chain_cert_store(ssl, hctx->conf.ssl_ca_file->store); if (1 != SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl, SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT | SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR | SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)) { log_error(hctx->r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: building cert chain for TLS server name %s: %s", hctx->r->uri.authority.ptr, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return 0; } else { /* copy chain for future reuse */ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; SSL_get0_chain_certs(ssl, &chain); hctx->kp->ssl_pemfile_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain); SSL_set1_chain_cert_store(ssl, NULL); } } #endif #endif if (1 != mod_openssl_SSL_use_cert_and_key(ssl, pc, hctx->kp)) { log_error(hctx->r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: failed to set cert for TLS server name %s: %s", hctx->r->uri.authority.ptr, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return 0; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP #ifdef BORINGSSL_API_VERSION /* BoringSSL suggests API different than SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb() */ buffer *ocsp_resp = hctx->kp->ssl_stapling_der; if (NULL != ocsp_resp && !SSL_set_ocsp_response(ssl, (uint8_t *)BUF_PTR_LEN(ocsp_resp))) { log_error(hctx->r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: failed to set OCSP response for TLS server name %s: %s", hctx->r->uri.authority.ptr, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return 0; } #endif #endif /* (openssl library keeps refcnts on its objects) */ /* retain hctx->kp if needed for OCSP staping response (tlsext_status_cb) */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) if (NULL == hctx->kp->ssl_stapling_der) #endif { mod_openssl_kp_rel(hctx->kp); hctx->kp = NULL; } if (hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient) { if (NULL == hctx->conf.ssl_ca_file) { log_error(hctx->r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: can't verify client without ssl.verifyclient.ca-file " "for TLS server name %s", hctx->r->uri.authority.ptr); return 0; } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(ssl, hctx->conf.ssl_ca_file->store); #endif /* WTH openssl? SSL_set_client_CA_list() calls set0_CA_list(), * but there is no set1_CA_list() to simply up the reference count * (without needing to duplicate the list) */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * const cert_names = hctx->conf.ssl_ca_dn_file ? hctx->conf.ssl_ca_dn_file : hctx->conf.ssl_ca_file->names; SSL_set_client_CA_list(ssl, SSL_dup_CA_list(cert_names)); int mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; if (hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient_enforce) mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT; SSL_set_verify(ssl, mode, verify_callback); SSL_set_verify_depth(ssl, hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient_depth + 1); } else { SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static int mod_openssl_SNI (handler_ctx *hctx, const char *servername, size_t len) { request_st * const r = hctx->r; if (len >= 1024) { /*(expecting < 256; TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name is 255)*/ log_error(r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: SNI name too long %.*s", (int)len, servername); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } /* use SNI to patch mod_openssl config and then reset COMP_HTTP_HOST */ buffer_copy_string_len_lc(&r->uri.authority, servername, len); /*(r->uri.authority used below for configuration before request read) *(r->uri.authority is set here since it is used by config merging, * but r->uri.authority is later overwritten by each HTTP request)*/ if (0 != http_request_host_policy(&r->uri.authority, r->conf.http_parseopts, 443)) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH if (hctx->ech_only_policy) { /* ECH-only hosts are configured */ /*(given: r->uri.authority contains value from SSL_get_servername())*/ /*(check if host is ech-only before mod_openssl_patch_config() to try to * avoid timing differences (which might reveal existence of specific * ech-only host due to having to reset, re-patch if host is ech-only). * This is possible with the global list of ech_only_hosts configured * w/ ssl.ech-public-name. We have chosen to unconditionally strip port * to help admins avoid mistakes where ech-only host might be accessed * on a different port. Admin can use separate lighttpd instances if * there is a need for such complex behavior on different ports.) */ #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) int rc = SSL_ech_accepted(hctx->ssl); #else char *sni_ech = NULL; char *sni_clr = NULL; int rc = SSL_ech_get1_status(hctx->ssl, &sni_ech, &sni_clr); OPENSSL_free(sni_ech); OPENSSL_free(sni_clr); #endif switch (rc) { case SSL_ECH_STATUS_SUCCESS: break; /*case SSL_ECH_STATUS_NOT_TRIED:*/ default: /* **ignore** cleartext SNI if servername is marked ECH-only; * avoid acknowledging existence of host sent in cleartext SNI */ /* alternative: apply config for mod_openssl_ech_only() fallback */ if (NULL != mod_openssl_ech_only(hctx, BUF_PTR_LEN(&r->uri.authority))) { buffer_clear(&r->uri.authority); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } break; } } /* (might be called again after ECH is decrypted) */ if (r->conditional_is_valid & (1 << COMP_HTTP_HOST)) config_cond_cache_reset_item(r, COMP_HTTP_HOST); #endif r->conditional_is_valid |= (1 << COMP_HTTP_SCHEME) | (1 << COMP_HTTP_HOST); mod_openssl_patch_config(r, &hctx->conf); /* reset COMP_HTTP_HOST so that conditions re-run after request hdrs read */ /*(done in response.c:config_cond_cache_reset() after request hdrs read)*/ /*config_cond_cache_reset_item(r, COMP_HTTP_HOST);*/ /*buffer_clear(&r->uri.authority);*/ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; #else return (mod_openssl_cert_cb(hctx->ssl, NULL) == 1) ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; #endif } #ifdef SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS static int mod_openssl_client_hello_cb (SSL *ssl, int *al, void *srv) { handler_ctx *hctx = (handler_ctx *) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); buffer_copy_string_len(&hctx->r->uri.scheme, CONST_STR_LEN("https")); UNUSED(srv); const unsigned char *name; size_t len, slen; #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_ech /* code currently inactive; see top of file #undef SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS. * Were the openssl ECH callback (set with SSL_CTX_ech_set_callback()) to * become something other than what it currently is (mainly informational), * then we might reconsider using it. An alternative idea is to leverage * the cert_cb (always called during client hello processing and set with * SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb()) to access outcome of ECH or SNI immediately prior * to server certificate selection. Prior to existence of cert_cb, the use * of servername_callback (set with SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback) * was needed to handle SNI, but might now be folded into cert_cb. */ #if 0 if (SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(ssl, TLSEXT_TYPE_ech, &name, &len)) { return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS; /* defer to later ECH processing */ } #endif #endif if (!SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(ssl, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, &name, &len)) { return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS; /* client did not provide SNI */ } /* expecting single element in the server_name extension; parse first one */ if (len > 5 && (size_t)((name[0] << 8) + name[1]) == len-2 && name[2] == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name && (slen = (name[3] << 8) + name[4]) <= len-5) { /*(first)*/ int read_ahead = hctx->conf.ssl_read_ahead; int rc = mod_openssl_SNI(hctx, (const char *)name+5, slen); if (!read_ahead && hctx->conf.ssl_read_ahead) SSL_set_read_ahead(ssl, hctx->conf.ssl_read_ahead); if (rc == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS; } *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR; } #else static int network_ssl_servername_callback (SSL *ssl, int *al, void *srv) { handler_ctx *hctx = (handler_ctx *) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); buffer_copy_string_len(&hctx->r->uri.scheme, CONST_STR_LEN("https")); UNUSED(al); UNUSED(srv); const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); if (NULL == servername) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; /* client did not provide SNI */ size_t len = strlen(servername); int read_ahead = hctx->conf.ssl_read_ahead; int rc = mod_openssl_SNI(hctx, servername, len); if (!read_ahead && hctx->conf.ssl_read_ahead) SSL_set_read_ahead(ssl, hctx->conf.ssl_read_ahead); return rc; } #endif #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10101000L \ || !(defined(_LP64) || defined(__LP64__) || defined(_WIN64)) \ || defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ ||(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x3060000fL) static unix_time64_t mod_openssl_asn1_time_to_posix (const ASN1_TIME *asn1time); #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L \ && !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) #define X509_get0_notBefore X509_get_notBefore #define X509_get0_notAfter X509_get_notAfter #endif static int mod_openssl_cert_is_active (const X509 *crt) { const ASN1_TIME *notBefore = X509_get0_notBefore(crt); const ASN1_TIME *notAfter = X509_get0_notAfter(crt); #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10101000L \ || !(defined(_LP64) || defined(__LP64__) || defined(_WIN64)) \ || defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ ||(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x3060000fL) const unix_time64_t before = mod_openssl_asn1_time_to_posix(notBefore); const unix_time64_t after = mod_openssl_asn1_time_to_posix(notAfter); const unix_time64_t now = log_epoch_secs; return (0 <= before && before <= now && now <= after); #else /*(-2 is an error from ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t(); test cmp for -1, 0, 1)*/ const unix_time64_t now = log_epoch_secs; const int before_cmp = ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t(notBefore, (time_t)now); const int after_cmp = ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t(notAfter, (time_t)now); return ((before_cmp == -1 || before_cmp == 0) && 0 <= after_cmp); #endif } static X509 * mod_openssl_load_pem_file (const char *file, log_error_st *errh, STACK_OF(X509) **chain) { *chain = NULL; off_t dlen = 512*1024*1024;/*(arbitrary limit: 512 MB file; expect < 1 MB)*/ char *data = fdevent_load_file(file, &dlen, errh, malloc, free); if (NULL == data) return NULL; BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(data, (int)dlen); if (NULL == in) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: BIO_new/BIO_read_filename('%s') failed", file); if (dlen) ck_memzero(data, dlen); free(data); return NULL; } int is_pem = (NULL != strstr(data, "-----")); X509 *x = is_pem ? PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX_secmem(in, NULL, NULL, NULL) : d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL); if (NULL == x) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: couldn't read X509 certificate from '%s'", file); } else if (is_pem && !mod_openssl_load_X509_sk(file, errh, chain, in)) { X509_free(x); x = NULL; } else if (!mod_openssl_cert_is_active(x)) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: inactive/expired X509 certificate '%s'", file); } BIO_free(in); if (dlen) ck_memzero(data, dlen); free(data); return x; } static EVP_PKEY * mod_openssl_evp_pkey_load_pem_file (const char *file, log_error_st *errh) { off_t dlen = 512*1024*1024;/*(arbitrary limit: 512 MB file; expect < 1 MB)*/ char *data = fdevent_load_file(file, &dlen, errh, malloc, free); if (NULL == data) return NULL; EVP_PKEY *x = NULL; BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(data, (int)dlen); if (NULL != in) { x = (NULL != strstr(data, "-----")) ? PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, NULL, NULL) : d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL); BIO_free(in); } if (dlen) ck_memzero(data, dlen); free(data); if (NULL == in) log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: BIO_new/BIO_read_filename('%s') failed", file); else if (NULL == x) log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: couldn't read private key from '%s'", file); return x; } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) /* LibreSSL does not support SSL_set1_verify_cert_store() at this time */ __attribute_noinline__ static int mod_openssl_reload_crl_file (server *srv, plugin_cacerts *cacerts, const unix_time64_t cur_ts) { #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000 /* fall through to perform initial load, but skip reload for 1.0.2 */ /*(X509_STORE_get0_objects(), X509_OBJECT_get0_X509() available in 1.1.0)*/ if (cacerts->store) return 1; #endif /* CRLs can be updated at any time, though