import { Telemetry } from 'ai';
import { G as GuardrailResult, e as GuardrailExecutionSummary } from '../types-C7t6e3EI.cjs';
import { G as GovernanceAgentIdentity, a as PolicyDecision, b as GovernanceDelegationContext, c as PolicyDecisionMetadata, d as GuardrailGovernanceOptions, P as PlanRiskAssessment, A as AgentActionRiskClass } from '../peer-BxTI4phw.cjs';
export { e as AgentInputProvenance, _ as __setAutotelAgentModule } from '../peer-BxTI4phw.cjs';
import '@ai-sdk/provider';

/**
 * Pure SAIF policy mappers — the guardrail-result → policy-decision mapping,
 * unit-tested in isolation. No I/O, no optional-peer lifecycle; just data shape
 * transforms over {@link ../types.GuardrailResult} and the peer type vocabulary.
 */

/** Map a guardrail result to a 0..1 risk score: confidence first, else severity. */
declare function severityToRiskScore(result: GuardrailResult): number | undefined;
/** Best-available human name for the guardrail that produced a result. */
declare function guardrailNameOf(result: GuardrailResult): string;
/**
 * The single constructor for a `recordPolicyDecision` payload. Every emit path
 * funnels through here, so the `eventKind` constant and the `policy` sub-shape
 * live in exactly one place (and the unit test that covers it covers them all).
 */
declare function policyDecision(input: {
    action: string;
    agent: GovernanceAgentIdentity;
    decision: PolicyDecision;
    resource?: string;
    riskScore?: number;
    reason?: string;
    category?: string;
    delegation?: GovernanceDelegationContext;
    reasoningSummary?: string;
}): PolicyDecisionMetadata;
/**
 * Map a blocked guardrail result to a `recordPolicyDecision` payload. A block is
 * a deterministic policy-engine **deny** (SAIF Principle 2 / Layer 1).
 */
declare function toPolicyDecisionMetadata(result: GuardrailResult, options: GuardrailGovernanceOptions): PolicyDecisionMetadata;
/** Map a v7 `toolApproval` status to a policy decision. */
declare function approvalStatusToPolicyDecision(statusType: 'approved' | 'denied' | 'user-approval' | 'not-applicable'): PolicyDecision | undefined;

/**
 * `ai-sdk-guardrails/governance` — bridge guardrail outcomes into
 * **autotel-genai**'s agent-governance signals, structured around Google's
 * *Secure AI Agents* (SAIF) three principles:
 *
 * 1. **Well-defined human controllers** — records the controlling user
 *    (`recordControllerId`), the provenance of untrusted input
 *    (`recordInputProvenance`), and human-in-the-loop approval outcomes
 *    (`recordHumanApproval`).
 * 2. **Limited powers** — every block is emitted as a deterministic policy
 *    decision (`recordPolicyDecision` with `decision: 'deny'`), the canonical
 *    record of a runtime policy engine refusing an action.
 * 3. **Observable actions** — all of the above land on the active OpenTelemetry
 *    GenAI span, so guardrail decisions live in the *same* trace tree as the
 *    model calls they guard.
 *
 * `autotel-genai` is an **optional peer**: the {@link ./peer} layer lazily
 * imports it and silently no-ops when it (or an active trace context) is absent.
 * Observability must never crash the call it observes, so every emit is
 * best-effort.
 *
 * This module is the barrel + the four product factories. The shared substrate
 * lives in {@link ./peer} (optional-peer types + lifecycle) and the pure SAIF
 * mapping in {@link ./mappers}.
 *
 * ```ts
 * import { withGuardrails, promptInjectionDetector, sensitiveDataFilter } from 'ai-sdk-guardrails';
 * import { guardrailGovernance } from 'ai-sdk-guardrails/governance';
 *
 * const gov = guardrailGovernance({
 *   agent: { id: 'support-agent', model: 'gpt-4o' },
 *   controllerId: user.id,
 * });
 *
 * const model = withGuardrails({ model: baseModel,
 *   inputGuardrails: [promptInjectionDetector()],
 *   outputGuardrails: [sensitiveDataFilter()],
 *   onInputBlocked: gov.onInputBlocked,
 *   onOutputBlocked: gov.onOutputBlocked,
 * });
 * ```
 */

