/**
 * Shared log-sanitization helpers.
 *
 * Centralises truncate + secret-redaction patterns so every provider stays
 * consistent and any regex improvements only need one change.
 *
 * Coverage:
 *   - `Authorization: Bearer <token>` (with required whitespace)
 *   - `Authorization: Token <token>` (Replicate uses this, not Bearer)
 *   - `Authorization: Basic <base64>` (D-ID and similar)
 *   - Bare tokens by known provider prefix:
 *     sk-/pk- (OpenAI, Anthropic, Stability),
 *     r8_ (Replicate), gsk_ (Groq), csk- (Cerebras), xai- (xAI),
 *     tgp_ (Together), fw_ (Fireworks), pplx- (Perplexity), pa- (Voyage),
 *     jina_ (Jina), fish- (Fish Audio)
 *   - Generic key=value pairs: api_key=…, access_token: …, secret_key=…
 */
/**
 * Truncate `text` to `maxLen` chars then replace embedded secrets with `***`.
 *
 * Use this for free-form text logged from response/request bodies. For
 * structured data (records, headers) prefer {@link sanitizeRecord} and
 * {@link sanitizeHeaders} which know to redact by key name as well.
 *
 * @param text   - Raw text to sanitize (typically an HTTP response body).
 * @param maxLen - Maximum number of characters to keep (default 500).
 */
export declare function sanitizeForLog(text: string, maxLen?: number): string;
/**
 * Stringify non-string message/tool content without ever throwing.
 * JSON.stringify on a giant multimodal/tool-result payload can exceed V8's
 * maximum string length and throw `RangeError: Invalid string length` — a
 * generation turn must degrade to a placeholder, not abort, when that
 * happens. Shared by the SDK core and providers (single source of truth).
 */
export declare function stringifyContentSafe(content: unknown): string;
/**
 * Serialize an arbitrary value for a debug log without ever throwing or
 * producing an unbounded string.
 *
 * `JSON.stringify` on a full options object (conversation history + tool
 * outputs) can exceed V8's maximum string length and throw
 * `RangeError: Invalid string length`, which — when evaluated eagerly inside
 * a logger call — aborts the surrounding generation turn (observed in
 * production). This helper caps the output and converts any stringify
 * failure (RangeError, circular structure, BigInt, …) into a placeholder.
 *
 * Callers MUST still gate on `logger.shouldLog("debug")` per the Logger
 * Guard rule — this helper makes serialization safe, not free.
 *
 * @param value  - Arbitrary value to serialize.
 * @param maxLen - Maximum number of characters to keep (default 10 000).
 */
export declare function safeDebugSerialize(value: unknown, maxLen?: number): string;
/**
 * Strip embedded `user:pass@` credentials from a URL's authority component
 * before logging it or surfacing it in a user-facing error.
 *
 * Turns `https://user:secret@host/path` into `https://***@host/path` while
 * leaving credential-free URLs untouched, so the host/port/path stay useful
 * for diagnostics. Use this for any `baseURL`/endpoint a caller may have
 * supplied with inline credentials. The match is global, so every `//…@`
 * authority in the string is redacted (e.g. a proxy chain or a URL embedded
 * in a query parameter), not just the first. IPv6 literal hosts (`//u:p@[::1]/x`)
 * and percent-encoded userinfo (`//u:p%40x@host/x`) are handled naturally —
 * neither `[`/`]` nor `%` stop either pass below, so the bracketed host or
 * encoded byte just rides along as part of the (non-redacted) remainder.
 *
 * This is best-effort defense-in-depth for free-form logging, deliberately
 * regex-based so it can scrub *multiple* embedded authorities out of
 * arbitrary text (a real URL parser only ever parses one URL at a time).
 * It is NOT the primary protection for user-facing errors — that's
 * {@link redactUrlForError}, which parses the single input via `new URL()`
 * and reconstructs from protocol+host+pathname, never touching userinfo at
 * all. Prefer that function whenever the input is known to be exactly one
 * URL.
 *
 * Two passes, deliberately:
 *  1. Well-formed authorities — credentials with no raw `/` — bounded at the
 *     authority's first `/` (or string end). Greedy backtracking naturally
 *     absorbs multiple `@` segments within one authority (e.g. `//a@b@host`
 *     → `//***@host`) while leaving a second, separate `//...@` authority
 *     elsewhere in the string (e.g. one embedded in a query parameter)
 *     untouched, because pass 1's own exclusion of `/` stops it at the first
 *     `/`, before it can ever reach a nested authority.
 *  2. Malformed authorities whose credentials contain an unescaped `/`
 *     (e.g. `//user:sec/ret@host/path`) — pass 1 can't find an `@` before
 *     hitting that `/`, so this pass allows `/` and redacts up to the last
 *     remaining `@`. It stops before any *nested* `//` (via a negative
 *     lookahead) rather than excluding a specific character like `*` —
 *     excluding a literal character is what let a password containing both
 *     `/` and `*` (e.g. `//user:pa*ss/word@host/path`, legal under RFC 3986)
 *     slip through both passes entirely in an earlier version of this
 *     function.