expected on/before Next Update */ /* For BoringSSL, SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() is called in network_init_ssl() * to support auto-chaining. Since only CRLs are updated here, there are * no modifications needed there; the SSL_CTX will keep reference to * original ref-counted X509_STORE for cert auto-chaining. (Or, we could * add code to resolve all certificate chains at startup.) */ X509_STORE * const new_store = X509_STORE_new(); if (NULL == new_store) return 0; X509_STORE * const store = cacerts->store; int rc = 1; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000 /* duplicate X509_STORE with X509 objects and skip CRLs */ /* (modelled off X509_STORE_get1_all_certs()) */ /*X509_STORE_lock(store);*/ STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *objs = X509_STORE_get0_objects(store); for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(objs) && rc; ++i) { X509 *cert = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(sk_X509_OBJECT_value(objs, i)); if (cert != NULL) rc = X509_STORE_add_cert(new_store, cert); } /*X509_STORE_unlock(store);*/ #endif if (rc) { rc = mod_openssl_load_cacrls(new_store, cacerts->crl_file, srv); if (rc) { cacerts->crl_loadts = cur_ts; cacerts->store = new_store; } } /* XXX: not thread-safe if another thread has pointer to store and is about * to perform client certificate verification */ X509_STORE_free(rc ? store : new_store); return rc; } static int mod_openssl_refresh_crl_file (server *srv, plugin_cacerts *cacerts, const unix_time64_t cur_ts) { struct stat st; if (0 != stat(cacerts->crl_file, &st) || (TIME64_CAST(st.st_mtime) <= cacerts->crl_loadts && cacerts->crl_loadts != (unix_time64_t)-1)) return 1; return mod_openssl_reload_crl_file(srv, cacerts, cur_ts); } static void mod_openssl_refresh_crl_files (server *srv, const plugin_data *p, const unix_time64_t cur_ts) { /* future: might construct array of (plugin_cacerts *) at startup * to avoid the need to search for them here */ /* (init i to 0 if global context; to 1 to skip empty global context) */ if (NULL == p->cvlist) return; for (int i = !p->cvlist[0].v.u2[1], used = p->nconfig; i < used; ++i) { const config_plugin_value_t *cpv = p->cvlist + p->cvlist[i].v.u2[0]; for (; cpv->k_id != -1; ++cpv) { if (cpv->k_id != 2) continue; /* k_id == 2 for ssl.ca-file */ if (cpv->vtype != T_CONFIG_LOCAL) continue; plugin_cacerts *cacerts = cpv->v.v; if (cacerts->crl_file) mod_openssl_refresh_crl_file(srv, cacerts, cur_ts); } } } #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 && !LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP static buffer * mod_openssl_load_stapling_file (const char *file, log_error_st *errh, buffer *b) { /* load stapling .der into buffer *b only if successful * * Note: for some TLS libs, the OCSP stapling response is not copied when * assigned to a session (and is reasonable since not changed frequently) * - BoringSSL SSL_set_ocsp_response() * - WolfSSL SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() (differs from OpenSSL API) * Therefore, there is a potential race condition if the OCSP response is * assigned to the session during the handshake and the Server Hello is * partially sent, AND (unlikely, if possible at all), the TLS library is * in the middle of reading this OSCP response buffer. If the OCSP response * is replaced due to an updated ssl.stapling-file (checked periodically), * AND the buffer is resized, this would be a problem. Resizing the buffer * is unlikely since updated OSCP response for same certificate are * typically the same size with the signature and dates refreshed. */ /* load raw .der file */ off_t dlen = 1*1024*1024;/*(arbitrary limit: 1 MB file; expect < 1 KB)*/ char *data = fdevent_load_file(file, &dlen, errh, malloc, free); if (NULL == data) return NULL; #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) if (NULL == b) b = buffer_init(); else if (b->ptr) free(b->ptr); b->ptr = data; b->used = (uint32_t)dlen; b->size = (uint32_t)dlen+1; return b; #else BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(data, (int)dlen); if (NULL == in) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: BIO_new/BIO_read_filename('%s') failed", file); free(data); return NULL; } OCSP_RESPONSE *x = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(in, NULL); BIO_free(in); free(data); if (NULL == x) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: OCSP stapling file read error: %s %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), file); return NULL; } unsigned char *rspder = NULL; int rspderlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(x, &rspder); if (rspderlen > 0) { if (NULL == b) b = buffer_init(); buffer_copy_string_len(b, (char *)rspder, (uint32_t)rspderlen); } OPENSSL_free(rspder); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(x); return rspderlen ? b : NULL; #endif } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCSP */ static unix_time64_t mod_openssl_asn1_time_to_posix (const ASN1_TIME *asn1time) { #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) && BORINGSSL_API_VERSION >= 19 int64_t t; return ASN1_TIME_to_posix(asn1time, &t) ? (unix_time64_t)t : -1; #elif defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>=0x2050100fL struct tm x; #if LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3050000fL if (!ASN1_TIME_to_tm(asn1time, &x)) return -1; #else /* LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x2050100fL */ if (-1 == ASN1_time_parse(asn1time->data, asn1time->length, &x, 0)) return -1; #endif time_t t = timegm(&x); return (t != (time_t)-1) ? TIME64_CAST(t) : t; #elif defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER <0x3050000fL /* LibreSSL was forked from OpenSSL 1.0.1; does not have ASN1_TIME_diff */ /*(Note: all certificate times are expected to use UTC)*/ /*(Note: does not strictly validate string contains appropriate digits)*/ /*(Note: incorrectly assumes GMT if 'Z' or offset not provided)*/ /*(Note: incorrectly ignores if local timezone might be in DST)*/ if (NULL == asn1time || NULL == asn1time->data) return -1; const char *s = (const char *)asn1time->data; size_t len = strlen(s); struct tm x; x.tm_isdst = 0; x.tm_yday = 0; x.tm_wday = 0; switch (asn1time->type) { case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: /* 2-digit year */ if (len < 8) return -1; len -= 8; x.tm_year = (s[0]-'0')*10 + (s[1]-'0'); x.tm_year += (x.tm_year < 50 ? 2000 : 1900); s += 2; break; case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: /* 4-digit year */ if (len < 10) return -1; len -= 10; x.tm_year = (s[0]-'0')*1000+(s[1]-'0')*100+(s[2]-'0')*10+(s[3]-'0'); s += 4; break; default: return -1; } x.tm_mon = (s[0]-'0')*10 + (s[1]-'0'); x.tm_mday = (s[2]-'0')*10 + (s[3]-'0'); x.tm_hour = (s[4]-'0')*10 + (s[5]-'0'); x.tm_min = 0; x.tm_sec = 0; s += 6; if (len >= 2 && s[0] != '+' && s[0] != '-' && s[0] != 'Z') { len -= 2; x.tm_min = (s[0]-'0')*10 + (s[1]-'0'); s += 2; if (len >= 2 && s[0] != '+' && s[0] != '-' && s[0] != 'Z') { len -= 2; x.tm_sec = (s[0]-'0')*10 + (s[1]-'0'); s += 2; if (len && s[0] == '.') { /*(ignore .fff fractional seconds; * should be up to 3 digits but we ignore more)*/ do { ++s; --len; } while (*s >= '0' && *s <= '9'); } } } int offset = 0; if ((*s == '-' || *s == '+') && len != 5) { offset = ((s[1]-'0')*10 + (s[2]-'0')) * 3600 + ((s[3]-'0')*10 + (s[4]-'0')) * 60; if (*s == '-') offset = -offset; } else if (s[0] != '\0' && (s[0] != 'Z' || s[1] != '\0')) return -1; if (x.tm_year == 9999 && x.tm_mon == 12 && x.tm_mday == 31 && x.tm_hour == 23 && x.tm_min == 59 && x.tm_sec == 59 && s[0] == 'Z') return -1; // 99991231235959Z RFC 5280 x.tm_year-= 1900; x.tm_mon -= 1; time_t t = timegm(&x); return (t != (time_t)-1) ? TIME64_CAST(t) + offset : t; #else #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) struct tm x; if (!ASN1_TIME_to_tm(asn1time, &x)) return -1; time_t t = timegm(&x); return (t != (time_t)-1) ? TIME64_CAST(t) : t; #else /* Note: this does not check for integer overflow of time_t! */ int day, sec; return ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, NULL, asn1time) ? log_epoch_secs + day*86400 + sec : -1; #endif #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP static unix_time64_t mod_openssl_ocsp_next_update (buffer *der) { #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) UNUSED(der); return -1; /*(not implemented)*/ #else const unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)der->ptr; /*(p gets modified)*/ OCSP_RESPONSE *ocsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, buffer_clen(der)); if (NULL == ocsp) return -1; OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(ocsp); if (NULL == bs) { OCSP_RESPONSE_free(ocsp); return -1; } /* XXX: should save and evaluate cert status returned by these calls */ ASN1_TIME *nextupd = NULL; OCSP_single_get0_status(OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0), NULL, NULL, NULL, &nextupd); unix_time64_t t = nextupd ? mod_openssl_asn1_time_to_posix(nextupd) : (time_t)-1; /* Note: trust external process which creates ssl.stapling-file to verify * (as well as to validate certificate status) * future: verify OCSP response here to double-check */ OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(ocsp); return t; #endif } __attribute_cold__ static void mod_openssl_expire_stapling_file (server *srv, plugin_cert *pc) { mod_openssl_kp * const kp = pc->kp; if (NULL == kp->ssl_stapling_der) /*(previously discarded or never loaded)*/ return; /* discard expired OCSP stapling response */ buffer_free(kp->ssl_stapling_der); kp->ssl_stapling_der = NULL; if (kp->must_staple) log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "certificate marked OCSP Must-Staple, " "but OCSP response expired from ssl.stapling-file %s", pc->ssl_stapling_file->ptr); } static int mod_openssl_reload_stapling_file (server *srv, plugin_cert *pc, const unix_time64_t cur_ts) { mod_openssl_kp * const kp = pc->kp; buffer *b = mod_openssl_load_stapling_file(pc->ssl_stapling_file->ptr, srv->errh, kp->ssl_stapling_der); if (!b) return 0; kp->ssl_stapling_der = b; /*(unchanged unless orig was NULL)*/ kp->ssl_stapling_loadts = cur_ts; kp->ssl_stapling_nextts = mod_openssl_ocsp_next_update(b); if (kp->ssl_stapling_nextts == (time_t)-1) { /* "Next Update" might not be provided by OCSP responder * Use 3600 sec (1 hour) in that case. */ /* retry in 1 hour if unable to determine Next Update */ kp->ssl_stapling_nextts = cur_ts + 3600; kp->ssl_stapling_loadts = 0; } else if (kp->ssl_stapling_nextts < cur_ts) { mod_openssl_expire_stapling_file(srv, pc); return 0; } return 1; } static int mod_openssl_refresh_stapling_file (server *srv, plugin_cert *pc, const unix_time64_t cur_ts) { mod_openssl_kp * const kp = pc->kp; if (kp->ssl_stapling_der && kp->ssl_stapling_nextts > cur_ts + 256) return 1; /* skip check for refresh unless close to expire */ struct stat st; if (0 != stat(pc->ssl_stapling_file->ptr, &st) || TIME64_CAST(st.st_mtime) <= kp->ssl_stapling_loadts) { if (kp->ssl_stapling_der && kp->ssl_stapling_nextts < cur_ts) mod_openssl_expire_stapling_file(srv, pc); return 1; } return mod_openssl_reload_stapling_file(srv, pc, cur_ts); } static void mod_openssl_refresh_stapling_files (server *srv, const plugin_data *p, const unix_time64_t cur_ts) { /* future: might construct array of (plugin_cert *) at startup * to avoid the need to search for them here */ /* (init i to 0 if global context; to 1 to skip empty global context) */ if (NULL == p->cvlist) return; for (int i = !p->cvlist[0].v.u2[1], used = p->nconfig; i < used; ++i) { const config_plugin_value_t *cpv = p->cvlist + p->cvlist[i].v.u2[0]; for (; cpv->k_id != -1; ++cpv) { if (cpv->k_id != 0) continue; /* k_id == 0 for ssl.pemfile */ if (cpv->vtype != T_CONFIG_LOCAL) continue; plugin_cert *pc = cpv->v.v; if (pc->ssl_stapling_file) mod_openssl_refresh_stapling_file(srv, pc, cur_ts); } } } static int mod_openssl_crt_must_staple (const X509 *crt) { #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L \ || defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) /*(not currently supported in BoringSSL or LibreSSL)*/ UNUSED(crt); return 0; #else /* openssl/x509v3.h:typedef STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) TLS_FEATURE; */ TLS_FEATURE *tlsf = X509_get_ext_d2i(crt, NID_tlsfeature, NULL, NULL); if (NULL == tlsf) return 0; int rc = 0; for (int i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(tlsf); ++i) { ASN1_INTEGER *ai = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value(tlsf, i); long tlsextid = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ai); if (tlsextid == 5) { /* 5 = OCSP Must-Staple */ rc = 1; break; } } sk_ASN1_INTEGER_pop_free(tlsf, ASN1_INTEGER_free); return rc; /* 1 if OCSP Must-Staple found; 0 if not */ #endif } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCSP */ __attribute_noinline__ static plugin_cert * network_openssl_load_pemfile (server *srv, const buffer *pemfile, const buffer *privkey, const buffer *ssl_stapling_file) { if (!mod_openssl_init_once_openssl(srv)) return NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *ssl_pemfile_chain = NULL; X509 *ssl_pemfile_x509 = mod_openssl_load_pem_file(pemfile->ptr, srv->errh, &ssl_pemfile_chain); if (NULL == ssl_pemfile_x509) return NULL; EVP_PKEY *ssl_pemfile_pkey = mod_openssl_evp_pkey_load_pem_file(privkey->ptr, srv->errh); if (NULL == ssl_pemfile_pkey) { X509_free(ssl_pemfile_x509); sk_X509_pop_free(ssl_pemfile_chain, X509_free); return NULL; } if (!X509_check_private_key(ssl_pemfile_x509, ssl_pemfile_pkey)) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL:" "Private key does not match the certificate public key, " "reason: %s %s %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), pemfile->ptr, privkey->ptr); EVP_PKEY_free(ssl_pemfile_pkey); X509_free(ssl_pemfile_x509); sk_X509_pop_free(ssl_pemfile_chain, X509_free); return NULL; } plugin_cert *pc = ck_malloc(sizeof(plugin_cert)); mod_openssl_kp * const kp = pc->kp = mod_openssl_kp_init(); kp->ssl_pemfile_pkey = ssl_pemfile_pkey; kp->ssl_pemfile_x509 = ssl_pemfile_x509; kp->ssl_pemfile_chain= ssl_pemfile_chain; pc->ssl_pemfile = pemfile; pc->ssl_privkey = privkey; pc->ssl_stapling_file= ssl_stapling_file; pc->pkey_ts = log_epoch_secs; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP kp->must_staple = mod_openssl_crt_must_staple(ssl_pemfile_x509); #else kp->must_staple = 0; #endif kp->self_issued = (0 == X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(ssl_pemfile_x509), X509_get_issuer_name(ssl_pemfile_x509))); if (pc->ssl_stapling_file) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (!mod_openssl_reload_stapling_file(srv, pc, log_epoch_secs)) { /* continue without OCSP response if there is an error */ } #else log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL:" "OCSP stapling not supported; ignoring %s", pc->ssl_stapling_file->ptr); #endif } else if (kp->must_staple) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "certificate %s marked OCSP Must-Staple, " "but ssl.stapling-file not provided", pemfile->ptr); } #if 0 const ASN1_TIME *notAfter = X509_get0_notAfter(ssl_pemfile_x509); pc->notAfter = mod_openssl_asn1_time_to_posix(notAfter); #endif return pc; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation static int mod_openssl_acme_tls_1 (SSL *ssl, handler_ctx *hctx) { const buffer * const name = &hctx->r->uri.authority; log_error_st * const errh = hctx->r->conf.errh; X509 *ssl_pemfile_x509 = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *ssl_pemfile_chain = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ssl_pemfile_pkey = NULL; size_t len; int rc = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; /* check if acme-tls/1 protocol is enabled (path to dir of cert(s) is set)*/ if (!hctx->conf.ssl_acme_tls_1) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; /*(reuse value here for not-configured)*/ /* check if SNI set server name (required for acme-tls/1 protocol) * and perform simple path checks for no '/' * and no leading '.' (e.g. ignore "." or ".." or anything beginning '.') */ if (buffer_is_blank(name)) return rc; if (NULL != strchr(name->ptr, '/')) return rc; if (name->ptr[0] == '.') return rc; #if 0 if (0 != http_request_host_policy(name,hctx->r->conf.http_parseopts,443)) return rc; #endif buffer * const b = buffer_init(); buffer_copy_path_len2(b, BUF_PTR_LEN(hctx->conf.ssl_acme_tls_1), BUF_PTR_LEN(name)); len = buffer_clen(b); do { buffer_append_string_len(b, CONST_STR_LEN(".crt.pem")); ssl_pemfile_x509 = mod_openssl_load_pem_file(b->ptr, errh, &ssl_pemfile_chain); if (NULL == ssl_pemfile_x509) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: Failed to load acme-tls/1 pemfile: %s", b->ptr); break; } buffer_truncate(b, len); /*(remove ".crt.pem")*/ buffer_append_string_len(b, CONST_STR_LEN(".key.pem")); ssl_pemfile_pkey = mod_openssl_evp_pkey_load_pem_file(b->ptr, errh); if (NULL == ssl_pemfile_pkey) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: Failed to load acme-tls/1 pemfile: %s", b->ptr); break; } #if 0 /* redundant with below? */ if (!X509_check_private_key(ssl_pemfile_x509, ssl_pemfile_pkey)) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: Private key does not match acme-tls/1 " "certificate public key, reason: %s %s" ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), b->ptr); break; } #endif /* first set certificate! * setting private key checks whether certificate matches it */ if (1 != SSL_use_certificate(ssl, ssl_pemfile_x509)) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: failed to set acme-tls/1 certificate for TLS server " "name %s: %s", name->ptr, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL)); break; } if (ssl_pemfile_chain) { SSL_set0_chain(ssl, ssl_pemfile_chain); ssl_pemfile_chain = NULL; } if (1 != SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, ssl_pemfile_pkey)) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: failed to set acme-tls/1 private key for TLS server " "name %s: %s", name->ptr, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL)); break; } hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient_enforce = 0; SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); rc = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } while (0); if (ssl_pemfile_pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(ssl_pemfile_pkey); if (ssl_pemfile_x509) X509_free(ssl_pemfile_x509); if (ssl_pemfile_chain) sk_X509_pop_free(ssl_pemfile_chain, X509_free); buffer_free(b); return rc; } static int mod_openssl_alpn_h2_policy (handler_ctx * const hctx) { /*(currently called after handshake has completed)*/ #if 0 /* SNI omitted by client when connecting to IP instead of to name */ if (buffer_is_blank(&hctx->r->uri.authority)) { log_error(hctx->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: error ALPN h2 without SNI"); return -1; } #endif if (SSL_version(hctx->ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { log_error(hctx->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: error ALPN h2 requires TLSv1.2 or later"); return -1; } return 0; } /* https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml#alpn-protocol-ids */ static int mod_openssl_alpn_select_cb (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { handler_ctx *hctx = (handler_ctx *) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); unsigned short proto; UNUSED(arg); for (unsigned int i = 0, n; i < inlen; i += n) { n = in[i++]; if (i+n > inlen || 0 == n) break; switch (n) { case 2: /* "h2" */ if (in[i] == 'h' && in[i+1] == '2') { if (!hctx->r->conf.h2proto) continue; proto = MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_H2; if (hctx->r->handler_module == NULL)/*(e.g. not mod_sockproxy)*/ hctx->r->http_version = HTTP_VERSION_2; break; } continue; case 8: /* "http/1.1" "http/1.0" */ if (0 == memcmp(in+i, "http/1.", 7)) { if (in[i+7] == '1') { proto = MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_HTTP11; break; } if (in[i+7] == '0') { proto = MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_HTTP10; break; } } continue; case 10: /* "acme-tls/1" */ if (0 == memcmp(in+i, "acme-tls/1", 10)) { int rc = mod_openssl_acme_tls_1(ssl, hctx); if (rc == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { proto = MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_ACME_TLS_1; break; } /* (use SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK for not-configured) */ if (rc == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) continue; return rc; } continue; default: continue; } hctx->alpn = proto; *out = in+i; *outlen = n; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; #else return hctx->r->handler_module /*(e.g. mod_sockproxy)*/ ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; #endif } #endif /* TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation */ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) static int mod_openssl_ssl_conf_cmd (server *srv, plugin_config_socket *s); #endif static int network_openssl_ssl_conf_cmd (server *srv, plugin_config_socket *s) { #ifdef SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE int rc = 0; const data_string *ds; SSL_CONF_CTX * const cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, s->ssl_ctx); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE); /* always disable null and export ciphers */ ds = (const data_string *) array_get_element_klen(s->ssl_conf_cmd, CONST_STR_LEN("CipherString")); if (NULL != ds) { buffer *cipher_string = array_get_buf_ptr(s->ssl_conf_cmd, CONST_STR_LEN("CipherString")); if (buffer_is_blank(cipher_string)) buffer_append_string_len(cipher_string, CONST_STR_LEN("HIGH")); buffer_append_string_len(cipher_string, CONST_STR_LEN(":!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXP")); } for (size_t i = 0; i < s->ssl_conf_cmd->used; ++i) { ds = (data_string *)s->ssl_conf_cmd->data[i]; /* ("SecurityLevel" is lighttpd extension to SSL_CONF_cmd() syntax) * SSL_CTX_set_security_level() is specific to OpenSSL >= 1.1.0 */ if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("SecurityLevel"))) { #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L int level = atoi(ds->value.ptr); if (level >= 0) SSL_CTX_set_security_level(s->ssl_ctx, level); #endif continue; } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("DHParameters"))) SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(s->ssl_ctx, 0); #endif ERR_clear_error(); if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, ds->key.ptr, ds->value.ptr) <= 0) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: SSL_CONF_cmd %s %s: %s", ds->key.ptr, ds->value.ptr, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); rc = -1; break; } } if (0 == rc && 1 != SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(): %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); rc = -1; } SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); return rc; #elif defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) return mod_openssl_ssl_conf_cmd(srv, s); #else UNUSED(s); log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd not available; ignored"); return 0; #endif } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L \ || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL) #define DH_set0_pqg(dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g) \ ((dh)->p = (dh_p), (dh)->g = (dh_g), (dh_p) != NULL && (dh_g) != NULL) #endif /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7919#appendix-A.1 * A.1. ffdhe2048 * * https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/ffdhe2048.txt * C code generated with: openssl dhparam -C -in ffdhe2048.txt */ static DH *get_dh2048(void) { static unsigned char dhp_2048[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; static unsigned char dhg_2048[] = { 0x02 }; DH *dh = DH_new(); BIGNUM *p, *g; if (dh == NULL) return NULL; p = BN_bin2bn(dhp_2048, sizeof(dhp_2048), NULL); g = BN_bin2bn(dhg_2048, sizeof(dhg_2048), NULL); if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { DH_free(dh); BN_free(p); BN_free(g); return NULL; } return dh; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L */ static int mod_openssl_ssl_conf_dhparameters(server *srv, plugin_config_socket *s, const buffer *dhparameters) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L DH *dh; /* Support for Diffie-Hellman key exchange */ if (dhparameters) { /* DH parameters from file */ BIO *bio; bio = BIO_new_file((char *) dhparameters->ptr, "r"); if (bio == NULL) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: Unable to open file %s", dhparameters->ptr); return 0; } dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); BIO_free(bio); if (dh == NULL) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: PEM_read_bio_DHparams failed %s", dhparameters->ptr); return 0; } SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s->ssl_ctx, dh); DH_free(dh); } else { dh = get_dh2048(); if (dh == NULL) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: get_dh2048() failed"); return 0; } SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s->ssl_ctx, dh); DH_free(dh); } #else /* OSSL_STORE_open() available in openssl 1.1.1, but might * not be present in alt TLS libs (libressl or boringssl) */ EVP_PKEY *dhpkey = NULL; if (dhparameters) { OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; ctx = OSSL_STORE_open(dhparameters->ptr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (NULL != ctx) { if (OSSL_STORE_expect(ctx, OSSL_STORE_INFO_PARAMS)) { while (!OSSL_STORE_eof(ctx)) { OSSL_STORE_INFO *info = OSSL_STORE_load(ctx); if (info) { dhpkey = OSSL_STORE_INFO_get1_PARAMS(info); OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(info); } break; } } OSSL_STORE_close(ctx); } if (!dhpkey || !EVP_PKEY_is_a(dhpkey, "DH") || !SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(s->ssl_ctx, dhpkey)) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "Unable to load DH params from %s", dhparameters->ptr); EVP_PKEY_free(dhpkey); dhpkey = NULL; } /*(else dhpkey ownership transferred upon success)*/ } if (NULL == dhpkey) SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(s->ssl_ctx, 1); #endif SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); #else if (dhparameters) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: openssl compiled without DH support, " "can't load parameters from %s", dhparameters->ptr); } #endif return 1; } static int mod_openssl_ssl_conf_curves(server *srv, plugin_config_socket *s, const buffer *ssl_ec_curve) { #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x2050100fL) /* boringssl eccurves_default[] (now kDefaultGroups[]) * has been the equivalent of "X25519:secp256r1:secp384r1" since 2016 * (previously with secp521r1 appended for Android) * (and before that the equivalent of "secp256r1:secp384r1:secp521r1" * since mid 2014) */ /* libressl eccurves_default[] (now ecgroups_server_default[]) * has been the equivalent of "X25519:secp256r1:secp384r1" * since libressl v2.5.1 (Feb 2017) which added SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list()*/ if (NULL == ssl_ec_curve || buffer_is_blank(ssl_ec_curve)) return 1; #endif #if (defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) && BORINGSSL_API_VERSION >= 3) \ || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x2050100fL) \ || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L const char *groups = ssl_ec_curve && !buffer_is_blank(ssl_ec_curve) ? ssl_ec_curve->ptr : #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) /* libressl recognizes X448, but does not appear to implement X448 */ /* boringssl include/openssl/evp.h contains comment: * > EVP_PKEY_X448 is defined for OpenSSL compatibility, but we do not * > support X448 and attempts to create keys will fail. */ "X25519:P-256:P-384"; #else /* openssl recognizes and implements X448 */ "X25519:P-256:P-384:X448"; #endif #if (defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) && BORINGSSL_API_VERSION >= 19) \ || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \ && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x2050100fL) \ || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L int rc = SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(s->ssl_ctx, groups); #elif (defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) && BORINGSSL_API_VERSION >= 3) \ || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L int rc = SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(s->ssl_ctx, groups); #endif if (1 != rc) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: Unable to config groups %s", groups); return 0; } #else /* Support for Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange */ /* OpenSSL only supports the "named curves" from RFC 4492, section 5.1.1. */ const char *curve = ssl_ec_curve ? ssl_ec_curve->ptr : "prime256v1"; int nid = 0; if (ssl_ec_curve) { /* OpenSSL only supports the "named curves" * from RFC 4492, section 5.1.1. */ nid = OBJ_sn2nid((char *) curve); if (nid == 0) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: Unknown curve name %s", curve); return 0; } } else { #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000 /* Default curve */ nid = OBJ_sn2nid("prime256v1"); #elif OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L \ || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) if (!SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(s->ssl_ctx, 1)) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto() failed"); } #endif } if (nid) { #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L EC_KEY *ecdh; ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); if (ecdh == NULL) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: Unable to create curve %s", curve); return 0; } SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(s->ssl_ctx, ecdh); EC_KEY_free(ecdh); #else /* SSL_CTX_set1_groups() available in openssl 1.1.1, but might * not be present in alt TLS libs (libressl or boringssl) */ if (1 != SSL_CTX_set1_groups(s->ssl_ctx, &nid, 1)) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: Unable to config curve %s", curve); return 0; } #endif SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE); } #endif #endif #endif UNUSED(srv); UNUSED(s); UNUSED(ssl_ec_curve); return 1; } static int network_init_ssl (server *srv, plugin_config_socket *s, plugin_data *p) { /* load SSL certificates */ #ifndef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION #define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0 #endif #ifndef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS /* OpenSSL >= 1.0.0 */ #define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0 #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L uint64_t ssloptions = #elif defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) uint32_t ssloptions = #else long ssloptions = #endif SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L s->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); #else s->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()); #endif if (NULL == s->ssl_ctx) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return -1; } #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION /* openssl 1.1.0 */ ssloptions |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION; #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS /* openssl 3.0.0 */ if (ktls_enable) ssloptions |= SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS; #ifdef SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_SENDFILE ssloptions |= SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_SENDFILE; #endif #endif /* completely useless identifier; * required for client cert verification to work with sessions */ if (0 == SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context( s->ssl_ctx,(const unsigned char*)CONST_STR_LEN("lighttpd"))){ log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: failed to set session context: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return -1; } const int disable_sess_cache = !config_feature_bool(srv, "ssl.session-cache", 0); if (disable_sess_cache) /* disable session cache; session tickets are preferred */ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL); SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, ssloptions); SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(s->ssl_ctx, ssl_info_callback); if (0 != SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) { /* disable SSLv2 */ if ((SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 & SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)) != SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return -1; } } if (0 != SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) { /* disable SSLv3 */ if ((SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 & SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) != SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return -1; } } if (s->ssl_cipher_list) { /* Disable support for low encryption ciphers */ if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s->ssl_ctx,s->ssl_cipher_list->ptr)!=1){ log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return -1; } if (s->ssl_honor_cipher_order) { SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx,SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); } } #ifdef SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA /*(openssl 1.1.1)*/ if (s->ssl_honor_cipher_order) SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA); #endif if (!mod_openssl_ssl_conf_dhparameters(srv, s, NULL)) return -1; if (!mod_openssl_ssl_conf_curves(srv, s, NULL)) return -1; #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s->ssl_ctx, ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb); #else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L */ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_evp_cb(s->ssl_ctx, ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb); #endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP #ifndef BORINGSSL_API_VERSION /* BoringSSL suggests using different API */ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(s->ssl_ctx, ssl_tlsext_status_cb); #endif #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(s->ssl_ctx, mod_openssl_cert_cb, NULL); UNUSED(p); #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) /* BoringSSL limitation */ /* set cert store for auto-chaining * BoringSSL does not support SSL_set1_chain_cert_store() in cert_cb */ if (s->ssl_ca_file && s->ssl_ca_file->store) { if (!X509_STORE_up_ref(s->ssl_ca_file->store)) return -1; SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_ca_file->store); } #endif #else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000 */ /* load all ssl.ca-files specified in the config into each SSL_CTX * This might be a bit excessive, but are all trusted CAs; * load on-demand in mod_openssl_cert_cb() for openssl >= 1.0.2 */ if (!mod_openssl_load_ca_files(s->ssl_ctx, p, srv)) return -1; if (s->ssl_verifyclient) { if (NULL == s->ssl_ca_file) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: You specified ssl.verifyclient.activate " "but no ssl.verifyclient.ca-file"); return -1; } /* WTH openssl? SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() calls set0_CA_list(), * but there is no set1_CA_list() to simply up the reference count * (without needing to duplicate the list) */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * const cert_names = s->ssl_ca_dn_file ? s->ssl_ca_dn_file : s->ssl_ca_file->names; SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_dup_CA_list(cert_names)); int mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; if (s->ssl_verifyclient_enforce) { mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT; } SSL_CTX_set_verify(s->ssl_ctx, mode, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_verifyclient_depth + 1); if (s->ssl_ca_crl_file && !buffer_is_blank(s->ssl_ca_crl_file)) { X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(s->ssl_ctx); if (!mod_openssl_load_cacrls(store,s->ssl_ca_crl_file->ptr,srv)) return -1; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000 */ if (1 != mod_openssl_SSL_CTX_use_cert_and_key(s->ssl_ctx, s->pc, s->pc->kp)) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s %s %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->pc->ssl_pemfile->ptr, s->pc->ssl_privkey->ptr); return -1; } #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) #define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) #endif SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_read_ahead); SSL_CTX_set_mode(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_CTX_get_mode(s->ssl_ctx) | SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE | SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER | SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT #ifdef SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(s->ssl_ctx,mod_openssl_client_hello_cb,srv); #else if (!SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback( s->ssl_ctx, network_ssl_servername_callback) || !SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(s->ssl_ctx, srv)) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: failed to initialize TLS servername callback, " "openssl library does not support TLS servername extension"); return -1; } #endif #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(s->ssl_ctx,mod_openssl_alpn_select_cb,NULL); #endif #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L \ || defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) #ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION if (!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(s->ssl_ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION)) #else if (!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(s->ssl_ctx, TLS1_2_VERSION)) #endif return -1; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH if (s->ech_opts) { #if defined(LIGHTTPD_OPENSSL_ECH_DEBUG) #if !