// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-3.0-only
pragma solidity >=0.7.0 <0.9.0;

import "../common/SelfAuthorized.sol";

/**
 * @title Fallback Manager - A contract managing fallback calls made to this contract
 * @author Richard Meissner - @rmeissner
 */
abstract contract FallbackManager is SelfAuthorized {
    event ChangedFallbackHandler(address indexed handler);

    // keccak256("fallback_manager.handler.address")
    bytes32 internal constant FALLBACK_HANDLER_STORAGE_SLOT = 0x6c9a6c4a39284e37ed1cf53d337577d14212a4870fb976a4366c693b939918d5;

    /**
     *  @notice Internal function to set the fallback handler.
     *  @param handler contract to handle fallback calls.
     */
    function internalSetFallbackHandler(address handler) internal {
        /*
            If a fallback handler is set to self, then the following attack vector is opened:
            Imagine we have a function like this:
            function withdraw() internal authorized {
                withdrawalAddress.call.value(address(this).balance)("");
            }

            If the fallback method is triggered, the fallback handler appends the msg.sender address to the calldata and calls the fallback handler.
            A potential attacker could call a Safe with the 3 bytes signature of a withdraw function. Since 3 bytes do not create a valid signature,
            the call would end in a fallback handler. Since it appends the msg.sender address to the calldata, the attacker could craft an address 
            where the first 3 bytes of the previous calldata + the first byte of the address make up a valid function signature. The subsequent call would result in unsanctioned access to Safe's internal protected methods.
            For some reason, solidity matches the first 4 bytes of the calldata to a function signature, regardless if more data follow these 4 bytes.
        */
        require(handler != address(this), "GS400");

        bytes32 slot = FALLBACK_HANDLER_STORAGE_SLOT;
        // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly
        assembly {
            sstore(slot, handler)
        }
    }

    /**
     * @notice Set Fallback Handler to `handler` for the Safe.
     * @dev Only fallback calls without value and with data will be forwarded.
     *      This can only be done via a Safe transaction.
     *      Cannot be set to the Safe itself.
     * @param handler contract to handle fallback calls.
     */
    function setFallbackHandler(address handler) public authorized {
        internalSetFallbackHandler(handler);
        emit ChangedFallbackHandler(handler);
    }

    // @notice Forwards all calls to the fallback handler if set. Returns 0 if no handler is set.
    // @dev Appends the non-padded caller address to the calldata to be optionally used in the handler
    //      The handler can make us of `HandlerContext.sol` to extract the address.
    //      This is done because in the next call frame the `msg.sender` will be FallbackManager's address
    //      and having the original caller address may enable additional verification scenarios.
    // solhint-disable-next-line payable-fallback,no-complex-fallback
    fallback() external {
        bytes32 slot = FALLBACK_HANDLER_STORAGE_SLOT;
        // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly
        assembly {
            let handler := sload(slot)
            if iszero(handler) {
                return(0, 0)
            }
            calldatacopy(0, 0, calldatasize())
            // The msg.sender address is shifted to the left by 12 bytes to remove the padding
            // Then the address without padding is stored right after the calldata
            mstore(calldatasize(), shl(96, caller()))
            // Add 20 bytes for the address appended add the end
            let success := call(gas(), handler, 0, 0, add(calldatasize(), 20), 0, 0)
            returndatacopy(0, 0, returndatasize())
            if iszero(success) {
                revert(0, returndatasize())
            }
            return(0, returndatasize())
        }
    }
}