interface GuardrailGovernanceHooks {
    onInputBlocked: (summary: GuardrailExecutionSummary) => void;
    onOutputBlocked: (summary: GuardrailExecutionSummary) => void;
}
/**
 * Build `onInputBlocked` / `onOutputBlocked` hooks that emit each guardrail
 * block as an autotel-genai policy decision (plus controller + provenance on
 * input). Spread the result into a `withGuardrails` config.
 */
declare function guardrailGovernance(options: GuardrailGovernanceOptions): GuardrailGovernanceHooks;
/** Decision info handed to `guardrailApproval`'s `onDecision` hook. */
interface ApprovalDecisionInfo {
    toolName: string;
    /** The SDK tool-call id, threaded through to `recordHumanApproval`. */
    toolCallId?: string;
    status: {
        type: 'approved' | 'denied' | 'user-approval' | 'not-applicable';
    };
    guardrail?: string;
    result?: GuardrailResult;
}
/**
 * Build an `onDecision` callback for {@link guardrailApproval}, recording each
 * tool-approval outcome as a policy decision and — for human-in-the-loop
 * (`user-approval`) and `denied` — a `recordHumanApproval` signal (SAIF
 * Principle 1). When {@link GuardrailGovernanceOptions.toolRiskClass} is set, the
 * gated tool's action risk class is recorded too (SAIF Principle 3), for every
 * tool — including those no guardrail governs. The recorded `approved` reflects
 * the decision *at gate time*: `denied`/`user-approval` halt the call, so
 * `approved` is `false`.
 */
declare function guardrailGovernanceApproval(options: GuardrailGovernanceOptions): (info: ApprovalDecisionInfo) => void;
/**
 * Build a **native AI SDK `Telemetry` integration** that records SAIF
 * agent-governance signals on the SDK's own tool-execution lifecycle. Drop it
 * into the v7 `telemetry.integrations` slot — the single, SDK-canonical place
 * for observability — instead of the library's bespoke injected-`Tracer` path:
 *
 * ```ts
 * import { ToolLoopAgent } from 'ai';
 * import { OpenTelemetry } from '@ai-sdk/otel';
 * import { guardrailTelemetry } from 'ai-sdk-guardrails/governance';
 *
 * const agent = new ToolLoopAgent({
 *   model,
 *   tools,
 *   telemetry: {
 *     integrations: [
 *       new OpenTelemetry({ tracer }),   // creates the GenAI span tree
 *       guardrailTelemetry({             // rides it: SAIF signals per action
 *         agent: { id: 'support-agent', model: 'gpt-4o' },
 *         toolRiskClass: (t) => (t === 'executeSQL' ? 'destructive' : undefined),
 *       }),
 *     ],
 *   },
 * });
 * ```
 *
 * For every tool the agent actually executes it records the action's risk class
 * (SAIF Principle 3) and an `observe` policy decision, attributed to the agent
 * identity, onto the active GenAI span. Because it implements `ai`'s `Telemetry`
 * interface, no adapter is needed — and it composes with any other integration
 * (e.g. `@ai-sdk/otel`'s `OpenTelemetry`) registered alongside it.
 *
 * Best-effort: no-ops when the `autotel-genai` optional peer (or an active span)
 * is absent. Pair it with explicit `guardrailGovernance(...).onInputBlocked` /
 * `.onOutputBlocked` hooks on `withGuardrails` to emit the block decisions the
 * SDK lifecycle cannot see.
 */
declare function guardrailTelemetry(options: GuardrailGovernanceOptions): Telemetry;
/**
 * Record a plan-risk assessment on the active span (SAIF Layer-2). Best-effort:
 * no-ops when the optional peer or an active span is absent. Used by the
 * `planRiskGuardrail` to land `agent.plan.risk.*` attributes alongside the model
 * call. Set `emitSecurityEvent` to also emit `llm.plan.risk.elevated` for
 * non-`low` verdicts.
 */
declare function recordPlanRisk(assessment: PlanRiskAssessment, toolSequence: string[], options?: {
    emitSecurityEvent?: boolean;
}): void;
/** Thrown when a guarded tool is invoked without the scopes it requires. */
declare class ToolScopeDeniedError extends Error {
    readonly toolName: string;
    readonly missingScopes: string[];
    constructor(toolName: string, missingScopes: string[]);
}
interface GuardedToolOptions {
    /** The distinct agent identity invoking the tool (SAIF Principle 1). */
    agent: GovernanceAgentIdentity;
    /** Name of the tool, used as the policy `action`/`resource`. */
    toolName: string;
    /** Scopes the tool requires to run. */
    requiredScopes?: string[];
    /**
     * Scopes currently granted to the agent. Any {@link requiredScopes} not in
     * this set is a least-privilege violation → the call is denied.
     */
    grantedScopes?: string[];
    /** Action risk class recorded for the call (SAIF Principle 3). */
    riskClass?: AgentActionRiskClass;
    /** Controlling user id, recorded on a denial. */
    controllerId?: string;
    hashSalt?: string;
    /** Delegation context for a multi-agent handoff (authority lineage). */
    delegation?: GovernanceDelegationContext;
    onMissingContext?: 'warn' | 'skip' | 'throw';
}
type GuardedExecute = (...args: any[]) => any;
/**
 * Wrap an AI SDK tool with **deterministic least-privilege enforcement** (SAIF
 * Principle 2 — agent powers must be limited). Before the tool runs, the wrapper
 * checks that {@link GuardedToolOptions.grantedScopes} covers every
 * {@link GuardedToolOptions.requiredScopes}; if not, it records a `deny` policy
 * decision and throws {@link ToolScopeDeniedError} — the tool never executes.
 * On a permitted call it records a `permit` decision and the action risk class.
 *
 * The scope check is pure and works standalone; the canonical autotel-genai
 * emission (policy decision + risk class + delegation lineage) is best-effort and
 * no-ops when the optional peer (or an active span) is absent.
 *
 * ```ts
 * const tools = {
 *   transferFunds: withGuardedTool(transferFundsTool, {
 *     agent: { id: 'payments-agent' },
 *     toolName: 'transferFunds',
 *     requiredScopes: ['payments:write'],
 *     grantedScopes: session.scopes,
 *     riskClass: 'financial',
 *   }),
 * };
 * ```
 */
declare function withGuardedTool<T extends {
    execute?: GuardedExecute;
}>(tool: T, options: GuardedToolOptions): T;

export { AgentActionRiskClass, type ApprovalDecisionInfo, GovernanceAgentIdentity, GovernanceDelegationContext, type GuardedToolOptions, type GuardrailGovernanceHooks, GuardrailGovernanceOptions, PlanRiskAssessment, PolicyDecision, PolicyDecisionMetadata, ToolScopeDeniedError, approvalStatusToPolicyDecision, guardrailGovernance, guardrailGovernanceApproval, guardrailNameOf, guardrailTelemetry, policyDecision, recordPlanRisk, severityToRiskScore, toPolicyDecisionMetadata, withGuardedTool };