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) SSL_CTX_ech_set_callback(s->ssl_ctx, mod_openssl_ech_cb); #endif #endif #if defined(SSL_OP_ECH_TRIALDECRYPT) /* enable SSL_OP_ECH_TRIALDECRYPT by default unless disabled; * prefer "Options" => "ECHTrialDecrypt" * in lighttpd ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd */ if (config_plugin_value_tobool( array_get_element_klen(s->ech_opts, CONST_STR_LEN("trial-decrypt")), 1)) { SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_ECH_TRIALDECRYPT); } #endif } #endif if (s->ssl_conf_cmd && s->ssl_conf_cmd->used) { if (0 != network_openssl_ssl_conf_cmd(srv, s)) return -1; /* (force compression disabled, the default, if HTTP/2 enabled) */ if (srv->srvconf.h2proto) SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); } return 0; } #define LIGHTTPD_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST \ "EECDH+AESGCM:CHACHA20:!PSK:!DHE" static int mod_openssl_set_defaults_sockets(server *srv, plugin_data *p) { static const config_plugin_keys_t cpk[] = { { CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.engine"), T_CONFIG_BOOL, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_SOCKET } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.cipher-list"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_SOCKET } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd"), T_CONFIG_ARRAY_KVSTRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_SOCKET } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.pemfile"), /* included to process global scope */ T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.stek-file"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_SERVER } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.ech-opts"), T_CONFIG_ARRAY_KVANY, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_SOCKET } ,{ NULL, 0, T_CONFIG_UNSET, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_UNSET } }; static const buffer default_ssl_cipher_list = { CONST_STR_LEN(LIGHTTPD_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST), 0 }; p->ssl_ctxs = ck_calloc(srv->config_context->used,sizeof(plugin_ssl_ctx *)); int rc = HANDLER_GO_ON; plugin_data_base srvplug; memset(&srvplug, 0, sizeof(srvplug)); plugin_data_base * const ps = &srvplug; if (!config_plugin_values_init(srv, ps, cpk, "mod_openssl")) return HANDLER_ERROR; plugin_config_socket defaults; memset(&defaults, 0, sizeof(defaults)); defaults.ssl_cipher_list = &default_ssl_cipher_list; /* process and validate config directives for global and $SERVER["socket"] * (init i to 0 if global context; to 1 to skip empty global context) */ for (int i = !ps->cvlist[0].v.u2[1]; i < ps->nconfig; ++i) { config_cond_info cfginfo; config_get_config_cond_info(&cfginfo, (uint32_t)ps->cvlist[i].k_id); int is_socket_scope = (0 == i || cfginfo.comp == COMP_SERVER_SOCKET); int count_not_engine = 0; plugin_config_socket conf; memcpy(&conf, &defaults, sizeof(conf)); config_plugin_value_t *cpv = ps->cvlist + ps->cvlist[i].v.u2[0]; for (; -1 != cpv->k_id; ++cpv) { /* ignore ssl.pemfile (k_id=3); included to process global scope */ if (!is_socket_scope && cpv->k_id != 3) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "%s is valid only in global scope or " "$SERVER[\"socket\"] condition", cpk[cpv->k_id].k); continue; } ++count_not_engine; switch (cpv->k_id) { case 0: /* ssl.engine */ conf.ssl_enabled = (0 != cpv->v.u); --count_not_engine; break; case 1: /* ssl.cipher-list */ if (!buffer_is_blank(cpv->v.b)) { conf.ssl_cipher_list = cpv->v.b; /*(historical use might list non-PFS ciphers)*/ conf.ssl_honor_cipher_order = 1; log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "%s is deprecated. " "Please prefer lighttpd secure TLS defaults, or use " "ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd \"CipherString\" to set custom " "cipher list.", cpk[cpv->k_id].k); } break; case 2: /* ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd */ *(const array **)&conf.ssl_conf_cmd = cpv->v.a; break; case 3: /* ssl.pemfile */ /* ignore here; included to process global scope when * ssl.pemfile is set, but ssl.engine is not "enable" */ break; case 4: /* ssl.stek-file */ if (!buffer_is_blank(cpv->v.b)) p->ssl_stek_file = cpv->v.b->ptr; break; case 5: /* ssl.ech-opts */ *(const array **)&conf.ech_opts = cpv->v.a; break; default:/* should not happen */ break; } } if (HANDLER_GO_ON != rc) break; if (0 == i) memcpy(&defaults, &conf, sizeof(conf)); if (0 != i && !conf.ssl_enabled) continue; if (0 != i && !is_socket_scope) continue; /* fill plugin_config_socket with global context then $SERVER["socket"] * only for directives directly in current $SERVER["socket"] condition*/ /*conf.pc = p->defaults.pc;*/ conf.ssl_ca_file = p->defaults.ssl_ca_file; conf.ssl_ca_dn_file = p->defaults.ssl_ca_dn_file; conf.ssl_ca_crl_file = p->defaults.ssl_ca_crl_file; conf.ssl_verifyclient = p->defaults.ssl_verifyclient; conf.ssl_verifyclient_enforce = p->defaults.ssl_verifyclient_enforce; conf.ssl_verifyclient_depth = p->defaults.ssl_verifyclient_depth; conf.ssl_read_ahead = p->defaults.ssl_read_ahead; int sidx = ps->cvlist[i].k_id; for (int j = !p->cvlist[0].v.u2[1]; j < p->nconfig; ++j) { if (p->cvlist[j].k_id != sidx) continue; /*if (0 == sidx) break;*//*(repeat to get ssl_pemfile,ssl_privkey)*/ cpv = p->cvlist + p->cvlist[j].v.u2[0]; for (; -1 != cpv->k_id; ++cpv) { ++count_not_engine; switch (cpv->k_id) { case 0: /* ssl.pemfile */ if (cpv->vtype == T_CONFIG_LOCAL) conf.pc = cpv->v.v; break; case 2: /* ssl.ca-file */ if (cpv->vtype == T_CONFIG_LOCAL) conf.ssl_ca_file = cpv->v.v; break; case 3: /* ssl.ca-dn-file */ if (cpv->vtype == T_CONFIG_LOCAL) conf.ssl_ca_dn_file = cpv->v.v; break; case 4: /* ssl.ca-crl-file */ conf.ssl_ca_crl_file = cpv->v.b; break; case 5: /* ssl.read-ahead */ conf.ssl_read_ahead = (0 != cpv->v.u); break; case 6: /* ssl.disable-client-renegotiation */ /*(ignored; unsafe renegotiation disabled by default)*/ break; case 7: /* ssl.verifyclient.activate */ conf.ssl_verifyclient = (0 != cpv->v.u); break; case 8: /* ssl.verifyclient.enforce */ conf.ssl_verifyclient_enforce = (0 != cpv->v.u); break; case 9: /* ssl.verifyclient.depth */ conf.ssl_verifyclient_depth = (unsigned char)cpv->v.shrt; break; #if 0 /*(cpk->k_id remapped in mod_openssl_set_defaults())*/ case 15:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-file */ case 16:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-dn-file */ case 17:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-crl-file */ #endif default: break; } } break; } if (NULL == conf.pc) { if (0 == i && !conf.ssl_enabled) continue; if (0 != i) { /* inherit ssl settings from global scope * (if only ssl.engine = "enable" and no other ssl.* settings) * (This is for convenience when defining both IPv4 and IPv6 * and desiring to inherit the ssl config from global context * without having to duplicate the directives)*/ if (count_not_engine || (conf.ssl_enabled && NULL == p->ssl_ctxs[0])) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssl.pemfile has to be set in same $SERVER[\"socket\"] scope " "as other ssl.* directives, unless only ssl.engine is set, " "inheriting ssl.* from global scope"); rc = HANDLER_ERROR; continue; } p->ssl_ctxs[sidx] = p->ssl_ctxs[0]; /*(copy global scope)*/ continue; } /* PEM file is required */ log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssl.pemfile has to be set when ssl.engine = \"enable\""); rc = HANDLER_ERROR; continue; } /* configure ssl_ctx for socket */ /*conf.ssl_ctx = NULL;*//*(filled by network_init_ssl() even on error)*/ if (0 == network_init_ssl(srv, &conf, p)) { plugin_ssl_ctx * const s = p->ssl_ctxs[sidx] = ck_calloc(1, sizeof(plugin_ssl_ctx)); s->ssl_ctx = conf.ssl_ctx; s->pc = conf.pc; s->kp = mod_openssl_kp_acq(s->pc); if (conf.ech_opts) { const array * const ech_opts = conf.ech_opts; const data_unset *du; du = array_get_element_klen(ech_opts, CONST_STR_LEN("keydir")); s->ech_keydir = du ? &((data_string *)du)->value : NULL; if (s->ech_keydir && buffer_string_is_empty(s->ech_keydir)) s->ech_keydir = NULL; du = array_get_element_klen(ech_opts, CONST_STR_LEN("refresh")); s->ech_keydir_refresh_interval = (uint32_t)config_plugin_value_to_int32(du, 300); du = array_get_element_klen(ech_opts, CONST_STR_LEN("public-names")); if (du && du->type == TYPE_ARRAY) { s->ech_public_hosts = &((data_array *)du)->value; if (s->ech_public_hosts->used == 0) s->ech_public_hosts = NULL; else { /*(error out if "public-names" has ports appended) *(could instead re-create/re-index array, but naw)*/ const array * const a = s->ech_public_hosts; for (uint32_t j = 0; j < a->used; ++j) { const buffer * h = &a->data[j]->key; if (NULL != strchr(h->ptr, ':')) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssl.ech-opts \"public-names\" must be listed" "without port: %s", h->ptr); rc = HANDLER_ERROR; } } } } } } else { SSL_CTX_free(conf.ssl_ctx); rc = HANDLER_ERROR; } } free(srvplug.cvlist); if (rc == HANDLER_GO_ON && ssl_is_init) { #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket mod_openssl_session_ticket_key_check(p, log_epoch_secs); #endif #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_ech mod_openssl_refresh_ech_keys(srv, p, log_epoch_secs); #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) mod_openssl_refresh_crl_files(srv, p, log_epoch_secs); #endif } #if 0 /*(alt: inherit from global scope in mod_openssl_handle_con_accept()*/ if (defaults.ssl_enabled) { #if 0 /* used == 0; priv_defaults hook is called before network_init() */ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < srv->srv_sockets.used; ++i) { if (!srv->srv_sockets.ptr[i]->is_ssl) continue; plugin_ssl_ctx *s = p->ssl_ctxs[srv->srv_sockets.ptr[i]->sidx]; if (NULL == s) /*(no ssl.* directives; inherit from global scope)*/ p->ssl_ctxs[srv->srv_sockets.ptr[i]->sidx] = p->ssl_ctxs[0]; } #endif for (uint32_t i = 1; i < srv->config_context->used; ++i) { config_cond_info cfginfo; config_get_config_cond_info(&cfginfo, (uint32_t)i); if (cfginfo.comp != COMP_SERVER_SOCKET) continue; plugin_ssl_ctx * const s = p->ssl_ctxs[i]; if (NULL == s) p->ssl_ctxs[i] = p->ssl_ctxs[0]; /*(copy from global scope)*/ /* note: copied even when ssl.engine = "disabled", * even though config will not be used when disabled */ } } #endif return rc; } SETDEFAULTS_FUNC(mod_openssl_set_defaults) { static const config_plugin_keys_t cpk[] = { { CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.pemfile"), /* expect pos 0 for refresh certs,staple*/ T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.privkey"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.ca-file"), /* expect pos 2 for refresh crl */ T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.ca-dn-file"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.ca-crl-file"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.read-ahead"), T_CONFIG_BOOL, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.disable-client-renegotiation"), T_CONFIG_BOOL, /*(directive ignored)*/ T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.verifyclient.activate"), T_CONFIG_BOOL, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.verifyclient.enforce"), T_CONFIG_BOOL, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.verifyclient.depth"), T_CONFIG_SHORT, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.verifyclient.username"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.verifyclient.exportcert"), T_CONFIG_BOOL, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.acme-tls-1"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.stapling-file"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("debug.log-ssl-noise"), T_CONFIG_BOOL, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.verifyclient.ca-file"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.verifyclient.ca-dn-file"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.verifyclient.ca-crl-file"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.ech-public-name"), T_CONFIG_STRING, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION } ,{ NULL, 0, T_CONFIG_UNSET, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_UNSET } }; plugin_data * const p = p_d; p->srv = srv; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000 || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) p->cafiles = array_init(0); #endif if (!config_plugin_values_init(srv, p, cpk, "mod_openssl")) return HANDLER_ERROR; const buffer *default_ssl_ca_crl_file = NULL; /* process and validate config directives * (init i to 0 if global context; to 1 to skip empty global context) */ for (int i = !p->cvlist[0].v.u2[1]; i < p->nconfig; ++i) { config_plugin_value_t *cpv = p->cvlist + p->cvlist[i].v.u2[0]; config_plugin_value_t *pemfile = NULL; config_plugin_value_t *privkey = NULL; const buffer *ssl_stapling_file = NULL; const buffer *ssl_ca_file = NULL; const buffer *ssl_ca_dn_file = NULL; const buffer *ssl_ca_crl_file = NULL; plugin_cacerts *cacerts = NULL; for (; -1 != cpv->k_id; ++cpv) { switch (cpv->k_id) { case 0: /* ssl.pemfile */ if (!buffer_is_blank(cpv->v.b)) pemfile = cpv; break; case 1: /* ssl.privkey */ if (!buffer_is_blank(cpv->v.b)) privkey = cpv; break; case 15:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-file */ cpv->k_id = 2; __attribute_fallthrough__ case 2: /* ssl.ca-file */ if (buffer_is_blank(cpv->v.b)) break; if (!mod_openssl_init_once_openssl(srv)) return HANDLER_ERROR; ssl_ca_file = cpv->v.b; cpv->v.v = mod_openssl_load_cacerts(ssl_ca_file, srv->errh); if (NULL != cpv->v.v) { cpv->vtype = T_CONFIG_LOCAL; cacerts = (plugin_cacerts *)cpv->v.v; } else { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), ssl_ca_file->ptr); return HANDLER_ERROR; } break; case 16:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-dn-file */ cpv->k_id = 3; __attribute_fallthrough__ case 3: /* ssl.ca-dn-file */ if (buffer_is_blank(cpv->v.b)) break; if (!mod_openssl_init_once_openssl(srv)) return HANDLER_ERROR; ssl_ca_dn_file = cpv->v.b; cpv->v.v = SSL_load_client_CA_file(ssl_ca_dn_file->ptr); if (NULL != cpv->v.v) { cpv->vtype = T_CONFIG_LOCAL; } else { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), ssl_ca_dn_file->ptr); return HANDLER_ERROR; } break; case 17:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-crl-file */ cpv->k_id = 4; __attribute_fallthrough__ case 4: /* ssl.ca-crl-file */ if (buffer_is_blank(cpv->v.b)) break; ssl_ca_crl_file = cpv->v.b; if (0 == i) default_ssl_ca_crl_file = cpv->v.b; break; case 5: /* ssl.read-ahead */ case 6: /* ssl.disable-client-renegotiation */ /*(ignored; unsafe renegotiation disabled by default)*/ case 7: /* ssl.verifyclient.activate */ case 8: /* ssl.verifyclient.enforce */ break; case 9: /* ssl.verifyclient.depth */ if (cpv->v.shrt > 255) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "%s is absurdly large (%hu); limiting to 255", cpk[cpv->k_id].k, cpv->v.shrt); cpv->v.shrt = 255; } break; case 10:/* ssl.verifyclient.username */ if (buffer_is_blank(cpv->v.b)) cpv->v.b = NULL; break; case 11:/* ssl.verifyclient.exportcert */ break; case 12:/* ssl.acme-tls-1 */ if (buffer_is_blank(cpv->v.b)) cpv->v.b = NULL; break; case 13:/* ssl.stapling-file */ if (!buffer_is_blank(cpv->v.b)) ssl_stapling_file = cpv->v.b; break; case 14:/* debug.log-ssl-noise */ #if 0 /*(handled further above)*/ case 15:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-file */ case 16:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-dn-file */ case 17:/* ssl.verifyclient.ca-crl-file */ #endif break; case 18:/* ssl.ech-public-name */ if (0 != i) { config_cond_info cfginfo; config_get_config_cond_info(&cfginfo, (uint32_t)p->cvlist[i].k_id); if (cfginfo.comp == COMP_HTTP_HOST && cfginfo.cond == CONFIG_COND_EQ) { if (NULL == p->ech_only_hosts) p->ech_only_hosts = array_init(4); #if 0 array_set_key_value(p->ech_only_hosts, BUF_PTR_LEN(cfginfo.string), BUF_PTR_LEN(cpv->v.b)); #else /*(not expecting IPv6-literal as ECH-only)*/ const char *kcolon = strchr(cfginfo.string->ptr, ':'); size_t klen = kcolon ? (size_t)(kcolon - cfginfo.string->ptr) : buffer_string_length(cfginfo.string); array_set_key_value(p->ech_only_hosts, cfginfo.string->ptr, klen, BUF_PTR_LEN(cpv->v.b)); #endif } else { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "%s valid only in $HTTP[\"...