 *
 * @param url - The URL (or URL-shaped string) to redact.
 */
export declare function redactUrlCredentials(url: string): string;
/**
 * Reduce a URL to its origin + pathname for safe inclusion in error messages
 * and logs, dropping the query string and fragment — where presigned-URL
 * signatures, SAS tokens, and other secrets commonly live — while keeping
 * enough of the URL (scheme, host, path) for the error to stay diagnostic.
 *
 * Falls back to a best-effort redacted string (query/fragment and
 * `user:pass@` stripped) when the input isn't a parseable absolute URL.
 * Either way the result is capped at 200 chars so a very long host/path
 * can't blow up the error message.
 *
 * @param url - The URL (or URL-shaped string) to redact.
 */
export declare function redactUrlForError(url: string): string;
/**
 * Query-parameter names that commonly carry authentication/signature
 * secrets in presigned URLs, matched case-insensitively: generic
 * `token`/`signature`, AWS SigV4 (`X-Amz-Signature`, `X-Amz-Credential`,
 * `X-Amz-Security-Token`, and the legacy `AWSAccessKeyId`/`Signature`/
 * `Expires` query-auth params), Azure SAS (`sig`/`se`/`sp`/`sr`/`sv`), and
 * GCS V4 signed URLs (`X-Goog-Signature`, `X-Goog-Credential`,
 * `X-Goog-Algorithm`, `X-Goog-Date`, `X-Goog-Expires`,
 * `X-Goog-SignedHeaders`).
 *
 * Unlike {@link redactUrlForError} (which drops the *entire* query string
 * for a one-off error message), this is used where a URL is normalized
 * into a long-lived in-memory cache key — content-varying query params
 * must survive so distinct resources still get distinct keys, but a
 * presigned URL's secret must never persist as a Map key for the process
 * lifetime.
 */
export declare const SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_PARAM_DENYLIST: readonly string[];
/**
 * Strip common tracking/analytics query params (`utm_*`, `fbclid`, `gclid`,
 * `_ga`) from `parsed` in place, so callers that build a cache key from a
 * URL don't miss a cache hit solely because two otherwise-identical URLs
 * carry different tracking noise.
 *
 * Shared by `ImageCache.normalizeUrl` and `fileDetector.cacheKeyForUrl` —
 * both build a long-lived in-memory cache key from a URL and should
 * normalize tracking params the same way. Call this before
 * {@link stripSensitiveUrlParamsForCacheKey} so both normalizations apply
 * consistently regardless of caller.
 *
 * @param parsed - A `URL` instance to strip tracking params from in place.
 */
export declare function stripTrackingParams(parsed: URL): void;
/**
 * Build a secret-free, but still auth-context-distinct, cache key from a
 * URL that may carry presigned-URL secrets in its query string.
 *
 * Naively stripping {@link SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_PARAM_DENYLIST} params before
 * using a URL as a long-lived cache key (an earlier version of this code did
 * exactly that) creates a correctness bug, not just a hygiene one: two
 * *different* presigned URLs for the same underlying object — e.g. one
 * whose signature has since expired or been revoked, and a fresh one —
 * strip down to the *same* key and collide. A cache populated under the
 * first would silently serve its bytes back for the second, without ever
 * revalidating against the origin.
 *
 * Fix: still remove the sensitive params from `parsed` in place (so the
 * plaintext key never retains a raw secret — the original goal), but fold a
 * short, non-reversible hash of the *removed* key=value pairs into the
 * returned suffix whenever any were present, so distinct auth contexts keep
 * distinct cache keys. Two requests presenting the exact same secret value
 * still collide (correct — that's genuinely the same authorized request);
 * two different secret values for the same object no longer do.
 *
 * Callers combine the return value with the now-stripped `parsed.toString()`
 * to form the final cache key (see `ImageCache.normalizeUrl` and
 * `fileDetector.cacheKeyForUrl`), rather than this function returning the
 * full key itself, so each caller can apply its own additional
 * normalization (e.g. tracking-param removal) in between.
 *
 * Matching against {@link SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_PARAM_DENYLIST} is
 * case-insensitive (both the denylist lookup and the value folded into the
 * hash lower-case the param name), so the original casing of a sensitive
 * param's name is not preserved anywhere in the returned key. That's fine
 * here — this produces a cache key, not a user-facing URL, and the same
 * lower-cased name always hashes to the same suffix for the same value
 * regardless of how the caller happened to case it (`Token=` vs `token=`).
 * Non-sensitive params left on `parsed` keep their original casing untouched.
 *
 * @param parsed - A `URL` instance to strip sensitive params from in place.
 * @returns "" when no sensitive params were present; otherwise a short hex
 *   suffix — prefixed with `\0` (a byte `URL#toString()` never emits, since
 *   every URL component is percent-encoded, so it can't collide with real
 *   URL content) — to append to the caller's cache key.
 */
export declare function stripSensitiveUrlParamsForCacheKey(parsed: URL): string;
/**
 * Build a secret-free, auth-context-distinct cache key from a URL, for any
 * caller that needs a long-lived in-memory Map key derived from a URL.
 *
 * Centralizes the exact sequence both existing callers used independently:
 * parse via `new URL()`, strip tracking noise ({@link stripTrackingParams}),
 * then strip and hash-suffix sensitive auth params
 * ({@link stripSensitiveUrlParamsForCacheKey}) so distinct presigned URLs for
 * the same object don't collide (see that function's doc comment for why a
 * naive strip-only approach is a correctness bug, not just a hygiene one).
 *
 * Shared by `ImageCache.normalizeUrl` and `fileDetector.cacheKeyForUrl` — both
 * build a cache key from a URL and must normalize it identically, or the same
 * URL could hash to two different keys depending on which cache looked it up.
 *
 * Falls back to the raw `url` string unchanged when it isn't a parseable
 * absolute URL (mirrors both callers' pre-existing catch behavior).
 *
 * @param url - The URL (or URL-shaped string) to normalize into a cache key.
 */
export declare function normalizeUrlForCache(url: string): string;
/**
 * Scrub any embedded absolute URLs out of free-form text — typically the
 * `.message` of an underlying network/DNS/TLS error thrown by `fetch`,
 * undici's `request()`, or Node's resolver, all of which frequently embed
 * the full request URL (query string, credentials, and all) verbatim.
 * Interpolating that message raw into a thrown or logged error would leak a
 * presigned URL's token even after the explicit URL argument was already
 * redacted via {@link redactUrlForError}. Finds each `scheme://…` run in the
 * text and replaces it with its redacted form.
 *
 * @param text - Free-form text (typically `Error.message`) to scrub.
 */
export declare function redactUrlsInText(text: string): string;
/**
 * Redact every occurrence of `filePath` from an error message, checking both
 * the path exactly as given and its `path.resolve()`'d form.
 *
 * Node's own fs errors (ENOENT/EACCES) embed the exact string passed to the
 * fs call, so a plain substring match usually suffices — but wrapped or
 * lower-level errors sometimes normalize the path first (relative→absolute,
 * trailing-slash variations), which an exact-match-only redaction would miss.
 * This is defense-in-depth, not a guarantee: a `realpath`-resolved (symlink-
 * following) variant can still differ from both forms and would slip through.
 *
 * @param message  - The error message to scrub.
 * @param filePath - The path to redact (both as given and resolved).
 */
export declare function redactPathFromMessage(message: string, filePath: string): string;
/**
 * Build a sanitized copy of a network/URL/file error, safe to attach as
 * `Error.cause` on a rethrow.
 *
 * Redacting only the OUTER thrown error's message isn't enough: if the RAW
 * underlying error is attached as `cause`, anything that walks the cause
 * chain (cause-aware logging, telemetry spans) can still recover an
 * unredacted URL/path/secret via `error.cause.message`. This returns a NEW
 * `Error` whose message has been through {@link redactUrlsInText} — and,
 * when `options.filePath` is supplied, {@link redactPathFromMessage} too, so
 * a filesystem error's ENOENT/EACCES text doesn't leak the host's directory
 * layout via the cause chain the way the outer message already avoids.
 * `.name` and `.code` (`NodeJS.ErrnoException`) are copied over so retry
 * classification (e.g. `isRetryableNetworkError`) still works when it
 * inspects the cause. The raw original is never referenced by the result.
 *
 * Handles non-`Error` thrown values too (a raw string/object can just as
 * easily carry an unredacted URL or path) by running their `String()` form
 * through the same redaction before wrapping.
 *
 * @param error   - The raw underlying error (or thrown value) to sanitize.
 * @param options - `filePath`: a known filesystem path to redact to its
 *                  basename, in addition to URL redaction.
 */
export declare function sanitizeErrorCause(error: unknown, options?: {
    filePath?: string;
}): Error;
/**
 * Recursively sanitize a record/array, returning a structurally identical
 * value with sensitive keys redacted and string values run through
 * {@link sanitizeForLog}.
 *
 * Safe to call on any JSON-shaped data. Cycles are detected and replaced
 * with the string `"[Circular]"` to avoid infinite recursion when logging
 * mid-stream objects that reference themselves.
 *
 * @param value - The value to sanitize.
 * @param maxStringLen - Per-string truncation cap (default 1000).
 */
export declare function sanitizeRecord<T>(value: T, maxStringLen?: number): T;
/**
 * Sanitize an HTTP headers object — redacts sensitive header names entirely
 * (`***`) and applies {@link sanitizeForLog} to remaining values.
 *
 * Accepts both `Headers` instances and plain-object header maps so providers
 * can log either shape uniformly.
 */
export declare function sanitizeHeaders(headers: Headers | Record<string, string | undefined> | undefined): Record<string, string>;