\"] == \"...\" config " "condition, not: %s", cpk[cpv->k_id].k, cfginfo.comp_key); } } break; default:/* should not happen */ break; } } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000 /* p->cafiles for legacy only */ \ || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) /* load all ssl.ca-files into a single chain */ /*(certificate load order might matter)*/ if (ssl_ca_dn_file) array_insert_value(p->cafiles, BUF_PTR_LEN(ssl_ca_dn_file)); if (ssl_ca_file) array_insert_value(p->cafiles, BUF_PTR_LEN(ssl_ca_file)); UNUSED(cacerts); UNUSED(ssl_ca_crl_file); UNUSED(default_ssl_ca_crl_file); #else if (NULL == cacerts && ssl_ca_crl_file && i != 0) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssl.verifyclient.ca-crl-file (%s) ignored unless issued with " "ssl.verifyclient.ca-file", ssl_ca_crl_file->ptr); } else if (cacerts && (ssl_ca_crl_file || default_ssl_ca_crl_file)) { /* prior behavior in lighttpd allowed ssl.ca-crl-file only in global * scope or $SERVER["socket"], so this inheritance from global scope * is reasonable. This code does not implement inheritance of * ssl.ca-crl-file from $SERVER["socket"] into nested $HTTP["host"], * but the solution is to repeat ssl.ca-crl-file where ssl.ca-file * is issued (and to not unnecessarily repeat ssl.ca-file) * Alternative: write code to load ssl.ca-crl-file into (X509_CRL *) * using PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL() and in mod_openssl_cert_cb(), * create a new (X509_STORE *) which merges with CA (X509_STORE *) * using X509_STORE_add_cert() and X509_STORE_add_crl(), and keeps * the result in our (plugin_cert *) for reuse */ if (NULL == ssl_ca_crl_file) ssl_ca_crl_file = default_ssl_ca_crl_file; cacerts->crl_file = ssl_ca_crl_file->ptr; cacerts->crl_loadts = (time_t)-1; } #endif if (pemfile) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT config_cond_info cfginfo; uint32_t j = (uint32_t)p->cvlist[i].k_id; config_get_config_cond_info(&cfginfo, j); if (j > 0 && (COMP_SERVER_SOCKET != cfginfo.comp || cfginfo.cond != CONFIG_COND_EQ)) { if (COMP_HTTP_HOST == cfginfo.comp) log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL:" "can't use ssl.pemfile with $HTTP[\"host\"], " "as openssl version does not support TLS extensions"); else log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL:" "ssl.pemfile only works in SSL socket binding context " "as openssl version does not support TLS extensions"); return HANDLER_ERROR; } #endif if (NULL == privkey) privkey = pemfile; pemfile->v.v = network_openssl_load_pemfile(srv, pemfile->v.b, privkey->v.b, ssl_stapling_file); if (pemfile->v.v) pemfile->vtype = T_CONFIG_LOCAL; else return HANDLER_ERROR; } } p->defaults.ssl_verifyclient = 0; p->defaults.ssl_verifyclient_enforce = 1; p->defaults.ssl_verifyclient_depth = 9; p->defaults.ssl_verifyclient_export_cert = 0; p->defaults.ssl_read_ahead = 0; /* initialize p->defaults from global config context */ if (p->nconfig > 0 && p->cvlist->v.u2[1]) { const config_plugin_value_t *cpv = p->cvlist + p->cvlist->v.u2[0]; if (-1 != cpv->k_id) mod_openssl_merge_config(&p->defaults, cpv); } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L \ && !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL:" "openssl library version is outdated and has reached end-of-life. " "As of 11 Sep 2023, only openssl 3.0.0 and later continue to receive " "security patches from openssl.org"); #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS /* openssl 3.0.0 */ mod_openssl_check_ktls(); #endif feature_refresh_certs = config_feature_bool(srv, "ssl.refresh-certs", 0); feature_refresh_crls = config_feature_bool(srv, "ssl.refresh-crls", 0); return mod_openssl_set_defaults_sockets(srv, p); } __attribute_cold__ static int mod_openssl_write_err (SSL * const ssl, int wr, connection * const con, log_error_st * const errh) { int ssl_r; unsigned long err; switch ((ssl_r = SSL_get_error(ssl, wr))) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: con->is_readable = -1; return 0; /* try again later */ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: con->is_writable = -1; return 0; /* try again later */ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: /* perhaps we have error waiting in our error-queue */ if (0 != (err = ERR_get_error())) { do { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %d %d %s",ssl_r,wr,ERR_error_string(err,NULL)); } while ((err = ERR_get_error())); } else if (wr == -1) { /* no, but we have errno */ switch (errno) { case EAGAIN: #ifdef EWOULDBLOCK #if EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif #endif case EINTR: #if defined(__FreeBSD__) && defined(SF_NODISKIO) case EBUSY: #endif return 0; /* try again later */ case EPIPE: case ECONNRESET: return -2; default: log_perror(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %d %d", ssl_r, wr); break; } } else { /* neither error-queue nor errno ? */ log_perror(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL (error): %d %d", ssl_r, wr); } break; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* clean shutdown on the remote side */ if (wr == 0) return -2; __attribute_fallthrough__ default: while ((err = ERR_get_error())) log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %d %d %s", ssl_r, wr, ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); break; } return -1; } /* local_send_buffer is a static buffer of size (LOCAL_SEND_BUFSIZE) * * it has to stay at the same location all the time to satisfy the needs * of SSL_write to pass the SAME parameter in case of a _WANT_WRITE * * buffer is allocated once, is NOT realloced (note: not thread-safe) * * (Note: above restriction no longer true since SSL_CTX_set_mode() is * called with SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) * */ /* copy small mem chunks into single large buffer before SSL_write() * to reduce number times write() called underneath SSL_write() and * potentially reduce number of packets generated if TCP_NODELAY */ static int mod_openssl_close_notify(handler_ctx *hctx); static int connection_write_cq_ssl (connection * const con, chunkqueue * const cq, off_t max_bytes) { handler_ctx * const hctx = con->plugin_ctx[plugin_data_singleton->id]; SSL * const ssl = hctx->ssl; log_error_st * const errh = hctx->errh; if (__builtin_expect( (0 != hctx->close_notify), 0)) return mod_openssl_close_notify(hctx); while (max_bytes > 0 && !chunkqueue_is_empty(cq)) { char *data = local_send_buffer; uint32_t data_len = LOCAL_SEND_BUFSIZE < max_bytes ? LOCAL_SEND_BUFSIZE : (uint32_t)max_bytes; int wr; if (0 != chunkqueue_peek_data(cq, &data, &data_len, errh, 1)) return -1; if (__builtin_expect( (0 == data_len), 0)) { if (!cq->first->file.busy) chunkqueue_remove_finished_chunks(cq); break; /* try again later */ } /** * SSL_write man-page * * WARNING * When an SSL_write() operation has to be repeated because of * SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE, it must be * repeated with the same arguments. */ ERR_clear_error(); wr = SSL_write(ssl, data, data_len); if (__builtin_expect( (hctx->renegotiations > 1), 0)) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: renegotiation initiated by client, killing connection"); return -1; } if (wr <= 0) return mod_openssl_write_err(ssl, wr, con, errh); chunkqueue_mark_written(cq, wr); /* yield if wrote less than read or read less than requested * (if starting cqlen was less than requested read amount, then * chunkqueue should be empty now, so no need to calculate that) */ if ((uint32_t)wr < data_len || data_len <(LOCAL_SEND_BUFSIZE < max_bytes ?LOCAL_SEND_BUFSIZE :(uint32_t)max_bytes)) break; /* try again later */ max_bytes -= wr; } return 0; } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L static int connection_write_cq_ssl_ktls (connection * const con, chunkqueue * const cq, off_t max_bytes) { handler_ctx * const hctx = con->plugin_ctx[plugin_data_singleton->id]; if (__builtin_expect( (0 != hctx->close_notify), 0)) return mod_openssl_close_notify(hctx); /* not done: scan cq for FILE_CHUNK within first max_bytes rather than * only using SSL_sendfile() if the first chunk is FILE_CHUNK. * Checking first chunk for FILE_CHUNK means that initial response headers * and beginning of file will be read into memory before subsequent writes * use SSL_sendfile(). TBD: possible to be further optimized? */ for (chunk *c; (c = cq->first) && c->type == FILE_CHUNK; ) { off_t len = c->file.length - c->offset; if (len > max_bytes) len = max_bytes; if (0 == len) break; /*(FILE_CHUNK or max_bytes should not be 0)*/ if (-1 == c->file.fd && 0 != chunk_open_file_chunk(c, hctx->errh)) return -1; #if defined(__FreeBSD__) && defined(SF_NODISKIO) int flags = !c->file.busy ? SF_NODISKIO : 0; #ifdef SF_FLAGS flags = SF_FLAGS(32, flags); #endif ossl_ssize_t wr = SSL_sendfile(hctx->ssl, c->file.fd, c->offset, (size_t)len, flags); if (wr < 0) { c->file.busy = (errno == EBUSY); return mod_openssl_write_err(hctx->ssl, (int)wr, con, hctx->errh); } c->file.busy = 0; #else ossl_ssize_t wr = SSL_sendfile(hctx->ssl, c->file.fd, c->offset, (size_t)len, 0); if (wr < 0) return mod_openssl_write_err(hctx->ssl, (int)wr, con, hctx->errh); #endif chunkqueue_mark_written(cq, wr); max_bytes -= wr; if (wr < len) return 0; /* try again later */ } return connection_write_cq_ssl(con, cq, max_bytes); } #endif static int connection_read_cq_ssl (connection * const con, chunkqueue * const cq, off_t max_bytes) { handler_ctx * const hctx = con->plugin_ctx[plugin_data_singleton->id]; int len; char *mem = NULL; size_t mem_len = 0; UNUSED(max_bytes); if (__builtin_expect( (0 != hctx->close_notify), 0)) return mod_openssl_close_notify(hctx); ERR_clear_error(); do { len = SSL_pending(hctx->ssl); mem_len = len < 2048 ? 2048 : (size_t)len; chunk * const ckpt = cq->last; mem = chunkqueue_get_memory(cq, &mem_len); len = SSL_read(hctx->ssl, mem, mem_len); chunkqueue_use_memory(cq, ckpt, len > 0 ? len : 0); if (hctx->renegotiations > 1) { log_error(hctx->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: renegotiation initiated by client, killing connection (%s)", con->dst_addr_buf.ptr); return -1; } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L /* ideally should be done only once, after handshake completes, * so check each time for HTTP/2 so that we do not re-enable */ if (hctx->r->http_version < HTTP_VERSION_2 && BIO_get_ktls_send(SSL_get_wbio(hctx->ssl)) > 0) con->network_write = connection_write_cq_ssl_ktls; #endif #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation if (hctx->alpn) { if (hctx->alpn == MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_H2) { if (0 != mod_openssl_alpn_h2_policy(hctx)) return -1; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L /*(not expecting FILE_CHUNKs in write_queue with h2, * so skip ktls and SSL_sendfile; reset to default)*/ con->network_write = connection_write_cq_ssl; #endif } else if (hctx->alpn == MOD_OPENSSL_ALPN_ACME_TLS_1) { chunkqueue_reset(cq); /* initiate handshake in order to send ServerHello. * Once TLS handshake is complete, return -1 to result in * CON_STATE_ERROR so that socket connection is quickly closed*/ if (1 == SSL_do_handshake(hctx->ssl)) return -1; len = -1; break; } hctx->alpn = 0; } #endif } while (len > 0 && (hctx->conf.ssl_read_ahead || SSL_pending(hctx->ssl) > 0)); if (len < 0) { int oerrno = errno; int rc, ssl_err; switch ((rc = SSL_get_error(hctx->ssl, len))) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: con->is_writable = -1; __attribute_fallthrough__ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: con->is_readable = 0; /* the manual says we have to call SSL_read with the same arguments * next time. we ignore this restriction; no one has complained * about it in 1.5 yet, so it probably works anyway. */ return 0; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: /** * man SSL_get_error() * * SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL * Some I/O error occurred. The OpenSSL error queue may contain * more information on the error. If the error queue is empty * (i.e. ERR_get_error() returns 0), ret can be used to find out * more about the error: If ret == 0, an EOF was observed that * violates the protocol. If ret == -1, the underlying BIO * reported an I/O error (for socket I/O on Unix systems, consult * errno for details). * */ while((ssl_err = ERR_get_error())) { /* get all errors from the error-queue */ log_error(hctx->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %d %s", rc, ERR_error_string(ssl_err, NULL)); } switch(oerrno) { case ECONNRESET: if (!hctx->conf.ssl_log_noise) break; __attribute_fallthrough__ default: /* (oerrno should be something like ECONNABORTED not 0 * if client disconnected before anything was sent * (e.g. TCP connection probe), but it does not appear * that openssl provides such notification, not even * something like SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) */ if (0==oerrno && 0==cq->bytes_in && !hctx->conf.ssl_log_noise) break; errno = oerrno; /*(for log_perror())*/ log_perror(hctx->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %d %d %d", len, rc, oerrno); break; } break; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* clean shutdown on the remote side */ /* future: might set flag to record that we received CLOSE_NOTIFY * TLS alert from peer, then have future calls to this func return * the equivalent of EOF, but we also want to remove read interest * on fd, perhaps by setting RDHUP. If setting is_readable, ensure * that callers avoid spinning if we return EOF while is_readable. * * Should we treat this like len == 0 below and return -2 ? */ /*__attribute_fallthrough__*/ default: while((ssl_err = ERR_get_error())) { switch (ERR_GET_REASON(ssl_err)) { case SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: #ifdef SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING case SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING: #endif #ifdef SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA case SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA: #endif #ifdef SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN case SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: #endif #ifdef SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE case SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE: #endif if (!hctx->conf.ssl_log_noise) continue; break; default: break; } /* get all errors from the error-queue */ log_error(hctx->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %d %s (%s)", rc, ERR_error_string(ssl_err, NULL), con->dst_addr_buf.ptr); } break; } return -1; } else if (len == 0) { con->is_readable = 0; /* the other end close the connection -> KEEP-ALIVE */ return -2; } else { return 0; } } CONNECTION_FUNC(mod_openssl_handle_con_accept) { const server_socket *srv_sock = con->srv_socket; if (!srv_sock->is_ssl) return HANDLER_GO_ON; plugin_data *p = p_d; handler_ctx * const hctx = handler_ctx_init(); request_st * const r = &con->request; hctx->r = r; hctx->con = con; hctx->errh = r->conf.errh; con->plugin_ctx[p->id] = hctx; buffer_blank(&r->uri.authority); plugin_ssl_ctx *s = p->ssl_ctxs[srv_sock->sidx] ? p->ssl_ctxs[srv_sock->sidx] : p->ssl_ctxs[0]; if (s) { hctx->ssl_ctx_pc = s->pc; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH hctx->ech_public_hosts = s->ech_public_hosts; hctx->ech_only_hosts = p->ech_only_hosts; hctx->ech_only_policy = (hctx->ech_only_hosts||hctx->ech_public_hosts); #endif hctx->ssl = SSL_new(s->ssl_ctx); } if (NULL != hctx->ssl && SSL_set_app_data(hctx->ssl, hctx) && SSL_set_fd(hctx->ssl, con->fd)) { SSL_set_accept_state(hctx->ssl); con->network_read = connection_read_cq_ssl; con->network_write = connection_write_cq_ssl; con->proto_default_port = 443; /* "https" */ mod_openssl_patch_config(r, &hctx->conf); return HANDLER_GO_ON; } else { log_error(r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return HANDLER_ERROR; } } static void mod_openssl_detach(handler_ctx *hctx) { /* step aside from further SSL processing * (used after handle_connection_shut_wr hook) */ /* future: might restore prior network_read and network_write fn ptrs */ hctx->con->is_ssl_sock = 0; /* if called after handle_connection_shut_wr hook, shutdown SHUT_WR */ if (-1 == hctx->close_notify) shutdown(hctx->con->fd, SHUT_WR); hctx->close_notify = 1; } CONNECTION_FUNC(mod_openssl_handle_con_shut_wr) { plugin_data *p = p_d; handler_ctx *hctx = con->plugin_ctx[p->id]; if (NULL == hctx) return HANDLER_GO_ON; hctx->close_notify = -2; if (SSL_is_init_finished(hctx->ssl)) { mod_openssl_close_notify(hctx); } else { mod_openssl_detach(hctx); } return HANDLER_GO_ON; } static int mod_openssl_close_notify(handler_ctx *hctx) { int ret, ssl_r; unsigned long err; log_error_st *errh; if (1 == hctx->close_notify) return -2; ERR_clear_error(); switch ((ret = SSL_shutdown(hctx->ssl))) { case 1: mod_openssl_detach(hctx); return -2; case 0: /* Drain SSL read buffers in case pending records need processing. * Limit to reading next record to avoid denial of service when CPU * processing TLS is slower than arrival speed of TLS data packets. * (unless hctx->conf.ssl_read_ahead is set) * * references: * * "New session ticket breaks bidirectional shutdown of TLS 1.3 connection" * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6262 * * The peer is still allowed to send data after receiving the * "close notify" event. If the peer did send data it need to be * processed by calling SSL_read() before calling SSL_shutdown() a * second time. SSL_read() will indicate the end of the peer data by * returning <= 0 and SSL_get_error() returning * SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN. It is recommended to call SSL_read() * between SSL_shutdown() calls. * * Additional discussion in "Auto retry in shutdown" * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340 */ ssl_r = SSL_pending(hctx->ssl); if (ssl_r) { do { char buf[4096]; ret = SSL_read(hctx->ssl, buf, (int)sizeof(buf)); } while (ret > 0 && (hctx->conf.ssl_read_ahead||(ssl_r-=ret))); } ERR_clear_error(); switch ((ret = SSL_shutdown(hctx->ssl))) { case 1: mod_openssl_detach(hctx); return -2; case 0: hctx->close_notify = -1; return 0; default: break; } __attribute_fallthrough__ default: if (!SSL_is_init_finished(hctx->ssl)) { mod_openssl_detach(hctx); return -2; } switch ((ssl_r = SSL_get_error(hctx->ssl, ret))) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /*(unexpected here)*/ hctx->close_notify = -1; return 0; /* try again later */ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: if (0 == ERR_peek_error()) { switch(errno) { case 0: /*ssl bug (see lighttpd ticket #2213)*/ case EPIPE: case ECONNRESET: mod_openssl_detach(hctx); return -2; default: log_perror(hctx->r->conf.errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL (error): %d %d", ssl_r, ret); break; } break; } __attribute_fallthrough__ default: errh = hctx->r->conf.errh; while((err = ERR_get_error())) { log_error(errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %d %d %s", ssl_r, ret, ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); } break; } } ERR_clear_error(); hctx->close_notify = -1; return ret; } CONNECTION_FUNC(mod_openssl_handle_con_close) { plugin_data *p = p_d; handler_ctx *hctx = con->plugin_ctx[p->id]; if (NULL != hctx) { con->plugin_ctx[p->id] = NULL; handler_ctx_free(hctx); } return HANDLER_GO_ON; } static void https_add_ssl_client_subject (request_st * const r, X509_NAME *xn) { const size_t prelen = sizeof("SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_")-1; char key[64] = "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_"; for (int i = 0, nentries = X509_NAME_entry_count(xn); i < nentries; ++i) { int xobjnid; const char * xobjsn; X509_NAME_ENTRY *xe; if (!(xe = X509_NAME_get_entry(xn, i))) { continue; } xobjnid = OBJ_obj2nid((ASN1_OBJECT*)X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(xe)); xobjsn = OBJ_nid2sn(xobjnid); if (xobjsn) { const size_t len = strlen(xobjsn); if (prelen+len >= sizeof(key)) continue; memcpy(key+prelen, xobjsn, len); /*(not '\0'-terminated)*/ http_header_env_set(r, key, prelen+len, (const char*)X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xe)->data, X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xe)->length); } } } __attribute_cold__ static void https_add_ssl_client_verify_err (buffer * const b, long status) { char errstr[256]; ERR_error_string_n(status, errstr, sizeof(errstr)); buffer_append_string(b, errstr); } __attribute_noinline__ static void https_add_ssl_client_entries (request_st * const r, handler_ctx * const hctx) { X509 *xs; X509_NAME *xn; buffer *vb = http_header_env_set_ptr(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY")); long vr = SSL_get_verify_result(hctx->ssl); if (vr != X509_V_OK) { buffer_copy_string_len(vb, CONST_STR_LEN("FAILED:")); https_add_ssl_client_verify_err(vb, vr); return; } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L else if (!(xs = SSL_get_peer_certificate(hctx->ssl))) #else else if (!(xs = SSL_get0_peer_certificate(hctx->ssl))) #endif { buffer_copy_string_len(vb, CONST_STR_LEN("NONE")); return; } else { buffer_copy_string_len(vb, CONST_STR_LEN("SUCCESS")); } xn = X509_get_subject_name(xs); { char buf[256]; int len = safer_X509_NAME_oneline(xn, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len > 0) { if (len >= (int)sizeof(buf)) len = (int)sizeof(buf)-1; http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_CLIENT_S_DN"), buf, (size_t)len); } } https_add_ssl_client_subject(r, xn); { ASN1_INTEGER *xsn = X509_get_serialNumber(xs); BIGNUM *serialBN = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(xsn, NULL); char *serialHex = BN_bn2hex(serialBN); http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_CLIENT_M_SERIAL"), serialHex, strlen(serialHex)); OPENSSL_free(serialHex); BN_free(serialBN); } if (hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient_username) { /* pick one of the exported values as "REMOTE_USER", for example * ssl.verifyclient.username = "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_UID" * or * ssl.verifyclient.username = "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_emailAddress" */ const buffer *varname = hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient_username; vb = http_header_env_get(r, BUF_PTR_LEN(varname)); if (vb) { /* same as mod_auth_api.c:http_auth_setenv() */ http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("REMOTE_USER"), BUF_PTR_LEN(vb)); http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("AUTH_TYPE"), CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY")); } } if (hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient_export_cert) { BIO *bio; if (NULL != (bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) { PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, xs); const int n = BIO_pending(bio); vb = http_header_env_set_ptr(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_CLIENT_CERT")); buffer_extend(vb, (uint32_t)n); BIO_read(bio, vb->ptr, n); BIO_free(bio); } } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L X509_free(xs); #endif } #ifdef LIGHTTPD_OPENSSL_ECH_DEBUG #if !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) static void http_cgi_ssl_ech(request_st * const r, SSL * const ssl) { /* add to environment ECH status, inner SNI, and outer SNI */ char *sni_ech = NULL; char *sni_clr = NULL; int status = SSL_ech_get1_status(ssl, &sni_ech, &sni_clr); const char *str = ech_status_str(status); if (str == NULL) str = "ECH status unknown"; /*(alt: format status to str)*/ http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_ECH_STATUS"), str, strlen(str)); const char *clr = sni_clr ? sni_clr : "NONE"; http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_ECH_OUTER_SNI"),clr,strlen(clr)); const char *ech = sni_ech ? sni_ech : "NONE"; http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_ECH_INNER_SNI"),ech,strlen(ech)); OPENSSL_free(sni_ech); OPENSSL_free(sni_clr); } #endif #endif static void http_cgi_ssl_env (request_st * const r, handler_ctx * const hctx) { const char *s; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; s = SSL_get_version(hctx->ssl); http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_PROTOCOL"), s, strlen(s)); if ((cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(hctx->ssl))) { int usekeysize, algkeysize = 0; char buf[LI_ITOSTRING_LENGTH]; s = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_CIPHER"), s, strlen(s)); usekeysize = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher, &algkeysize); if (0 == algkeysize) algkeysize = usekeysize; http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE"), buf, li_itostrn(buf, sizeof(buf), usekeysize)); http_header_env_set(r, CONST_STR_LEN("SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE"), buf, li_itostrn(buf, sizeof(buf), algkeysize)); } #ifdef LIGHTTPD_OPENSSL_ECH_DEBUG #if !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) http_cgi_ssl_ech(r, hctx->ssl); #endif #endif } REQUEST_FUNC(mod_openssl_handle_request_env) { plugin_data *p = p_d; /* simple flag for request_env_patched */ if (r->plugin_ctx[p->id]) return HANDLER_GO_ON; handler_ctx *hctx = r->con->plugin_ctx[p->id]; if (NULL == hctx) return HANDLER_GO_ON; r->plugin_ctx[p->id] = (void *)(uintptr_t)1u; http_cgi_ssl_env(r, hctx); if (hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient) { https_add_ssl_client_entries(r, hctx); } return HANDLER_GO_ON; } REQUEST_FUNC(mod_openssl_handle_uri_raw) { /* mod_openssl must be loaded prior to mod_auth * if mod_openssl is configured to set REMOTE_USER based on client cert */ /* mod_openssl must be loaded after mod_extforward * if mod_openssl config is based on lighttpd.conf remote IP conditional * using remote IP address set by mod_extforward, *unless* PROXY protocol * is enabled with extforward.hap-PROXY = "enable", in which case the * reverse is true: mod_extforward must be loaded after mod_openssl */ plugin_data *p = p_d; handler_ctx *hctx = r->con->plugin_ctx[p->id]; if (NULL == hctx) return HANDLER_GO_ON; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH if (hctx->ech_only_policy) { /* ECH-only hosts are configured */ handler_t rc = mod_openssl_ech_only_policy_check(r, hctx); if (HANDLER_GO_ON != rc) return rc; } #endif mod_openssl_patch_config(r, &hctx->conf); if (hctx->conf.ssl_verifyclient) { mod_openssl_handle_request_env(r, p); } return HANDLER_GO_ON; } REQUEST_FUNC(mod_openssl_handle_request_reset) { plugin_data *p = p_d; r->plugin_ctx[p->id] = NULL; /* simple flag for request_env_patched */ return HANDLER_GO_ON; } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) static void mod_openssl_refresh_plugin_ssl_ctx (server * const srv, plugin_ssl_ctx * const s) { if (NULL == s->kp || NULL == s->pc || s->kp == s->pc->kp) return; mod_openssl_kp_rel(s->kp); s->kp = mod_openssl_kp_acq(s->pc); if (1 != mod_openssl_SSL_CTX_use_cert_and_key(s->ssl_ctx, s->pc, s->kp)) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s %s %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->pc->ssl_pemfile->ptr, s->pc->ssl_privkey->ptr); /* no recovery until admin fixes input files */ } } static int mod_openssl_refresh_plugin_cert (server * const srv, plugin_cert * const pc) { /* Check for and free updated items from prior refresh iteration and which * now have refcnt 0. Waiting for next iteration is a not-quite thread-safe * but lock-free way to have extremely low probability that another thread * might have a reference but was suspended between storing pointer and * updating refcnt (kp_acq), and still suspended full refresh period later; * highly unlikely unless thread is stopped in a debugger. There should be * single maint thread, other threads read only pc->kp head, and pc->kp head * should always have refcnt >= 1, except possibly during process shutdown*/ /*(lighttpd is currently single-threaded)*/ for (mod_openssl_kp **kpp = &pc->kp->next; *kpp; ) { mod_openssl_kp *kp = *kpp; if (kp->refcnt) kpp = &kp->next; else { *kpp = kp->next; mod_openssl_kp_free(kp); } } /* Note: check last modification timestamp only on privkey file, so when * 'mv' updated files into place from generation location, script should * update privkey last, after pem file (and OCSP stapling file) */ struct stat st; if (0 != stat(pc->ssl_privkey->ptr, &st)) return 0; /* ignore if stat() error; keep using existing crt/pk */ if (TIME64_CAST(st.st_mtime) <= pc->pkey_ts) return 0; /* mtime match; no change */ plugin_cert *npc = network_openssl_load_pemfile(srv, pc->ssl_pemfile, pc->ssl_privkey, pc->ssl_stapling_file); if (NULL == npc) return 0; /* ignore if crt/pk error; keep using existing crt/pk */ /*(future: if threaded, only one thread should update pcs)*/ mod_openssl_kp * const kp = pc->kp; mod_openssl_kp * const nkp = npc->kp; nkp->next = kp; pc->pkey_ts = npc->pkey_ts; pc->kp = nkp; mod_openssl_kp_rel(kp); free(npc); return 1; } static void mod_openssl_refresh_certs (server *srv, const plugin_data * const p) { if (NULL == p->cvlist) return; int newpcs = 0; /* (init i to 0 if global context; to 1 to skip empty global context) */ for (int i = !p->cvlist[0].v.u2[1], used = p->nconfig; i < used; ++i) { config_plugin_value_t *cpv = p->cvlist + p->cvlist[i].v.u2[0]; for (; -1 != cpv->k_id; ++cpv) { if (cpv->k_id != 0) continue; /* k_id == 0 for ssl.pemfile */ if (cpv->vtype != T_CONFIG_LOCAL) continue; newpcs |= mod_openssl_refresh_plugin_cert(srv, cpv->v.v); } } if (newpcs && NULL != p->ssl_ctxs) { if (p->ssl_ctxs[0]) mod_openssl_refresh_plugin_ssl_ctx(srv, p->ssl_ctxs[0]); /* refresh $SERVER["socket"] (if not copy of global scope) */ for (uint32_t i = 1; i < srv->config_context->used; ++i) { plugin_ssl_ctx * const s = p->ssl_ctxs[i]; if (s && s != p->ssl_ctxs[0]) mod_openssl_refresh_plugin_ssl_ctx(srv, s); } } } #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 && !LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ TRIGGER_FUNC(mod_openssl_handle_trigger) { const plugin_data * const p = p_d; const unix_time64_t cur_ts = log_epoch_secs; if (cur_ts & 0x3f) return HANDLER_GO_ON; /*(continue once each 64 sec)*/ UNUSED(srv); UNUSED(p); #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket mod_openssl_session_ticket_key_check(p, cur_ts); #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) /* enable with SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb() which runs unconditionally; * not enabled for older openssl or for LibreSSL since refcnt not incr if * SNI not present (when SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb() is not supported and used) */ /*if (!(cur_ts & 0x3ff))*/ /*(once each 1024 sec (~17 min))*/ if (feature_refresh_certs) mod_openssl_refresh_certs(srv, p); #else UNUSED(feature_refresh_certs); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP mod_openssl_refresh_stapling_files(srv, p, cur_ts); #endif #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_ech mod_openssl_refresh_ech_keys(srv, p, cur_ts); #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000 && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) if (feature_refresh_crls) mod_openssl_refresh_crl_files(srv, p, cur_ts); #else UNUSED(feature_refresh_crls); #endif return HANDLER_GO_ON; } __attribute_cold__ __declspec_dllexport__ int mod_openssl_plugin_init (plugin *p); int mod_openssl_plugin_init (plugin *p) { p->version = LIGHTTPD_VERSION_ID; p->name = "openssl"; p->init = mod_openssl_init; p->cleanup = mod_openssl_free; p->priv_defaults= mod_openssl_set_defaults; p->handle_connection_accept = mod_openssl_handle_con_accept; p->handle_connection_shut_wr = mod_openssl_handle_con_shut_wr; p->handle_connection_close = mod_openssl_handle_con_close; p->handle_uri_raw = mod_openssl_handle_uri_raw; p->handle_request_env = mod_openssl_handle_request_env; p->handle_request_reset = mod_openssl_handle_request_reset; p->handle_trigger = mod_openssl_handle_trigger; return 0; } #if defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION) \ || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) static int mod_openssl_ssl_conf_proto_val (server *srv, const buffer *b, int max) { if (NULL == b) /* default: min TLSv1.3 (if supported), max TLSv1.3 */ #ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION return TLS1_3_VERSION; #else return TLS1_2_VERSION; #endif else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(b, CONST_STR_LEN("None"))) /*"disable" limit*/ return max ? #ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION TLS1_3_VERSION #else TLS1_2_VERSION #endif : TLS1_VERSION; else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(b, CONST_STR_LEN("TLSv1.0"))) return TLS1_VERSION; else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(b, CONST_STR_LEN("TLSv1.1"))) return TLS1_1_VERSION; else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(b, CONST_STR_LEN("TLSv1.2"))) return TLS1_2_VERSION; #ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(b, CONST_STR_LEN("TLSv1.3"))) return TLS1_3_VERSION; #endif else { if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(b, CONST_STR_LEN("DTLSv1")) || buffer_eq_icase_slen(b, CONST_STR_LEN("DTLSv1.2"))) log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd %s %s ignored", max ? "MaxProtocol" : "MinProtocol", b->ptr); else log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd %s %s invalid; ignored", max ? "MaxProtocol" : "MinProtocol", b->ptr); } #ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION return TLS1_3_VERSION; #else return TLS1_2_VERSION; #endif } static int mod_openssl_ssl_conf_cmd (server *srv, plugin_config_socket *s) { /* reference: * https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.html */ int rc = 0; buffer *cipherstring = NULL; buffer *ciphersuites = NULL; buffer *minb = NULL; buffer *maxb = NULL; buffer *curves = NULL; for (size_t i = 0; i < s->ssl_conf_cmd->used; ++i) { data_string *ds = (data_string *)s->ssl_conf_cmd->data[i]; if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("CipherString"))) cipherstring = &ds->value; else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("Ciphersuites"))) ciphersuites = &ds->value; else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("Curves")) || buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("Groups"))) curves = &ds->value; else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("DHParameters"))){ if (!buffer_is_blank(&ds->value)) { if (!mod_openssl_ssl_conf_dhparameters(srv, s, &ds->value)) rc = -1; } } else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("MaxProtocol"))) maxb = &ds->value; else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("MinProtocol"))) minb = &ds->value; else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("Protocol"))) { /* openssl config for Protocol=... is complex and deprecated */ log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd %s ignored; " "use MinProtocol=... and MaxProtocol=... instead", ds->key.ptr); } else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("Options"))) { for (char *v = ds->value.ptr, *e; *v; v = e) { while (*v == ' ' || *v == '\t' || *v == ',') ++v; int flag = 1; if (*v == '-') { flag = 0; ++v; } else if (*v == '+') ++v; for (e = v; light_isalpha(*e); ++e) ; switch ((int)(e-v)) { #ifdef SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS case 4: if (buffer_eq_icase_ssn(v, "KTLS", 4)) { if (flag) SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS); else SSL_CTX_clear_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS); continue; } break; #endif case 11: if (buffer_eq_icase_ssn(v, "Compression", 11)) { /* (force disabled, the default, if HTTP/2 enabled) */ if (srv->srvconf.h2proto) flag = 0; if (flag) SSL_CTX_clear_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); else SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); continue; } break; case 13: if (buffer_eq_icase_ssn(v, "SessionTicket", 13)) { if (flag) SSL_CTX_clear_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET); else SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET); continue; } break; case 16: if (buffer_eq_icase_ssn(v, "ServerPreference", 16)) { if (flag) SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); else SSL_CTX_clear_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); s->ssl_honor_cipher_order = flag; continue; } break; default: break; } /* warn if not explicitly handled or ignored above */ if (!flag) --v; log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd Options %.*s " "ignored", (int)(e-v), v); } } #if 0 else if (buffer_eq_icase_slen(&ds->key, CONST_STR_LEN("..."))) { } #endif else { /* warn if not explicitly handled or ignored above */ log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd %s ignored", ds->key.ptr); } } if (minb) { int n = mod_openssl_ssl_conf_proto_val(srv, minb, 0); if (!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(s->ssl_ctx, n)) rc = -1; } if (maxb) { int x = mod_openssl_ssl_conf_proto_val(srv, maxb, 1); if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(s->ssl_ctx, x)) rc = -1; } if (ciphersuites && !buffer_is_blank(ciphersuites)) { #if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && defined(LIBRESSL_HAS_TLS1_3) if (SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(s->ssl_ctx, ciphersuites->ptr) != 1) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); rc = -1; } #endif } if (cipherstring && !buffer_is_blank(cipherstring)) { /* Disable support for low encryption ciphers */ buffer_append_string_len(cipherstring, CONST_STR_LEN(":!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXP")); if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s->ssl_ctx, cipherstring->ptr) != 1) { log_error(srv->errh, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSL: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); rc = -1; } if (s->ssl_honor_cipher_order) SSL_CTX_set_options(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); } if (curves && !buffer_is_blank(curves)) { if (!mod_openssl_ssl_conf_curves(srv, s, curves)) rc = -1; } return rc; } #endif /* BORINGSSL_API_VERSION || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER */