@foba/quotes-financial/dist/index.mjs

import { FlopShuffleMaker } from '@foba/util-quotes';

var Aaron_Brown = [{
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch1. The Art of Uncalculated Risk, p2',
  quote: 'Other people snap up the riskless profits pretty fast and bid the price of calculable risk opportunities to near their fair values. Things get a lot less crowded if you go for the incalculable risks, leaps of faith that cannot be inspected carefully before takeoff. So that is where you find extraordinary opportunities.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch1. The Art of Uncalculated Risk, p12',
  quote: 'If you want to understand financial markets, and their effects on the economy, you have to understand the trading game. Many short-term price movements are neither random nor caused by economic fundamentals. They\'re caused by investors buying and selling.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch1. The Art of Uncalculated Risk, p23',
  quote: 'You need a strategy, and a trade or investment decision can be evaluated only in the context of that strategy.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch3. Finance Basics, p59',
  quote: 'The trading characteristics of a security become more important than its underlying economics. The virtual economics began to drive the physical economy rather than the other way around.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch3. Finance Basics, p67',
  quote: 'Most people wander through life, carelessly taking whatever risk crosses their paths without compensation, but never consciously accepting extra risk to pick up the money and other good things lying all around them.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch3. Finance Basics, p69',
  quote: 'There\'s no way to know how good a player you are except by measuring against others.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch4. A Brief History of Risk Denial, p75',
  quote: 'Monotheism introduced the idea that we should passively accept whatever fate God dealt. Gambling seemed to be a refusal to do that.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch4. A Brief History of Risk Denial, p81',
  quote: 'If no one gambled against the grain in good times, there would be no winners to inspire people in the bad times.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch4. A Brief History of Risk Denial, p82',
  quote: 'Fortunes made buying and selling securities have underwritten economic revolutions.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch4. A Brief History of Risk Denial, p83',
  quote: 'Many financial disasters can be traced to people who thought they were hedging.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch4. A Brief History of Risk Denial, p86',
  quote: 'From the lottery to raise the funds for the founding of Jamestown, Virginia, in 1607 to the lottery used to pay the interest on Dutch loans to the United States during the Revolutionary War, the development of the United States was funded by gambling.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch5. Pokernomics, p127',
  quote: 'All exchange stimulates productive activity, whether exchange by gift, gambling, barter, or money transaction.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch6. Son of a Soft Money Bank, p167',
  quote: 'There is a deep, ancient connection between gambling and divination.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch8. The Games People Play, p231',
  quote: 'But you can\'t ignore dense people-they\'re not unarmed; they\'re armed differently.'
}, {
  figure: 'Aaron Brown (financial author)',
  mark: 'The Poker Face of Wall Street (2006). Ch9. Who Got Game, p279',
  quote: 'Mathematical theory, tested in practice and constantly retested, is a valuable aid to play. Mathematics alone will blind you and let others rob you.'
}];

var Ben_Bernanke = [{
  figure: 'Ben Bernanke',
  mark: '"A Crash Course for Central Bankers," Foreign Policy (September/200010)',
  quote: 'There’s no denying that a collapse in stock prices today would pose serious macroeconomic challenges for the United States. Consumer spending would slow, and the U.\nS. economy would become less of a magnet for foreign investors. Economic growth, which in any case has recently been at unsustainable levels, would decline somewhat. History proves, however, that a smart central bank can protect the economy and the financial sector from the nastier side effects of a stock market collapse.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Bernanke',
  mark: '"A Crash Course for Central Bankers," Foreign Policy (September/200010)',
  quote: 'The economic repercussions of a stock market crash depend less on the severity of the crash itself than on the response of economic policymakers, particularly central bankers.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Bernanke',
  mark: '"Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke at the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois," federalreserve.\ngov (2002-11-08)',
  quote: 'Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve System. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You\'re right, we did it. We\'re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won\'t do it again.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Bernanke',
  mark: '20051020, in testimony to Congress\'s Joint Economic Committee.',
  quote: 'House prices have risen by nearly 25 percent over the past two years. Although speculative activity has increased in some areas, at a national level these price increases largely reflect strong economic fundamentals, including robust growth in jobs and incomes, low mortgage rates, steady rates of household formation, and factors that limit the expansion of housing supply in some areas.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Bernanke',
  mark: 'Speech given on 20100407 to the Dallas Regional Chamber of Commerce, "Economic Challenges: Past, Present and Future".  (See p13-14 of the speech transcript).',
  quote: 'To avoid large and unsustainable budget deficits, the nation will ultimately have to choose among higher taxes, modifications to entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare, less spending on everything else from education to defense, or some combination of the above.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Bernanke',
  mark: 'The Ten Suggestions. Speech given at Baccalaureate Ceremony at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 20130602.',
  quote: 'Economics is a highly sophisticated field of thought that is superb at explaining to policymakers precisely why the choices they made in the past were wrong. About the future, not so much. However, careful economic analysis does have one important benefit, which is that it can help kill ideas that are completely logically inconsistent or wildly at variance with the data. This insight covers at least 90 percent of proposed economic policies.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Bernanke',
  mark: 'The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis (2012). Lecture 1: Origins and Mission of the Federal Reserve',
  quote: 'It was a global depression, had many causes, the whole story requires you to look at the whole international system. But policy errors in United States, as well as abroad, did play an important role. And in particular as I said, the Federal Reserve failed in this first challenge in both parts of its mission. It did not use monetary policy aggressively to prevent deflation and the collapse in the economy, so it failed in its economic stability function. And it didn\'t adequately perform its function as lender of last resort allowing many bank failures and a resulting contraction in credit and also with the money supply. So, in that respect, again, the Fed did not fulfill its intended mission.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Bernanke',
  mark: 'The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis (2012). Lecture 2: The Federal Reserve after World War II',
  quote: 'I want to make sure you keep your eyes on the ball, that is, the two basic missions of a central bank. The first is maintaining macroeconomic stability: maintaining stable growth and keeping inflation low and stable. The principal policy tool for maintaining macroeconomic stability is monetary policy. In normal times, the Fed and other central banks use open market operations—purchases and sales of securities in markets—to move interest rates up or down, and in doing so try to create a more stable macroeconomic environment.\nThe second part of a central bank\'s mission is maintaining financial stability. Central banks are focused on trying to ensure that the financial system functions properly, and in particular, they want to prevent, if possible, and if not, to mitigate the effects of a financial crisis or a financial panic.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Bernanke',
  mark: 'The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis (2012). Lecture 3: The Federal Reserve\'s Response to the Financial Crisis',
  quote: 'We did stop the meltdown. We avoided what would have been, I think, a collapse of the global financial system. That was obviously a good thing. But one thing that I was always sure of and the Federal Reserve was always sure of was that a collapse of some of these big financial firms was going to have very serious collateral consequences. There were people arguing even as late as 200809, “Well, why don\'t you just let the firms collapse? There is a system that can take care of it: bankruptcy. Why don\'t you let them fail?” We never thought that was a good option. Particularly, if the whole system had collapsed, we would have had extraordinarily serious consequences.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Bernanke',
  mark: 'The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis (2012). Lecture 4: The Aftermath of the Crisis',
  quote: 'Obviously, based on the crisis and what happened and the effects that we\'re still feeling, it\'s now clear that maintaining financial stability is just as an important a responsibility as monetary and economic stability. And indeed, this is, you know, very much a return to the—where the Fed came from in the beginning. Remember the reason that Fed was created was to try to reduce the incidents of financial panics, so financial stability was the original goal of creation of the Fed. So now we sort of come full circle.'
}];

var Ben_Horowitz = [{
  figure: 'Ben Horowitz',
  mark: 'Ben Horowitz, "What’s The Most Difficult CEO Skill? Managing Your Own Psychology," at bhorowitz.\ncom, 20110331.',
  quote: 'By far the most difficult skill I learned as a C.\nE.\nO. was the ability to manage my own psychology. Organizational design, process design, metrics, hiring and firing were all relatively straightforward skills to master compared with keeping my mind in check.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Horowitz',
  mark: 'Ben Horowitz, "The Fine Line Between Fear and Courage," at bhorowitz.\ncom, 20110807.',
  quote: 'In life, everybody faces choices between doing what\'s popular, easy, and wrong vs. doing what\'s lonely, difficult, and right. These decisions intensify when you run a company, because the consequences get magnified 1,\n000 fold. As in life, the excuses for CEOs making the wrong choice are always plentiful.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Horowitz',
  mark: 'Ben Horowitz in: Ben Parr, "VC Ben Horowitz Says Founders Make Best Startup CEOs," at mashable.\ncom, 2011/10/18',
  quote: 'It helps to have founded and run a company if you\'re going to help somebody run a company who is a founder.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ben Horowitz',
  mark: 'Ben Horowitz in: Maria Bartiromo, "Maria Bartiromo interviews tech investor Ben Horowitz," for USA TODAY, 2/20/2012.',
  quote: 'The important thing about mobile is, everybody has a computer in their pocket. The implications of so many people connected to the Internet all the time from the standpoint of education is incredible.'
}];

var Benjamin_Graham = [{
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'As quoted by Warren Buffett, in an interview in Forbes magazine (19741101)',
  quote: 'You are neither right nor wrong because people agree with you.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). Preface, p. vii',
  quote: 'The idea of storage as a solution of economic problems at least has the support of common sense.\nIt is diametrically opposed to the topsy-turvy Alice-in-Wonderland reasoning that has marked so much of our depression thinking and policy.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P1Ch1. The Changing Role of Surplus Stocks, p4',
  quote: 'Instead of passing blithely over into that Promised Land, flowing almost literally with milk and honey, it may be our destiny to wander a full 40 years or more in the wilderness of doubt and divided sentiments.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P1Ch1. The Changing Role of Surplus Stocks, p17',
  quote: 'Even the most conservative must realize that the recent transformation of surplus from an individual to a national disaster implies a scathing indictment of our capitalist system as it has now developed.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P1Ch2. Government and Surplus Stocks, p26',
  quote: 'Whether we like it or not, government intervention in the face of surplus is here to stay.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P1Ch2. Government and Surplus Stocks, p28',
  quote: 'It is a fact worth pondering that four centuries ago the evil of "an abundance or surplus" arose from its being kept off the market, while today the evil of surplus lies in its being thrown upon the market.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P1Ch3. The Problem of Conserving Surplus, p43 (italics as per text)',
  quote: 'The State can always afford to finance what its citizens can soundly produce.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P2Ch4. A Plan For Conserving Surplus, p50',
  quote: 'The Reservoir system will function not only as an equalizer of business conditions, but also as a national store to meet further emergencies, such as war and drought, and-most important of all-as the concrete means of developing a steadily higher living standard for all.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P2Ch5. Reservoir System and Commodities, p72',
  quote: 'Why should the cotton growers suffer if there is shortage of wheat?'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P2Ch6. The Question of Price Stability, p85',
  quote: 'Price statistics show clearly that instability in raw-material prices is a prime cause of instability of other prices.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P2Ch8. Ultimate Uses of the Stored Units, p97',
  quote: 'The existence of such a war chest might go far to strengthen our prestige and frighten off any would be assailant.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P2Ch8. \nUltimate Uses of the Stored Units, p103',
  quote: 'Both a priori reasoning and experience teach us that as as these funds grow larger the geometrical rate of growth by compound interest ultimately defeats itself.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P2Ch9. The Cost of the Reservoir Plan, p114',
  quote: 'The money cost of the reservoir plan literally fades into insignificance when it is compared with the financial burden which the great depression imposed on the nation.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P3Ch10. The Status of Gold and Silver, p127',
  quote: 'The utility, or intrinsic value of gold as a commodity is now considerably less than in the past; its monetary status has become extraordinarily ambiguous; and its future is highly uncertain.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P3Ch13. The Reservoir Plan and Credit Control, p153',
  quote: 'THERE is widespread agreement among economists that abuse of credit constitutes one of the chief unwholesome elements in business booms and is mainly responsible for the ensuing crash and depression.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P3Ch13. The Reservoir Plan and Credit Control, p154',
  quote: 'The volume of credit depends upon three factors: the desire to borrow, the ability to lend and the desire to lend.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P4Ch14. Farm Problems and Remedies, p172',
  quote: 'There is something paradoxical in the fact that by establishing an export market we subject our entire domestic production to the vagaries of that market.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P4Ch16. Reservoir Plan Versus Crop Control, p195',
  quote: 'It must be fundamentally wrong to reduce production of food and fiber while one-third of our population is still ill fed and ill clothed.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P5Ch19. The Reservoir Plan and Tradition, p232',
  quote: 'The Reservoir plan is an engineering mechanism applied to the field of economics, and in its essence it has nothing to do with democracy or any other political philosophy.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'Storage and Stability (1937). P5Ch19. The Reservoir Plan and Tradition, p234 (See also; Karl Marx, Capital)',
  quote: 'The people of the United States will not tolerate another deep depression that arises not from any lack of natural resources, productive capacity or man and brain power, but solely from imperfections in the functioning of the system of finance capitalism.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'World Commodities and World Currencies (1944). Ch1. The Problem of Raw Materials, p5',
  quote: 'The world has not learned the technique of balanced expansion without the resultant commercial and financial congestion.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'World Commodities and World Currencies (1944). Ch2. The Issue of Cartels, p21',
  quote: 'Cartels have spread and will spread as long as the world lacks an effective mechanism by which balanced expansion may be achieved without a resulting disruption of prices.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'World Commodities and World Currencies (1944). Ch3. The Paradox of the Stockpile, p23',
  quote: 'The modern world is not geared properly to the storage of goods.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'World Commodities and World Currencies (1944). Ch5. Stabilization of Raw Materials, p56',
  quote: 'The story of Joseph in Egypt and of the seven fat and the seven lean years has passed into the homely wisdom of the ages; but our economic thinking seems to have lost contact with so simple and basic approach to prudent management of a nations welfare.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'World Commodities and World Currencies (1944). Ch9. Commodities, Gold, Credit as Money, p100 (See also Karl Marx, Capital Vol1. p89)',
  quote: 'Many progressive economists insist that gold is now in essentially the same position as silver and that the arguments the simon-pure gold advocates use against the white metal can be directed with equal effect against their own fetish.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'World Commodities and World Currencies (1944). Ch10. Commodity Unit Stabilization, p109',
  quote: 'It is a misfortune of the times that all of us must needs be amateur economists-including, and perhaps especially, the professionals.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'World Commodities and World Currencies (1944). Ch10. Commodity Unit Stabilization, p114',
  quote: 'We have introduced the monetary factor not by necessity but by choice. Its advantages are obvious. Self-financed commodity units are not only interest free, but free also from dependence upon credit conditions. They are a step-desirable, it seems to us-in the direction of a goods economy as distinct from a money economy; but this step is taken without violence by merely identifying basic goods with money. It guarantees unfailing purchasing power where it is most needed-among the countless producers of raw commodities.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Intro, p. xxiv',
  quote: 'Though business conditions may change, corporations and securities may change, and financial institutions and regulations may change, human nature remains the same. Thus the important and difficult part of sound investment, which hinges upon the investor\'s own temperament and attitude, is not much affected by the passing years.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch1. What the Intelligent Investor Can Accomplish, p7',
  quote: 'The history of the past fifty years, and longer, indicates that a diversified holding of representative common stocks will prove more profitable over a stretch of years than a bond portfolio, with one important provisio—that the shares must be purchased at reasonable market levels, that is, levels that are reasonable in the light of fairly well-defined standards derived from past experience.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch1. What the Intelligent Investor Can Accomplish, p8',
  quote: 'Stocks can be dynamite.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch1. What the Intelligent Investor Can Accomplish, p8',
  quote: 'The genuine investor in common stocks does not need a great equipment of brain and knowledge, but he does need some unusual qualities of character'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch1. What the Intelligent Investor Can Accomplish, p11',
  quote: 'It is no difficult trick to bring a great deal of energy, study, and native ability into Wall Street and to end up with losses instead of profits. These virtues, if channeled in the wrong directions, become indistinguishable from handicaps.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch1. What the Intelligent Investor Can Accomplish, p17',
  quote: 'All the real money in investment will have to be made—as most of it has been in the past— not out of buying and selling but out of owning and holding securities, receiving interests and dividends therein, and benefiting from their long-term increases in value. Hence stockholder\'s major energies and wisdom as investors should be directed toward assuring themselves of the best operating results from their corporations. This in turn means assuring themselves of fully honest and competent managements.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch1. What the Intelligent Investor Can Accomplish, p18',
  quote: 'Nothing in finance is more fatuous and harmful, in our opinion, than the firmly established attitude of common stock investors regarding questions of corporate management. That attitude is summed up in the phrase: "If you don\'t like the management, sell your stock." [...] The public owners seem to have abdicated all claim to control over the paid superintendents of their property'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p21',
  quote: 'Intelligent investment is more a matter of mental approach than it is of technique. A sound mental approach toward stock fluctuations is the touchstone of all successful investment under present-day conditions.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p25',
  quote: 'In most cases the favorable price performance will be accompanied by a well-defined improvement in the average earnings, in the dividend, and in the balance-sheet position. Thus in the long run the market test and the ordinary business test of a successful equity commitment tend to be largely identical.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p25',
  quote: 'A price decline is of no real importance to the bona fide investor unless it is either very substantial—say, more than a third from cost—or unless it reflects a known deterioration of consequence in the company\'s position. In a well-defined bear market many sound common stocks sell temporarily at extraordinary low prices. It is possible that the investor may then have a paper loss of fully 50 per cent on some of his holdings, without any convincing indication that the underlying values have been permanently affected.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p31',
  quote: 'Why could the typical investor expect any better success in trying to buy at low levels and sell at high levels than in trying to forecast what the market is going to do? Because if he does the former he acts only after the market has moved down into buying levels or up into selling levels. His role is not that of a prophet but of a businessman seizing clearly evident investment opportunities. He is not trying to be smarter than his fellow investors but simply trying to be less irrational than the mass of speculators who insist on buying after the market advances and selling after it goes down. If the market persists in behaving foolishly, all he seems to need is ordinary common sense in order to exploit its foolishness.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p34',
  quote: 'It is worth pointing out that assuredly not more than one person out of a hundred who stayed in the market after after 1925 emerged from it with a net profit and that the speculative losses taken were appalling.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p35',
  quote: 'Whenever the investor sold out in an upswing as soon as the top level of the previous well-recognized bull market was reached, he had a chance in the next bear market to buy back at one third (or better) below his selling price.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p36',
  quote: 'The graph does show one tremendous rise and collapse which stands out starkly from all the other fluctuations. This is commonly called the "new era" stock market of 1927-33. The striking feature of this phenomenon was that the new era existed solely in the minds of market speculators. The whole episode, in retrospect, now seems to have been one of those rare manifestations of mass financial madness which we used to study in our history books under the titles of "the South Sea Bubble", "the Mississippi Bubble" and so on.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p38',
  quote: 'The purchase of a bargain issue presupposes that the market\'s current appraisal is wrong, or at least that the buyer\'s idea of value is more likely to be right than the market\'s. In this process the investor sets his judgement against that of the market. To some this may seem arrogant or foolhardy.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p39',
  quote: 'If General Motors is worth $60 a share to an investor it must be because the full common-stock ownership of this gigantic enterprise as a whole is worth 43 million (shares) times $60, or no less than $2,\n600 million.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p40',
  quote: 'The true investor scarcely ever has to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free di disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more. Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons\' mistakes of judgement.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p41',
  quote: 'The investor has the benefit of the stock market\'s daily and changing appraisal of his holdings, for whatever that appraisal may be worth, and, second, that the investor is able to increase or decrease his investment at the market\'s daily figure—if he chooses. Thus the existence of a quoted market gives the investor certain options which he does not have if his security is unquoted. But it does not impose the current quotation on an investor who prefers to take his idea of value from some other source.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p42',
  quote: 'Basically, price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor. They provide him with an opportunity to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and to sell wisely when they advance a great deal. At other times he will do better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to his dividend returns and to the operating results of his companies.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p43',
  quote: 'The investor\'s primary interest lies in acquiring and holding suitable securities at suitable prices.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p43',
  quote: 'The investor would not be far wrong if this motto read more simply: "Never buy a stock immediately after a substantial rise or sell one immediately after a substantial drop".'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch2. The Investor and Stock-Market Fluctuations, p44',
  quote: 'Good managements produce a good average market price, and bad managements produce bad market prices.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch3. The Investor and His Advisers, p45',
  quote: 'If we assume that there are normal or standard income results to be obtained from investing money in securities, then the role of the adviser can be more readily established. He will use his superior training and experience to protect his clients against mistakes and to make sure that they obtain the results to which their money is entitled.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch3. The Investor and His Advisers, p48',
  quote: 'Nearly everyone interested in common stocks wants to be told by someone else what he thinks the market is going to do. The demand being there, it must be supplied.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch3. The Investor and His Advisers, p51',
  quote: 'The value of the security analyst to the investor depends largely on the investor\'s own attitude. If the investor asks the analyst the right questions, he is likely to get the right—or at least valuable— answers.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). p204.',
  quote: 'Readers of this book, however intelligent and knowing, could scarcely expect to do a better job of portfolio selection than the top analysts of the country. But if it is true that a fairly large segment of the stock market is often discriminated against or entirely neglected in the standard analytical selections, then the intelligent investor may be in a position to profit from the resultant undervaluations.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor: The Classic Text on Value Investing (1949). Ch14. Stockholders and Managements, p209',
  quote: 'Good management are rarely overcompensated to an extent that makes any significant difference with respect to the stockholder\'s position. Poor management are always overcompensated, because they are worth less than nothing to the owners.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor (1973) (Fourth Revised Edition). Ch7. Portfolio Policy: The Positive Side, p75',
  quote: 'Unusually rapid growth cannot keep up forever; when a company has already registered a brilliant expansion, its very increase in size makes a repetition of its achievement more difficult.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor (1973) (Fourth Revised Edition). Ch16. Convertible Issues and Warrants, p225',
  quote: 'Wall Street has a few prudent principles; the trouble is that they are always forgotten when they are most needed.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor (1973) (Fourth Revised Edition). Ch20. "Margin of Safety": The Central Concept, p280',
  quote: 'Observation over many years has taught us that the chief losses to investors come from the purchase of low-quality securities at times of favorable business conditions.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor (1973) (Fourth Revised Edition). Ch20. "Margin of Safety": The Central Concept, p286',
  quote: 'Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor (1973) (Fourth Revised Edition). Ch20. "Margin of Safety": The Central Concept, p286',
  quote: 'Do not let anyone else run your business.'
}, {
  figure: 'Benjamin Graham',
  mark: 'The Intelligent Investor (1973) (Fourth Revised Edition). Ch20. "Margin of Safety": The Central Concept, p287',
  quote: 'To achieve satisfactory investment results is easier than most people realize; to achieve superior results is harder than it looks.'
}];

var Ed_Seykota = [{
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Koppel, Robert The Intuitive Trader: Developing Your Inner Trading Wisdom, John Wiley & Sons Inc (199605), ISBN 0471130478 Read it here',
  quote: 'The markets are the same now as they were five or ten years ago because they keep changing-just like they did then.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Jenks, Philip, (Editor) 500 of the Most Witty, Acerbic and Erudite Things Ever Said About Money, Harriman House (200212), ISBN 1897597223 Read it here',
  quote: 'The elements of good trading are cutting losses, cutting losses, and cutting losses.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Schwager, Jack D. (Editor), Market Wizards, HarperCollins (1989), p172, ISBN 0-88730-610-1, Read it here',
  quote: 'Win or lose, everybody gets what they want out of the market.  Some people seem to like to lose, so they win by losing money.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Schwager, Market Wizards, p172, Read it here',
  quote: 'I think that if people look deeply enough into their trading patterns, they find that, on balance, including all their goals, they are really getting what they want, even though they may not understand it or want to admit it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Schwager, Jack D. Technical Analysis, Wiley; 1 edition (199512), ISBN 0471020516 Read it here',
  quote: 'The trend is your friend except at the end where it bends.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Covel, Michael W., Trend Following: How Great Traders Make Millions in Up or Down Markets, FT Press (2007), p172-173, ISBN 0-13-613718-0',
  quote: 'Charles Faulkner tells a story about Seykota\'s finely honed intuition when it comes to trading:  I am reminded of an experience that Ed Seykota shared with a group. He said that when he looks at a market, that everyone else thinks has exhausted its up trend, that is often when he likes to get in.  When I asked him how he made this determination, he said he just puts the chart on the other side of the room and if it looked like it was going up, then he would buy it... Of course this trade was seen through the eyes of someone with deep insight into the market behavior.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Harris, Sunny J. Trading 102: Getting Down to Business, Wiley; 1 edition (199809), ISBN 0471181331 Read it here',
  quote: 'If you want to know everything about the market, go to the beach. Push and pull your hands with the waves. Some are bigger waves, some are smaller. But if you try to push the wave out when it\'s coming in, it\'ll never happen. The market is always right.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Covel, Michael W., Trend Following: How Great Traders Make Millions in Up or Down Markets, FT Press (2007), p59, ISBN 0-13-613718-0',
  quote: 'To avoid whipsaw losses, stop trading.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Covel, Trend Following, p59',
  quote: 'Here\'s the essence of risk management: Risk no more than you can afford to lose, and also risk enough so that a win is meaningful.  If there is no such amount, don\'t play.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Covel, Trend Following, p55',
  quote: 'Pyramiding instructions appear on dollar bills.  Add smaller and smaller amounts on the way up.  Keep your eye open at the top.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Covel, Trend Following, p59',
  quote: 'Markets are fundamentally volatile.  No way around it.  Your prolem is not in the math.  There is no math to get you out of having to experience uncertainty.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Covel, Trend Following, p59',
  quote: 'It can be very expensive to try to convince the markets you are right.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Schwager, Jack D., Market Wizards, HarperCollins (1989), p159, ISBN 0-88730-610-1',
  quote: 'Systems don\'t need to be changed.  The trick is for a trader to develop a system with which he is compatible.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: Schwager, Market Wizards, p166',
  quote: 'I don\'t think traders can follow rules for very long unless they reflect their own trading style.  Eventually, a breaking point is reached and the trader has to quit or change, or find a new set of rules he can follow.  This seems to be part of the process of evolution and growth of a trader.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: FAQ',
  quote: 'Our work is not so much to treat or to cure feelings, as to accept and celebrate them.  This is a critical difference.\nFundamentalists figure things out and anticipate change. Trend followers join the trend of the moment. Fundamentalists try to solve their feelings. Trend followers join their feelings and observe them evolve and dis-solve.\nThe feelings we accept and enjoy rarely interfere with trading.\nTrying to treat or cure feelings adds mass.'
}, {
  figure: 'Ed Seykota',
  mark: 'Source: FAQ - Fri, 20031031 Thought Processes',
  quote: 'When a feeling dissolves, it ceases to be your enemy and begins to be one of your allies.'
}];

var George_Soros = [{
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the Mind of the Market (1987)',
  quote: 'Economic theory is devoted to the study of equilibrium positions. The concept of equilibrium is very useful. It allows us to focus on the final outcome rather than the process that leads up to it. But the concept is also very deceptive. It has the aura of something empirical: since the adjustment process is supposed to lead to an equilibrium, an equilibrium position seems somehow implicit in our observations. That is not true. Equilibrium itself has rarely been observed in real life — market prices have a notorious habit of fluctuating.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: '"Can Europe Work? A Plan to Rescue the Union" in Foreign Affairs (September/199610)',
  quote: 'The bureaucratic method of building an integrated Europe has exhausted its potential.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Address at the University of Pennsylvania (2002); quoted in "White House playing into Soros\' hands?" by J. Michael Waller, in WorldNetDaily (20031201)',
  quote: 'How can we escape from the trap that the terrorists have set us? Only by recognizing that the war on terrorism cannot be won by waging war. We must, of course, protect our security; but we must also correct the grievances on which terrorism feeds. Crime requires police work, not military action.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: '"The Bubble of American Supremacy" in The Atlantic Monthly (200312), p63 - 66',
  quote: 'The supremacist ideology of the Bush Administration stands in opposition to the principles of an open society, which recognize that people have different views and that nobody is in possession of the ultimate truth. The supremacist ideology postulates that just because we are stronger than others, we know better and have right on our side. The very first sentence of the 200209 National Security Strategy (the President\'s annual laying out to Congress of the country\'s security objectives) reads, "The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." The assumptions behind this statement are false on two counts. First, there is no single sustainable model for national success. Second, the American model, which has indeed been successful, is not available to others, because our success depends greatly on our dominant position at the center of the global capitalist system, and we are not willing to yield it.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: '"How Terrorism\'s Victims Became Perpetrators" (200404)',
  quote: 'Americans, sadly, are now victims who have turned into perpetrators. Indeed, since 200109, the war on terror has claimed more innocent victims than those terrorist attacks. This fact is unrecognized at home because the victims of the war on terror are not Americans. But the rest of the world does not draw the same distinction, and world opinion has turned against America.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'As quoted in "Great Money Minds" by Chris Stallman at TeenAnalyst.\ncom (20050505)',
  quote: 'Markets are constantly in a state of uncertainty and flux and money is made by discounting the obvious and betting on the unexpected.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'As quoted in The Winning Investment Habits of Warren Buffett & George Soros (2006) by Mark Tier, p217',
  quote: 'If investing is entertaining, if you\'re having fun, you\'re probably not making any money. Good investing is boring.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'As quoted in The Winning Investment Habits of Warren Buffett & George Soros (2006) by Mark Tier, p219',
  quote: 'The main difference between me and other people who have amassed this kind of money is that I am primarily interested in ideas, and I don\'t have much personal use for money. But I hate to think what would have happened if I hadn\'t made money: My ideas would not have gotten much play.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'As quoted in The Winning Investment Habits of Warren Buffett & George Soros (2006) by Mark Tier, p219',
  quote: 'I wish I could write a book that will be read for as long as our civilization lasts... I would value it much more highly than any business success if I could contribute to an understanding of the world in which we live or, better yet, if I could help to preserve the economic and political system that has allowed me to flourish as a participant.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: '"How Do You Say ‘Billionaire’ in Esperanto?" in The New York Times (20101216)',
  quote: 'Esperanto was a very useful language, because wherever you went, you found someone to speak with.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'nybooks.\ncom',
  quote: 'So the euro is here to stay, and the arrangements that evolved in response to the crisis have become established as the new order governing the eurozone. This confirms my worst fears. It’s the nightmare I’ve been talking about. I’m hopeful that the Russian invasion of Crimea may serve as a wake-up call. Germany is the only country in a position to change the prevailing order.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Remarks delivered at the World Economic Forum (20180125)',
  quote: 'Companies earn their profits by exploiting their environment. Mining and oil companies exploit the physical environment; social media companies exploit the social environment. This is particularly nefarious because social media companies influence how people think and behave without them even being aware of it.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the mind of the Market (1987)',
  quote: 'The truth is, successful investing is a kind of alchemy.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the mind of the Market (1987)',
  quote: 'I made two major discoveries in the course of writing: one is a reflexive connection between credit and collateral; the other is a reflexive relationship between regulators and the economies they regulate'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the mind of the Market (1987)',
  quote: 'The act of lending can change the value of the collateral'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Soros on Soros (1995)',
  quote: 'My peculiarity is that I don\'t have a particular style of investing or, more exactly, I try to change my style to fit the conditions.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Soros on Soros (1995)',
  quote: 'On the abstract level, I have turned the belief in my own fallibility into the cornerstone of an elaborate philosophy. On a personal level, I am a very critical person who looks for defects in myself as well as in others. But, being so critical, I am also quite forgiving. I couldn\'t recognize my mistakes if I couldn\'t forgive myself. To others, being wrong is a source of shame; to me, recognizing my mistakes is a source of pride. Once we realize that imperfect understanding is the human condition, there is no shame in being wrong, only in failing to correct our mistakes.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Soros on Soros (1995)',
  quote: 'The prevailing wisdom is that markets are always right. I take the opposition position. I assume that markets are always wrong. Even if my assumption is occasionally wrong, I use it as a working hypothesis. It does not follow that one should always go against the prevailing trend. On the contrary, most of the time the trend prevails; only occasionally are the errors corrected. It is only on those occasions that one should go against the trend. This line of reasoning leads me to look for the flaw in every investment thesis. ... I am ahead of the curve. I watch out for telltale signs that a trend may be exhausted. Then I disengage from the herd and look for a different investment thesis. Or, if I think the trend has been carried to excess, I may probe going against it. Most of the time we are punished if we go against the trend. Only at an inflection point are we rewarded.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Crisis of Global Capitalism (1998)',
  quote: 'We live in a global economy, but the political organization of our global society is woefully inadequate. We are bereft of the capacity to preserve peace and to counteract the excesses of the financial markets. Without these controls, the global economy, is liable to break down'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Crisis of Global Capitalism (1998)',
  quote: 'The development of a global economy has not been matched by the development of a global society. The basic unit for political and social life remains the nation-state. International law and international institutions, insofar as they exist, are not strong enough to prevent war or the large-scale abuse of human rights in individual countries. Ecological threats are not adequately dealt with. Global financial markets are largely beyond the control of national or international authorities.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Crisis of Global Capitalism (1998). On the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis',
  quote: 'Financial markets are supposed to swing like a pendulum: They may fluctuate wildly in response to exogenous shocks, but eventually they are supposed to come to rest at an equilibrium point and that point is supposed to be the same irrespective of the interim fluctuations. Instead, as I told Congress, financial markets behaved more like a wrecking ball, swinging from country to country and knocking over the weaker ones.  It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the international financial system itself constituted the main ingredient in the meltdown process.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Crisis of Global Capitalism (1998)',
  quote: 'The global crisis is caused by pathologies inherent in the global financial system itself.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Crisis of Global Capitalism (1998)',
  quote: 'It is time to recognize that financial markets are inherently unstable. Imposing market discipline means imposing instability, and how much instability can society take? ... To put it bluntly, the choice confronting us is whether we will regulate global financial markets internationally or leave it to each individual state to protect its interests as best it can. The latter course will surely lead to the breakdown of the gigantic circulatory system, which goes under the name of global capitalism.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Crisis of Global Capitalism (1998)',
  quote: 'A global society does not mean a global state. To abolish the existence of states is neither feasible nor desirable; but insofar as there are collective interests that transcend state boundaries, the sovereignty of states must be subordinated to international law and international institutions.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with Mark Shapiro (2000)',
  quote: 'I think there\'s a lot of merit in an international economy and global markets, but they\'re not sufficient because markets don\'t look after social needs. Markets are designed to allow individuals to look after their private needs and to pursue profit. It\'s really a great invention and I wouldn\'t under-estimate the value of that, but they\'re not designed to take care of social needs.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with Mark Shapiro (2000)',
  quote: 'Each state is guided by its interests, not by some nebulous concept of common interest. And not many states are even democratic. So, you have a problem with the concept between international institutions and sovereignty. To my mind, there is a solution which has to do with democracy, because democratic governments are subject to the will of the people. So, if the people will it, you can actually create international institutions through the democratic states.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with Mark Shapiro (2000)',
  quote: 'I advocate an alliance of democratic states, with a dual purpose. One, to promote what I call open society. I talk about an alliance of open societies which would first foster the development of open societies within individual countries, because there\'s a lot that needs to be done in that effort. And secondly, to establish basic international law and international institutions that you need for a global, open society. So that\'s my sort of broad concept. Now, I have not worked out the details, because I don\'t think it\'s for me to work out the details. It\'s for them to work out the details.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with Mark Shapiro (2000)',
  quote: 'I used to be opposed to the idea of social entrepreneurship. I said, you know, let business be business, and philanthropy be philanthropy. Keep the two separate, don\'t mix it up, and this is what I did, and I did that rather successfully, but I now recognize that actually you do need to mix it up and I think there is room for social entrepreneurship.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with Mark Shapiro (2000)',
  quote: 'It\'s more difficult, you know, to bring about positive change than it is to make money. It\'s much easier to make money, because it\'s a much easier way to measure success — the bottom line. When it comes to social consequences, they\'ve got all different people acting in different ways, very difficult to even have a proper criterion of success. So, it\'s a difficult task. Why not use an entrepreneurial, rather than a bureaucratic, approach. As long as people genuinely care for the people they\'re trying to help, they can actually do a lot of good.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with Mark Shapiro (2000)',
  quote: 'Well, you know, I was a human being before I became a businessman.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with Mark Shapiro (2000)',
  quote: 'I argue that it\'s appropriate for people to pursue their profit motive in business. If you want to change that, you\'re going against human nature. But when it comes to setting the rules or creating the institutions, then you should have the general interest at heart, even if it conflicts with your personal interest.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with Mark Shapiro (2000)',
  quote: 'You know, these things interested me before I became a businessman and I kind of neglected them during twenty, twenty-five years, while I was engaged in making money, because running a hedge fund takes, you know, a hundred percent of your attention on Saturday morning, and so I didn\'t get involved in these issues very much. It\'s only when I was rather successful at it and I\'ve made enough money for my personal needs and to look after my family that we established this interest and, by now, it is more important to me than my business.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with Mark Shapiro (2000)',
  quote: 'I did spearhead the introduction of the Internet in countries like Russia, the former Soviet Union, because it is a very open system of communication. I think it has great potential for self-organization and self-organization is very much at the heart of an open society. The Internet is sort of a medium of open society. However, it can also be a medium of control and so we have to be careful it doesn\'t destroy you.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with Mark Shapiro (2000)',
  quote: 'I think you will have to be very, very careful to have the regulations that will protect freedom.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with David Brancaccio (2003)',
  quote: 'The Republican Party has been captured by a bunch of extremists … People who maintain that markets will take care of everything, that you leave it to the markets and the markets know best. Therefore, you need no government, no interference with business. Let everybody pursue his own interests. And that will serve the common interest. Now, there is a good foundation for this. But it\'s a half-truth.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with David Brancaccio (2003)',
  quote: 'We need to maintain law and order. We need to maintain peace in the world. We need to protect the environment. We need to have some degree of social justice, equality of opportunity. The markets are not designed to take care of those needs. That\'s a political process. And the market fundamentalists have managed to reduce providing those public goods.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with David Brancaccio (2003)',
  quote: 'I give away something up to $500 million a year throughout the world promoting Open Society. My foundations support people in the country who care about an open society. It\'s their work that I\'m supporting. So it\'s not me doing it. But I can empower them. I can support them, and I can help them.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with David Brancaccio (2003)',
  quote: 'I\'m not doing my philanthropic work, out of any kind of guilt, or any need to create good public relations. I\'m doing it because I can afford to do it, and I believe in it.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with David Brancaccio (2003)',
  quote: 'You know, I learned at a very early age that what kind of social system or political system prevails is very important. Not just for your well-being, but for your very survival. Because, you know, I could have been killed by the Nazis. I could have wasted my life under the Communists. So, that\'s what led me to this idea of an open society. And that is the idea that is motivating me.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with David Brancaccio (2003)',
  quote: 'The people currently in charge have forgotten the first principle of an open society, namely that we may be wrong and that there has to be free discussion. That it\'s possible to be opposed to the policies without being unpatriotic.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with David Brancaccio (2003)',
  quote: 'We are the dominant power. And that imposes on us a responsibility to be actually concerned with the well being of the world. Because we set the agenda. And there are a lot of problems, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, that can only be tackled by collective action. And we ought to be leading that collective action, instead of riding roughshod over other people\'s opinions and interests.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with David Brancaccio (2003)',
  quote: 'If the terrorists have the sympathy of people, it\'s much harder to find them. So we need people on our side, and that leads us to be responsible leaders of the world, show some concern with the problems.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with David Brancaccio (2003). On George W. Bush',
  quote: 'I think he\'s a man of good intentions. I don\'t doubt it. But I think he\'s leading us in the wrong direction.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Interview with David Brancaccio (2003)',
  quote: 'If we re-elect Bush, we are endorsing the Bush doctrine. And then we are off to a vicious circle of escalating violence in the world. And I think, you know, terrorism, counter-terrorism, it\'s a very scary spectacle to me. If we reject him, then we are effectively rejecting the Bush doctrine. Because he was elected on a platform of a more humble foreign policy. Then we can go back to a more humble foreign policy. And treat this episode as an aberration. We have to pay a heavy price. You know, 100 billion dollars a year in Iraq. We can\'t get out of that. We mustn\'t get out of it. But still, we can then regain the confidence of the world, and our rightful place as leaders of the world, working to make the world a better place.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'BuzzFlash interview (2004)',
  quote: 'Stock market bubbles don\'t grow out of thin air. They have a solid basis in reality — but reality as distorted by a misconception. Under normal conditions misconceptions are self-correcting, and the markets tend toward some kind of equilibrium. Occasionally, a misconception is reinforced by a trend prevailing in reality, and that is when a boom-bust process gets under way. Eventually the gap between reality and its false interpretation becomes unsustainable, and the bubble bursts.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'BuzzFlash interview (2004)',
  quote: 'Now look at the ideology of American supremacy. It has a solid foundation in reality; namely, the United States is the dominant power in the world. The current government believes the United States ought to use this dominant position to impose its will on the world. That is the misconception. This approach is not what made America great. America did not arrive at its dominant position by imposing its will on the world.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'BuzzFlash interview (2004)',
  quote: 'My position is that America is great precisely because it is an open society, and an open society recognizes that nobody is the ultimate arbiter — and that we may be wrong at times, even if we are powerful. We must be open to criticism and respect divergent and different views and interests.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'BuzzFlash interview (2004)',
  quote: 'I find the idea that you can introduce democracy by military force a very quaint idea. Moreover, if I wanted to choose a testing ground for doing it, Iraq would be the last nation I would choose.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'BuzzFlash interview (2004)',
  quote: 'Most of the poverty and misery in the world is due to bad government, lack of democracy, weak states, internal strife, and so on. We do need to intervene, to improve political and economic conditions inside countries that have bad governments, where people are suffering. One way of doing this, without violating sovereignty, is through constructive actions — reinforcements and incentives for countries that are moving in the right direction, toward an open society, a market economy, et cetera. That is what I\'m advocating. I\'m advocating preventive action of a constructive nature. And I would use military force only as the very last resort, when nothing else works.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Why We Must Not Reelect President Bush (2004)',
  quote: 'This is the most important election of my lifetime. I have never been heavily involved in partisan politics but these are not normal times. President Bush is endangering our safety, hurting our vital interests and undermining American values. That is why I am publishing this message. I have been demonized by the Bush campaign but I hope you will give me a hearing.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Why We Must Not Reelect President Bush (2004)',
  quote: 'We face a vicious circle of escalating violence. President Bush ran on the platform of a "humble" foreign policy in 2000. If we re-elect him now, we endorse the Bush doctrine of preemptive action and the invasion of Iraq, and we will have to live with the consequences.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Why We Must Not Reelect President Bush (2004)',
  quote: 'I grew up in Hungary, lived through fascism and the Holocaust, and then had a foretaste of communism. I learned at an early age how important it is what kind of government prevails. I chose America as my home because I value freedom and democracy, civil liberties and an open society. When I had made more money than I needed for myself and my family, I set up a foundation to promote the values and principles of a free and open society.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Why We Must Not Reelect President Bush (2004)',
  quote: 'A full and fair discussion is essential to democracy.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Why We Must Not Reelect President Bush (2004)',
  quote: 'We are losing the values that have made America great. The destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center was such a horrendous event that it required a strong response. But the President committed a fundamental error in thinking: the fact that the terrorists are manifestly evil does not make whatever counter-actions we take automatically good. What we do to combat terrorism may also be wrong. Recognizing that we may be wrong is the foundation of an open society.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Why We Must Not Reelect President Bush (2004)',
  quote: 'President Bush inadvertently played right into the hands of bin Laden. The invasion of Afghanistan was justified: that was where bin Laden lived and al Qaeda had its training camps. The invasion of Iraq was not similarly justified. It was President Bush\'s unintended gift to bin Laden.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Why We Must Not Reelect President Bush (2004)',
  quote: 'War and occupation create innocent victims. We count the body bags of American soldiers; there have been more than 1000 in Iraq. The rest of the world also looks at the Iraqis who get killed daily. There have been 15 times more. Some were trying to kill our soldiers; far too many were totally innocent, including many women and children. Every innocent death helps the terrorists\' cause by stirring anger against America and bringing them potential recruits.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'I have been crisscrossing the country for the last three weeks arguing against the reelection of President Bush. I feel strongly that he has led us in the wrong direction. The invasion of Iraq was a colossal blunder and only by rejecting the President at the polls can we hope to escape from the quagmire in which we find ourselves.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'The nation is deeply divided and the two camps seem to be talking past each other. John Kerry won all three debates but President Bush invokes his faith and that inspires his followers. In the end, it boils down to a philosophical difference over how to deal with an often confusing and threatening reality.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'An open society such as ours is based on the recognition that our understanding of reality is inherently imperfect. Nobody is in possession of the ultimate truth. As the philosopher Karl Popper has shown, the ultimate truth is not attainable even in science. All theories are subject to testing and the process of replacing old theories with better ones never ends.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'Faith plays an important role in an open society. Exactly because our understanding is imperfect, we cannot base our decisions on knowledge alone. We need to rely on beliefs, religious or otherwise, to help us make decisions. But we must remain open to the possibility that we may be wrong so that we can correct our mistakes. Otherwise, we are bound to be wrong.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'President Bush has shown that he is incapable of recognizing his mistakes. He insists on making reality conform to his beliefs even at the cost of deceiving himself and deliberately deceiving the public. There is something appealing in the strength of his faith, especially in our troubled time. But the cost is too high. By putting our faith in a President who cannot admit his mistakes we commit ourselves to the wrong policies.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'We are the most powerful nation on earth. No external power, no terrorist organization, can defeat us. But we can defeat ourselves by getting caught in a quagmire.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'If we reelect President Bush we are endorsing his policies and we shall have to live with the consequences. We are facing a vicious circle of escalating violence with no end in sight. If we reject him at the polls we shall have a better chance to regain the respect and support of the world and break the vicious circle. Our future depends on it.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'I have devoted half my fortune and most of my energies in the last 15 years to promoting the values of democracy and open society all over the world, especially in the former Soviet Empire. After 9/11 I came to feel that those principles need to be defended at home.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'The invasion of Afghanistan was justified: that was where Osama bin Laden lived and al Qaeda had its training camps. The invasion of Iraq was not similarly justified.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'The war in Iraq was misconceived from start to finish — if it has a finish. It is a war of choice, not of necessity, as President Bush claims. It goes without saying that Saddam was a tyrant, and it is good to be rid of him. But in invading Iraq as we did, without a second UN resolution, we violated international law. By mistreating and even torturing prisoners, we violated the Geneva conventions. President Bush has boasted that we do not need a permission slip from the international community, but our disregard for international law has endangered our security, particularly the security of our troops.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'The war on terror is an abstraction. But the terrorists are real people and they are not all alike. Most of the people attacking our soldiers in Iraq originally had nothing to do with al Qaeda. They have been generated by the policies of the Bush administration. We have been spared a terrorist attack at home but it is quite a stretch to attribute that to the invasion of Iraq. The insurrection in Iraq, however, is a somber reality and it doesn\'t make us safer at home. Our security, far from improving as President Bush claims, is deteriorating.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'Bush\'s war in Iraq has done untold damage to the United States. It has impaired our military power and undermined the morale of our armed forces. Our troops were trained to project overwhelming power. They were not trained for occupation duties.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'Before the invasion of Iraq, we could project overwhelming power in any part of the world. We cannot do so any more because we are bogged down in Iraq. Iran and North Korea are moving ahead with their nuclear programs at full speed and our hand in dealing with them has been greatly weakened.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'The war on terror as defined by President Bush is a one-dimensional presentation of reality. We cannot fight terrorism by military means alone. We can use military force only when we have a known target; but it is the habit of terrorists to keep their whereabouts hidden. To track them down we need the support of the populations amongst whom they hide. Offense is not necessarily the best defense if it offends those whose allegiance we need.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'George W. Bush revels in being a war president. His campaign is shamelessly exploiting the fears generated by 9/11. Vice President Cheney is conjuring mushroom clouds into our cities. But fear is a bad counselor; we must resist it wherever it comes from. President Roosevelt had the right idea when he said, "We have nothing to fear but Fear itself."'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'Speech at the National Press Club (2004)',
  quote: 'An open society is always in danger. It must constantly reaffirm its principles in order to survive. We are being sorely tested, first by 9/11 and then by President Bush\'s response. To pass the test we must face reality instead of finding solace in false certainties. This election transcends party loyalties. Our future as an open society depends on resisting the Siren\'s song.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Age of Fallibility (2006). Prologue, p. xvi',
  quote: 'The main obstacle to a stable and just world order is the United States. This is a harsh — indeed, for me, painful — thing to say, but unfortunately I am convinced it is true. The United States continues to set the agenda for the world in spite of its loss of influence since 9/11, and the Bush administration is setting the wrong agenda . The Bush agenda is nationalistic: it emphasizes the use of force and ignores global problems whose solution requires international cooperation. The rest of the world dances to the tune the United States is playing, and if that continues too long we are in danger of destroying our civilization. Changing the attitude and policies of the United States remains my top priority.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'The Age of Fallibility (2006). Intro, p. xxv',
  quote: 'We must recognize that as the dominant power in the world we have a special responsibility. In addition to protecting our national interests, we must take the leadership in protecting the common interests of humanity. I go into some detail as to what that entails.   Mankind’s power over nature has increased cumulatively while its ability to govern itself has not kept pace. There is no other country that can take the place of the United States in the foreseeable future. If the United States fails to provide the right kind of leadership our civilization may destroy itself. That is the unpleasant reality that confronts us.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'On Israel, America and AIPAC (2007)',
  quote: 'I am not a Zionist, nor am I am a practicing Jew, but I have a great deal of sympathy for my fellow Jews and a deep concern for the survival of Israel.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'On Israel, America and AIPAC (2007)',
  quote: 'The Bush administration is once again in the process of committing a major policy blunder in the Middle East ... Hamas won the elections in an upset victory. Then came the blunder I am talking about. Israel, with the strong backing of the United States, refused to recognize the democratically elected Hamas government.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'On Israel, America and AIPAC (2007)',
  quote: 'The Palestine problem does not have a purely military solution. Military superiority is necessary for Israel\'s national security, but it is not sufficient. The solution has to be political, as President Clinton recognized.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'On Israel, America and AIPAC (2007)',
  quote: 'The pro-Israel lobby has been remarkably successful in suppressing criticism. Politicians challenge it at their peril because of the lobby\'s ability to influence political contributions. ... Following his criticism of repressive Israeli policy on the West Bank, former president Jimmy Carter has suffered the loss of some of the financial backers of his center.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'On Israel, America and AIPAC (2007)',
  quote: 'One of the myths propagated by the enemies of Israel is that there is an all-powerful Zionist conspiracy. That is a false accusation. Nevertheless, that AIPAC has been so successful in suppressing criticism has lent some credence to such false beliefs. Demolishing the wall of silence that has protected AIPAC would help lay them to rest. A debate within the Jewish community, instead of fomenting anti-Semitism, would only help diminish it.  Anticipating attacks, I should like to emphasize that I do not subscribe to the myths propagated by enemies of Israel and I am not blaming Jews for anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism predates the birth of Israel. Neither Israel\'s policies nor the critics of those policies should be held responsible for anti-Semitism. At the same time, I do believe that attitudes toward Israel are influenced by Israel\'s policies, and attitudes toward the Jewish community are influenced by the pro-Israel lobby\'s success in suppressing divergent views.'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'On BREXIT (2018)',
  quote: '‘The EU needs to transform itself into an association that countries like Britain would want to join, in order to strengthen the political case,’ Mr Soros said he was convinced it was the ideal time for the EU to reform itself and prepare the ground for the UK staying inside the bloc.[1]'
}, {
  figure: 'George Soros',
  mark: 'On China (2019)',
  quote: 'China isn’t the only authoritarian regime in the world, but it’s undoubtedly the wealthiest, strongest and most developed in machine learning and artificial intelligence. This makes Xi Jinping the most dangerous opponent of those who believe in the concept of open society.'
}];

var Henry_Kaufman = [{
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'Interest Rates, the Markets, and the New Financial World (1986)',
  quote: 'The proliferation of credit instruments, financing techniques, and vast matrices of trading and investing opportunities requires highly objective evaluations of risks and rewards, and a sense of historical perspective, if excessive risk taking is to be avoided.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'Interest Rates, the Markets, and the New Financial World (1986)',
  quote: 'The current plethora of instant interpretations tends to emphasize the near-term without adequate regard for longer-term objectives. The problem is compounded by the compressed time scales within which business and government function.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'Interest Rates, the Markets, and the New Financial World (1986)',
  quote: 'Judgements on the performance of our economy require a clearly defined objective. Too often... there are multiple and contradictory objectives. Unless we are clear on our... objectives, we are not able to evaluate performance as good or bad...'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'Interest Rates, the Markets, and the New Financial World (1986)',
  quote: 'Often the real value of management decisions does not become apparent until many years later.\nPerhaps what we should do is try to analyze the impact of decisions in any one period on longer-term performance. In the political arena, for example, why should we emphasize the skill and acumen of national policy-makers only on the new initiatives they introduce and legislate? Sometimes the events that do not materialize are more important than those that do. We should try to ascertain what decisions political leaders are undertaking that will benefit their nations subsequent to their terms in office.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: 'I take great pride in being an American. Consequently, when financial excess threatens our economic moorings, and thus our extraordinary dynamic and pluralistic nation, I have often spoken out for saner behavior and more effective policies.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: 'The credit approval process began with the analysis of balance sheets and profit and loss statements. For those who know how to unlock their secrets, these documents can contain hidden traps, as I soon discovered—and was later reminded by some of the more spectacular credit problems of recent decades. Balance sheets tend to overstate assets and understate liabilities. Inventories commonly are assigned a large cash value after they have become obsolete, while receivables that are ostensibly current are quite often in arrears. Inadequate reserves constitute yet another common weakness that is poorly reflected... A receivable is a current asset, but it could be a slow asset.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[A] balance sheet is a snapshot of one moment in time, and thus presents a very limited view... To be a good banker, therefore, a business is much more than its balance sheet.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[A] profit and loss statement is not simply a collection of figures, but rather—for the perceptive banker—a window into the nuts and bolts of the business, from its method of operation to its management philosophy.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[G]ood bankers understand the shortcomings of accounting and know how to correct for them.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: 'What fascinated me about Drucker, and still does, is how he infuses his broad perspective on business issues with philosophical and historical considerations.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: 'The professor that had the most influence on me was Marcus Nadler. ...As a teacher he had a rare ability to break down complex subjects into more palatable and understandable points. ...[H]e had a great capacity to simplify, to turn abstract ideas into practical applications. ...His lectures helped shape my belief that financial institutions and markets must balance entrepreneurial drive with fiduciary responsibility. And his fairness and openness to opposing points of view influenced me to conclude that no one school of economic thought has a monopoly on wisdom.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: 'Billy Salomon... along with Charles Simon and Sidney Homer predicted... that research would become a critical function of the firm. ... Sidney was given a free hand in creating a bond market research operation. Years later, he wrote a... memoir... Fun with Bonds. Sidney was taken into the firm as a general partner when he was nearly 60 years old. ...such a step would be impossible today ...Sidney wrote with great clarity. ...I later came to appreciate his great historical sensibilities when he asked me to review and edit a draft of a book... A History of Interest Rates... covering 40 centuries and 40 nations.\nWhen Sidney and I met... he was looking for an assistant to help him build a research department devoted solely to money and bond markets.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: 'Salomon\'s growth over the next generation would astound even its most optimistic partners. ...And as we would all see to our amazement, Salomon\'s rise was reflected in broader and equally dramatic transformations in the financial markets—as credit burgeoned, financial crises occasionally rocked the markets, prices and interest rates moved with new volatility, institutions underwent massive shifts, and monetary policy emerged as the dominant force in sustaining economic growth.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: 'In 1900, two-thirds of the nation\'s... citizens still lived in rural communities... But that was changing rapidly (by 1920 more than half of all Americans lived in cities), thanks in large part to the explosive growth of manufacturing. ...[T]wo-thirds of the nation\'s output was in manufactured goods, even though manufacturing employed less than a quarter of the work force. The average plant producing petroleum, iron and steel, and textiles (the three leading industries)... were belied by the behemoth factories... Carnegie... christened the new century by selling his sprawling steel interests to J. P. Morgan, who promptly assembled the $1.\n4 billion United States Steel Corporation in 1901, the nation\'s first billion-dollar industry.\nStill, American manufacturing was then churning out a tiny fraction—roughly 1 percent...—of what today\'s cleaner and enormously more efficient plants produce.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: 'In 1900, industrial workers toiled 10 hours a day, 6 days a week and earning an average of $375 dollars a year. ...[W]orking conditions were typically unsanitary, unsafe, and often fatal, and there were few protections—whether from unions (...a meager 5 percent of industrial workers), employers, or government. ...[S]tate and federal governments frequently trotted out their armed militias to help suppress striking laborers. ...[W]hites lived an average of only 47 years, blacks a mere 33.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[T]he nation\'s middle class was about to embark on an educational revolution that would help boost incomes to unimagined levels over the next three generations. ...Along with the obvious benefits to... individuals, education yielded enormous social and economic returns. Economists have found universal public education in America to be one of the leading engines of economic growth.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: 'In the 1890s and 1810s corporate consolidation inspired an enormous public outcry against the "trusts" (...big business). Newspapers overflowed with editorial deriding... "robber barons," and for the first time in American history the federal government stepped in to regulate... First came the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887... designed to limit discriminatory railroad rates, and then the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890—Congresses\' first attempt to constrain monopolistic practices. In practice, both acts proved to be weak against the predominant power of big business. For decades, the courts in effect made regulatory policy in how they interpreted... these two...'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[D]uring the Progressive Era... the federal government took large strides to regulate corporate America. ...[T]he federal government managed to break up several trusts (including the Northern Securities Company, American Tobacco, and Standard Oil) and to establish the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Reserve.\nIn our time, business consolidation is evoking no similar reaction.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[F]inancial markets have evolved at least as dramatically as... manufacturing, work, technology, education, and business regulation since the turn of the previous century.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[T]he most striking feature of America\'s Gilded Age banking and financial markets is their lack of regulation. Wall Street was periodically upended by... colorful figures such as Daniel Drew, Jim Fiske, and Jay Gould to manipulate prices and corner markets. The only force countervailing against such panics was a handful of more responsible investors, most notably J. P. Morgan... [who] engineered a successful rescue operation after the Panic of 1907... That episode inspired Congress to begin... plans for a central bank. After all, Morgan couldn\'t live forever.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: 'The federal made some efforts at regulation in 1900, by passing the Gold Standard Act, which allowed state banks to set up branches in small towns and ended the bimetalism debate by establishing gold as the only redeemable metal. Still, the vast majority of banks were local, single unit operations, and access to capital and credit... increasingly difficult as... business enterprises expanded rapidly.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[R]icher nations have larger stock and bond markets than poorer ones, and the assets of financial intermediaries are much larger in relation to GDP.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[A]n economy cannot grow and thrive without a strong commercial and investment banking infrastructure. Without the ability to create debt and equity instruments, the world\'s economies would not have advanced beyond their most rudimentary forms.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[F]inancial markets can be considered one of the great wonders of the world.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry Kaufman',
  mark: 'On Money and Markets (2000)',
  quote: '[F]inancial markets are... a microcosm of the people and societies they serve. ...The extremes of market movements reflect the extremes of human nature and human emotion—from optimism and elation to pessimism and despair. In financial markets—as in life—rationality prevails most of the time.'
}];

var Henry_S_Haskins = [{
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p22',
  quote: 'Man is sadly retarded by allowable imperfections.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p22',
  quote: 'Thoughts left unsaid are never wasted.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p22',
  quote: 'It is only an uncivilized world that would worship civilization.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p29',
  quote: 'The tongues of conscience need a conscience of their own to keep them from speaking before they know what they are talking about.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p29',
  quote: 'No conscience which is a palimpsest of the consciences of others is a safe guide.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p30',
  quote: 'Avoid membership in a body of persons pledged to only one side of anything.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p31',
  quote: 'If we exiled our sins, our virtues would get lonely without their old sparring partners.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p35',
  quote: 'When study becomes labor, we had better change the subject-matter as quickly as possible.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p37',
  quote: 'Only occasional hours meet our full requirements.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p37',
  quote: 'If you obtain provision for yourself of spiritual abundance, don’t throw the surplus at people’s heads; feed it back into your own industry as capital for the production of more abundance.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p38',
  quote: 'There is not an ounce of our former strength which is not doing some sort of job, right now.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p38',
  quote: 'Our portion of life is the whole thing for us.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p43',
  quote: 'Proud souls in the true sense are never humbled by adversity.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p46',
  quote: 'Remembrance of hopes that were silly has an especial tenderness, for much of their silliness came from a thoughtless credulity which we would be glad to have back again.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p46',
  quote: '… memories that never ride anything but sound waves.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p49',
  quote: 'Dive where the water is deep.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p49',
  quote: 'The man who has a dogmatic creed has more time left for his business.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p52',
  quote: 'It would be as natural for a full-grown tiger to mew as for a man released from the slavery of imitations ever to go back to his neighbor again with: “What do you think of this? What do you advise about that?”'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p57',
  quote: 'There never is any diminution of the vast majority, indifferent to what they are, whence they came, and whither they go, who rush from business to pastime, and from pastime back to business, leaving no vacancy into which the unknown might slip a little experimental greatness.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p58',
  quote: 'Twenty is in hot haste to become a year older and cast its first vote, which Forty will know was cast like the legendary pearls.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p68',
  quote: 'It is the honest lies we tell—statements factually correct and essentially deceiving—which debauch our manhood and stunt our growth.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p69',
  quote: 'Some have half-baked ideas because their ideals are not heated up enough.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p69',
  quote: 'Many a superior brain is blockaded by inferior thoughts.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p70',
  quote: 'Vacant minds have their uses, yet it seems a pity to waste first-class bodies on them.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p70',
  quote: 'The unfortunate who has to travel for amusement lacks capacity for amusement.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p74',
  quote: 'The man who is too old to learn was probably always too old to learn.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p77',
  quote: 'Make a party over your negative thoughts, assuring them that they are the safest, the most cautious, company you have ever kept. At first they will swallow your flattery, but then suddenly, stricken with shame, and knowing themselves for the impostors they are, out and off they will go.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p77',
  quote: 'Some talk in quarto volumes and act in pamphlets.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p79',
  quote: 'We cannot be too earnest, too persistent, too determined, about living superior to the herd instinct.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p80',
  quote: 'Many of our intentions die after we have put their harness on.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p80',
  quote: 'The darkness around us might somewhat light up if we would first practice using the light we have on the place we are.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p80',
  quote: 'The way to get the most out of a victory is to follow it with another that makes it look small.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p81',
  quote: 'A soul which is truly in earnest is not above disabling the body to discourage dangerous competition.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p81',
  quote: 'When you start to indulge yourself, remember it is what they do with invalids and children.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p82',
  quote: 'Many of us are impersonations of what we know we ought to be.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p82',
  quote: 'Be a sincere effort never so misguided, to laugh at it is a breach of faith with decency.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p82',
  quote: 'We demand about everything of ourselves but discrimination in what we demand.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p82',
  quote: 'Ugly facts are a challenge to beautify them.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p91',
  quote: 'There are many branches of learning, but only the one solid tree-trunk of wisdom.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p91-92',
  quote: 'The art of a pedant is to divert his pupils from noticing the smallness of his puddle, and to make them attribute his apparent size to his being a really big toad.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p92',
  quote: 'It is not so much tutoring that the minds needs, but clearer recognition and better use of what it already knows.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p92',
  quote: 'It is the semi-learned who scorn the ignorant; the learned know too much about them for that.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p92',
  quote: 'The highest grades of humanity have passed through the millstones more than once.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p93',
  quote: 'Man is liberated from his illusions to make room for a fresh set.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p94',
  quote: 'The rare individual who has learned to govern himself is too fed up with the labor of it to want to govern anybody else.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p94',
  quote: 'Academic questions are interlopers in a world where so few of the real ones have been answered.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p94',
  quote: 'It is when we start to discipline our mind that we discover how many undisclosed relationships it already has.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p94',
  quote: 'Sedate ignorance is the last stage of deterioration.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p96',
  quote: 'Imitation can acquire pretty much everything but the power which created the thing imitated.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p99',
  quote: 'Symbols have a trick of stealing the show away from the thing they stand for.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p100',
  quote: 'Compliments have lost their lure by the time a man does not have to fish for them.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p100',
  quote: 'Expletives serve opinions well which are not sure enough of themselves to risk expression in restrained language.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p101',
  quote: 'Having climbed to a height, it is easier to slip from it than to stay there after the zest of striving is removed.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p103',
  quote: 'We should train our desires to show the way to our dreams.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p103',
  quote: 'The man who feels that he must be hopeful and cheerful to get along ignores the careers of some pretty successful misanthropes.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p104',
  quote: 'Contentment has been worn as a crown by no end of sleepy heads.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p104',
  quote: 'When a man’s success becomes commonplace to him, it is his success no longer.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p104',
  quote: 'We have to serve ourselves for many years before we gain our own confidence.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p107',
  quote: 'When you think of the silly things people have said to you which have stopped you from saying the same silly things, you simply can’t do justice to your gratitude.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p108',
  quote: 'The deadliest contagion is majority opinion.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p108',
  quote: 'Tradition is a prison with majority opinion the modern jailer.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p109',
  quote: 'By an unfailing coincidence, the man who wrongs us is a villain, and the man who does us a kindness is a saint.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p110',
  quote: 'Not a little of our condemnation of the acts of others is spillage from our own condemnation of our own acts.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p111',
  quote: 'Acting as your own sovereign power, grant yourself oblivion for past offences.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p111',
  quote: 'He who longs for the far-away proves thereby that he has corrupted the near-at-hand.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p111',
  quote: 'Stand aloof from your own opinions; they seek to lure you with an illusive certainty.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p115',
  quote: 'Thought the fool is to be pitied, still he is spared watching spurious wisdom turn to ashes in his head.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p115',
  quote: 'A distant destination austerely reached rarely compensates for a loved starting-point forever lost.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p116',
  quote: 'We fall short when we ascribe all the modes of happiness to walking in paths of rectitude. There are joys which only tramps and thieves know.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p117',
  quote: 'If imagination would disentangle itself from absurdities, soon we should have it harnessed to reason, pulling the same plough.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p118',
  quote: 'Where you find imagination tracing the outlines and reason filling in the details, there you have a man.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p119',
  quote: 'Some live lies who won’t tell them; some tell lies who won’t live them.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p120',
  quote: 'If someone offers to furnish a sure test, ask what the test was which made the sure test sure.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p131',
  quote: 'What lies behind us and what lies before us are but tiny matters compared to what lies within us.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p132',
  quote: 'Who can set us straight in our labyrinth from the mazes of his own?'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p133',
  quote: 'It is getting what we started to get, not the thing got, which spells success.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p134',
  quote: 'We are no more alike under the skin than we are on top of it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p134',
  quote: 'Tradition supplants inspiration with the warmed-over article.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p135',
  quote: 'We condemn a sin before we have even tried it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p135',
  quote: 'Normal is the wrong name often used for average.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p135',
  quote: 'Good behavior is the last refuge of mediocrity.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p137',
  quote: 'Discontent follows ambition like a shadow.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p139',
  quote: 'How often our bosom swells and our temples throb to a thought which proves itself not to be worth anything but for the exaltation we feel while the swelling and throbbing are going on, which after all is something.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p140',
  quote: 'The things we counterfeit are not worth the trouble of falling into disgrace with ourselves.'
}, {
  figure: 'Henry S. Haskins',
  mark: 'Meditations in Wall Street (1940). p146',
  quote: 'For a competent audience, uncommon men must have other uncommon men.'
}];

var Kenneth_Griffin = [{
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: 'Bloomberg News (20050429).',
  quote: 'Capital markets reward you for what you learn that other people have yet to ascertain.'
}, {
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: 'Chicago Mercantile Exchange advertisement',
  quote: 'Risk is what you make of it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: 'Interview with Harvard Investment Magazine (Winter 2005)\nResponse to question about managing a large hedge fund.',
  quote: 'Size is a double-edged sword with great advantages and disadvantages..'
}, {
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: 'Interview with Harvard Investment Magazine (Winter 2005)',
  quote: '...my advice to every student who is trying to make a decision for the years immediately after graduation: take the opportunity that in your mind is the most rewarding, that you are most passionate about and that you find most interesting and save the rest of your life for being risk averse. Whatever you want to do, this is the time to pursue it. Twenty years from now, your freedom to take risks will be limited.'
}, {
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: 'Video commentary featured on website of the Chicago Public Education Fund',
  quote: 'We all know that great leaders can create great successes...success for the Chicago public education fund is to bring great leaders into Chicago\'s public schools.'
}, {
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: 'Institutional Investor Magazine (200109)',
  quote: 'Every organization has two choices. Choice one is to grow. Choice two is to die. If you decide not to grow, it\'s a clear-cut message to talented people that it\'s time to leave.'
}, {
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: '"Citadel Boss Won\'t Be Hedging On Day Job," Chicago Tribune (200603)\nOn competition among hedge funds.',
  quote: 'We\'re subject to the same forces of capitalism that have built the entire American economy. Strong returns induce more capital flow, which creates more competitors, and you have to evolve and get better, or you die.'
}, {
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: '"Justice Delayed," FTSE Global Markets (May/200506)\nOn using technology to end market timing.',
  quote: 'The ability to create same day straight through processing of mutual fund trades is a matter of will.'
}, {
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: '"The Age of Global Markets and the Global Investor," 25th International SFOA Bürgenstock Conference\nFrom a presentation by Griffin.',
  quote: '...there won’t be one, single global market. But there will be global investors.'
}, {
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: '"Why Citadel Pounced On Wounded E*Trade," The Wall Street Journal (200611)\nReportedly the words initiating "the highest-profile move in Citadel\'s history."',
  quote: 'Let\'s go.'
}, {
  figure: 'Kenneth Griffin',
  mark: '"A Wishlist for Fixing Wall Street," New York Times (20080513).',
  quote: 'The investment banks should either choose to be regulated as banks or should arrange to conduct their affairs to not require the stop-gap support of the Federal Reserve.'
}];

var Mary_Meeker = [{
  figure: 'Mary Meeker',
  mark: 'Newsweek: "Climbing Back Up" (20040829)',
  quote: 'One of the greatest investments of our lifetime has been New York City real estate, and investors made the highest returns when they bought stuff during the 1970s and 1980s when people were getting mugged. The lesson is that you make the most money when you buy stuff that\'s out of consensus.'
}];

var Nassim_Nicholas_Taleb = [{
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb\'s Home Page',
  quote: 'My major hobby is teasing people who take themselves and the quality of their knowledge too seriously and those who don’t have the guts to sometimes say: I don’t know....'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb\'s Home Page',
  quote: 'You may not be able to change the world but can at least get some entertainment and make a living out of the epistemic arrogance of the human race.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Quoted in the introduction to "A Talk with Nassim Nicholas Taleb," Edge (200404) [1]',
  quote: 'It is now the scientific consensus that our risk-avoidance mechanism is not mediated by the cognitive modules of our brain, but rather by the emotional ones. This may have made us fit for the Pleistocene era. Our risk machinery is designed to run away from tigers; it is not designed for the information-laden modern world.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: '"Learning to Expect the Unexpected," The New York Times (2004-04-08}',
  quote: 'Much of the research into humans\' risk-avoidance machinery shows that it is antiquated and unfit for the modern world; it is made to counter repeatable attacks and learn from specifics. If someone narrowly escapes being eaten by a tiger in a certain cave, then he learns to avoid that cave.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: '"Learning to Expect the Unexpected," The New York Times (2004-04-08}',
  quote: 'We should reward people, not ridicule them, for thinking the impossible.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'Delivering advice assumes that our cognitive apparatus rather than our emotional machinery exerts some meaningful control over our actions.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'It does not matter how frequently something succeeds if failure is too costly to bear.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'Trading forces someone to think hard; those who merely work hard generally lose their focus and intellectual energy. In addition, they end up drowning in randomness; work ethics draw people to focus on noise rather than the signal.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'Mild success can be explainable by skills and labor. Wild success is attributable to variance.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'Lucky fools do not bear the slightest suspicion that they may be lucky fools - by definition, they do not know that they belong to such a category.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'Unlike a well-defined, precise game like Russian roulette, where the risks are visible to anyone capable of multiplying and dividing by six, one does not observe the barrel of reality.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Two: A Bizarre Accounting Method | George Will is No Solon: On Counterintuitive Truths',
  quote: '[T]he epic poet did not judge heroes by the result... their fate depended on totally external forces... Heroes are heroes because they are heroic in behavior, not because they won or lost.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Two: A Bizarre Accounting Method | George Will is No Solon: On Counterintuitive Truths',
  quote: 'Mixing forecast and prophecy is symptomatic of randomness-foolishness...'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Two: A Bizarre Accounting Method | George Will is No Solon: On Counterintuitive Truths | Humiliated in Debates',
  quote: 'I do not dispute that arguments should be simplified to their maximum... but people often confuse complex ideas that cannot be simplified into a media-friendly statement as symptomatic of a confused mind. ...MBAs tend to blow up in financial markets, as they are trained to simplify... beyond... requirement. (...I am myself the unhappy holder of the degree.)'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Two: A Bizarre Accounting Method | George Will is No Solon: On Counterintuitive Truths | A Different Kind of News',
  quote: '[T]he mental probabilistic map in one\'s mind is so geared toward the sensational that one would realize informational gains by dispensing with the news.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Two: A Bizarre Accounting Method | George Will is No Solon: On Counterintuitive Truths | Epiphenomena',
  quote: 'From the standpoint of an institution, the existence of a risk manager has less to do with actual risk reduction than it has to do with the impression of risk reduction.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Three: A Mathematical Meditation on History | Fun in My Attic | Making History',
  quote: 'In the early 1990s... I became addicted to the various Monte Carlo engines, which I taught myself to build... The dividend of the computer revolution... did not come in... e-mail messages and... chat rooms; it was in the sudden availability of fast processors capable of generating a million sample paths per minute.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Three: A Mathematical Meditation on History | Fun in My Attic | Zorglubs Crowding the Attic',
  quote: 'My models showed that ultimately almost nobody really survived; bears dropped like flies in the rally and bulls ended up being slaughtered... But there was one exception... option buyers... could buy the insurance against blowup...'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Three: A Mathematical Meditation on History | Fun in My Attic | Denigration of History',
  quote: 'I have two ways of learning from history: from the past, by reading the elders; and from the future, thanks to my Monte Carlo toy.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Three: A Mathematical Meditation on History | Fun in My Attic | Skills in Predicting Past History',
  quote: 'A... vicious effect of... hindsight bias is that those that are good at predicting the past... think of themselves as good at predicting the future... [W]e live in a world where important events are not predictable...'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Three: A Mathematical Meditation on History | Fun in My Attic | My Salon',
  quote: '[H]istory cannot lend itself to experimentation. But... is potent enough... to eventually bury the bad guy. Bad trades catch up with you... Mathematicians of probability give that a... name: ergodicity. [R]oughly... properties of a very... long sample path would be similar to the Monte Carlo properties of an average of shorter ones.  ...Those unlucky... in spite of their skills would eventually rise. The lucky fool... would slowly converge to the state of a less-lucky idiot. Each ...would revert to his long-term properties.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Three: A Mathematical Meditation on History | Distilled Thinking On Your Palm Pilot | Breaking News',
  quote: '[A]ge is beauty. ...[M]y instinct is to value distilled thought over newer thinking, regardless of its apparent sophistication—another reason to accumulate the hoary volumes by my bedside... For an idea to have survived so many cycles is indicative of its relative fitness. Noise, at least some noise, was filtered out. ...[P]rogress means that some new information is better than past information, not that the average of new information will supplant past information...'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Three: A Mathematical Meditation on History | Distilled Thinking On Your Palm Pilot | Shiller Redux',
  quote: 'There are hordes of thoughtful journalists... [I]t is just that prominent media journalism is a thoughtless process of providing the noise that captures people\'s attention and there exists no mechanism for separating the two.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Three: A Mathematical Meditation on History | Distilled Thinking On Your Palm Pilot | Gerontocracy',
  quote: 'I... found a significant advantage in selecting aged traders, using as a selection criterion their cumulative years of experience rather than their absolute success... [O]lder people have been exposed longer to the rare event and can be, convincingly, more resistant to it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Three: A Mathematical Meditation on History | Philostratus in Monte Carlo: On the Difference Between Noise and Information',
  quote: 'Over a short time increment, one observes the variability of the portfolio, not the returns. ...[O]ne sees the variance, little else. ...Our emotions are not designed to understand the point. ...I deal with it by having no access to information. ...I prefer to read poetry.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Three: A Mathematical Meditation on History | Philostratus in Monte Carlo: On the Difference Between Noise and Information',
  quote: '[N]ews... is full of noise and... history is largely stripped of it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Five: Survival of the Least Fit—Can Evolution be Fooled by Randomness | Carlos the Emerging-Markets Wizard | L1. n the Sand',
  quote: 'A trader\'s mental construction should direct him to do precisely what other people do not do.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Five: Survival of the Least Fit—Can Evolution be Fooled by Randomness | Carlos the Emerging-Markets Wizard | L1. n the Sand',
  quote: 'Veteran trader Marty O\'Connell calls this the firehouse effect. ...[F]iremen ...who talk to each other for too long come to agree on many things that an outside, impartial observer would find ludicrous...'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Five: Survival of the Least Fit—Can Evolution be Fooled by Randomness | Carlos the Emerging-Markets Wizard | L1. n the Sand',
  quote: '[A]t any point in time, the richest traders are often the worst traders. This I will call the cross-sectional problem: At a given time... the most successful traders are likely to be those fit for the latest cycle.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Five: Survival of the Least Fit—Can Evolution be Fooled by Randomness | John the High Yield Trader | The Traits They Shared',
  quote: '[T]hey share the traits of the acute successful randomness fool who, in addition, operates in the most random of environments. ...[T]heir bosses and employers shared the same trait. They, too, are permanently out of the market.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Five: Survival of the Least Fit—Can Evolution be Fool by Randomness | A Review of Market Fools of Randomness Constants | The Traits They Shared',
  quote: 'There is a saying that bad traders divorce their spouse sooner than abandon their positions. Loyalty to ideas is not a good thing for traders, scientists - or anyone.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Five: Survival of the Least Fit—Can Evolution be Fool by Randomness | A Review of Market Fools of Randomness Constants | Can Evolution be Fooled by Randomness?',
  quote: 'Just as an animal could have survived because its sample path was lucky... free of the evolutionary rare event, the "best" operators in a given business can... One vicious attribute is that the longer these... can go without encountering the rare event, the more vulnerable they will be to it. ...[S]hould one extend time to infinity, then by ergodicity, that event will happen with certainty—the species will be wiped out! For evolution means fitness to... only one time series, not the average of all possible environments.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Six: Skewness and Symmetry | The Median is Not the Message',
  quote: 'Why do [people] confuse probability and expectation, that is, probability [vs.] probability times payoff? Mainly because much... schooling comes from examples in symmetric environments... the... bell curve... is entirely symmetric.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Six: Skewness and Symmetry | Bull and Bear Zoology | Rare Events',
  quote: 'I have organized my career and business in such a way as to... benefit... I am profiting from the rare event, with asymmetric bets.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Six: Skewness and Symmetry | Bull and Bear Zoology | Symmetry and Science',
  quote: 'In most disciplines... asymmetry does not matter. ...People in most fields ...do not have problems eliminating extreme values from their sample, when the difference in payoff between different outcomes is not significant ...A professor ...removes the ...outliers, and takes the average of the remaining ones, without ...being ...unsound. A casual weather forecaster does the same ...So people in finance borrow the technique and ignore infrequent events, not knowing that the effect ...can bankrupt a company.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Six: Skewness and Symmetry | Bull and Bear Zoology | Symmetry and Science',
  quote: 'Many scientists... are... subject to such foolishness... One flagrant example is... global warming... These scientists initially ignored the fact that these [high temperature] spikes, although rare, had the effect of adding disproportionately to the cumulative melting of the ice caps. ...[A]n event, although rare, that brings large consequences cannot be ignored.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Six: Skewness and Symmetry | Almost Everyone is Above Average',
  quote: 'Sometimes market data becomes a simple trap; it shows you the opposite of its nature... [e.\ng.,] Currencies that exhibit the largest historical stability... are the most prone to crashes.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Six: Skewness and Symmetry | Almost Everyone is Above Average',
  quote: 'I reject a sole time series of the past as an indication of future performance; I need a lot more than data.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Six: Skewness and Symmetry | Almost Everyone is Above Average',
  quote: '[W]e read too much into shallow recent history... but not from history in general [which] teaches us that things that never happened before do happen. ...outside of the narrowly defined time series; the broader the look, the better the lesson.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Six: Skewness and Symmetry | The Rare-Event Fallacy | The Mother of All Deceptions',
  quote: '[T]here is a category of traders who have inverse rare events, for whom volatility is often the bearer of good news. Those traders lose money frequently, but in small amounts, and make money rarely, but in large amounts. ...crisis hunters. I am happy to be one of them.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Six: Skewness and Symmetry | The Rare-Event Fallacy | Why Don\'t Statisticians Detect Rare Events?',
  quote: 'Statistics... is all based on... the steady augmentation of the confidence level... [F]or an n times increase in sample size, we increase our knowledge by the square root on n. ...Where statistics ...fails us, is when we have distributions that are not symmetric... If there is a very small probability of finding a red ball in an urn dominated by black ones, then our knowledge about the absence of red balls will increase [even more] slowly. ...On the other hand, our knowledge of the presence of red balls will dramatically improve once one of them is found. This asymmetry in knowledge... is the central philosophical problem for... David Hume and Karl Popper.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Seven: The Problem of Induction | From Bacon to Hume | Cygnus Atratus',
  quote: 'David Hume posed the issue in the following way (as rephrased in the black swan problem by... John Stuart Mill) No amount of observations of white swans can allow the inference that all swans are white, but the observation of a single black swan is sufficient to refute that conclusion.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Seven: The Problem of Induction | From Bacon to Hume | Cygnus Atratus',
  quote: 'Science had shifted, thanks to Bacon, into an emphasis on empirical observation. The problem is that, without a proper method, empirical observations can lead you astray. Hume came to... stress the need for some rigor in the gathering and interpretation of knowledge... epistemology... Hume is the first modern epistemologist... he was an obsessive skeptic and never believed... that a link between two items could be established as being causal.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Seven: The Problem of Induction | From Bacon to Hume | Neiderhoffer',
  quote: 'Maximizing the probability of winning does not lead to maximizing the expectation from the game when one\'s strategy may include skewness, i.\ne., a small chance of a large loss and a large chance of a small win. If you engaged in a Russian Roulette-type strategy... you are likely to show up as the winner in almost all samples—except in the year when you are dead.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Seven: The Problem of Induction | Sir Karl\'s Promoting Agent | Nobody is Perfect',
  quote: '[W]e like to emit logical and rational ideas but we do not enjoy this execution.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Seven: The Problem of Induction | Sir Karl\'s Promoting Agent | Induction and Memory',
  quote: 'What is easier to remember, a collection of facts glued together, or a story, something that offers a series of logical links? Causality is easier to commit to memory. ...What is induction exactly? ...It is very handy, as the general takes much less room in onel\'s memory than a collection of particulars. The effect of such compression is the reduction in the degree of detected randomness.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Seven: The Problem of Induction | Sir Karl\'s Promoting Agent | Pascal\'s Wager',
  quote: 'I will use statistics and inductive methods to make aggressive bets, but I will not use them to manage my risks and exposure. ...[A]ll the surviving traders I know seem to have done the same. ...[T]hey make sure the cost of being wrong is limited ...they know ...which events would prove their conjecture wrong and allow for it ...They would then terminate their trade. This is called a stop loss ...I find it rarely practiced.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'A mistake is not something to be determined after the fact, but in the light of the information until that point.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'I always remind myself that what one observes is at best a combination of variance and returns, not just returns.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'I try to make money infrequently, as infrequently as possible simply because I believe that rare events are not fairly valued, and that the rarer the event, the more undervalued it will be in price.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). P2. Monkeys on Typewriters | Survivorship and Other Biases',
  quote: 'The major problem with inference... is that those whose profession it is to derive conclusions from data often fall into the trap faster and more confidently... The more data we have, the more likely we are to drown in it. For common wisdom... is to base... decision making on the following principle: It is very unlikely for someone to perform... well in a consistent fashion without doing something right. ...[I]f someone performed better... in the past then there is a great[er] chance of performing better than the crowd in the future... But... [a] small knowledge of probability can lead to worse results than no knowledge at all.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Eight: Too Many Millionaires | How to Stop the Sting of Failure | You\'re a Failure',
  quote: '[B]ecoming more rational, or not feeling the emotions of social slights, is not part of the human race... not with our current biology. There is no solace to be found from reasoning...'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Eight: Too Many Millionaires | A Guru\'s Opinion',
  quote: 'Optimism, it is said, is predictive of success. ...It can also be predictive of failure. Optimistic people... take more risks as they are overconfident of the about the odds; those who win show up among the rich and famous, others fail and disappear from the analysis.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Nine: It is Easier to Buy and Sell than to Fry an Egg | Fooled by the Numbers | Placebo Investors',
  quote: 'Let us use 10,\n000 fictional investment managers... [O]nce a manager has a single bad year, he is thrown out of the sample. ...[T]oss a coin; heads and the manager will make $10,\n000 over the year, tails and he will lose $10,\n000. ...We have, in a fair game, 313 managers who made money five years in a row. ...[I]f we throw one of these ...into the real world we would get ...comments on his remarkable style, his incisive mind... His biographer will dwell on ...a great mind in the making. ...[S]hould he stop performing (...his odds ...have stayed at 50%) they would start ...finding fault with his dissipated lifestyle. They will find something he stopped doing, and attribute his failure... The truth ...he simply ran out of luck.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Nine: It is Easier to Buy and Sell than to Fry an Egg | Fooled by the Numbers | Ergodicity',
  quote: 'The information that a person derived some profit in the past... by itself, is neither meaningful nor relevant. We need to know the size of the population from which he came. If the initial population is 10,\n000 managers, I would ignore the results.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Nine: It is Easier to Buy and Sell than to Fry an Egg | Comparative Luck | Professor Pearson Goes to Monte Carlo (Literally): Randomness does not Look Random!',
  quote: 'Professor Karl Pearson... devised the first test of nonrandomness... He examined millions of runs of what was called a Monte Carlo (the old name for a roulette wheel)... He discovered... the runs were not purely random. ...Philosophers of statistics call this the reference case problem to explain that there is no true attainable randomness in practice, only in theory.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001). Nine: It is Easier to Buy and Sell than to Fry an Egg | Comparative Luck | Professor Pearson Goes to Monte Carlo (Literally): Randomness does not Look Random!',
  quote: 'Even the fathers of statistical science forgot that a random series is bound to exhibit some pattern... Pearson was among the first scholars interested in creating artificial random number generators, tables one could use as inputs for... simulations (precursors of our Monte Carlo simulator). ...[T]hey did not want these tables to exhibit... regularity. Yet real randomness does not look random! ...A single random run is bound to exhibit some pattern ...'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'At no point during his ordeal did Nero think of himself as 72% alive and 28% dead.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'Probability is not about the odds, but about the belief in the existence of an alternative outcome, cause, or motive.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'We favor the visible, the embedded, the personal, the narrated, and the tangible; we scorn the abstract.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: 'Wittgenstein\'s ruler: "Unless you have confidence in the ruler\'s reliability, if you use a ruler to measure a table you may also be using the table to measure the ruler." (page 224)'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: '[E]conomists are evaluated on how intelligent they sound, not on a scientific measure of their knowledge of reality. (page 85)'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: '[E]conomics is a narrative discipline, and explanations are easy to fit retrospectively. (page 257)'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Fooled by Randomness (2001)',
  quote: '[In] economics... you can disguise charlatanism under the weight of equations and nobody can catch you since there is no such thing as a controlled experiment. Now the spirit of such methods, called scientism by its detractors, continued into the discipline of finance as a few technicians thought their mathematical knowledge could lead them to understand markets. The practice of financial engineering came along with massive doses of pseudoscience. (page 115)'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p. xxi',
  quote: 'I disagree with the followers of Marx and those of Adam Smith: the reason free markets work is because they allow people to be lucky, thanks to aggressive trial and error, not by giving rewards or "incentives" for skill.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p. xxix',
  quote: 'If you want to get an idea of a friend\'s temperament, ethics, and personal elegance, you need to look at him under the tests of severe circumstances, not under the regular rosy glow of daily life. Can you assess the danger a criminal poses by examining only what he does on an ordinary day? Can we understand health without considering wild diseases and epidemics? Indeed the normal is often irrelevant.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p5',
  quote: 'It is remarkable how fast and how effectively you can construct a nationality with a flag, a few speeches, and a national anthem; to this day I avoid the label "Lebanese," preferring the less restrictive "Levantine" designation.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p8',
  quote: 'History is opaque. You see what comes out, not the script that produces events, [...] The generator of historical events is different from the events themselves, much as the minds of the gods cannot be read just by witnessing their deeds.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p15',
  quote: 'Categorizing is necessary for humans, but it becomes pathological when the category is seen as definitive, preventing people from considering the fuzziness of boundaries, let alone revising their categories.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p58',
  quote: 'But it remains the case that you know what is wrong with a lot more confidence than you know what is right.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p69',
  quote: 'We tend to use knowledge as therapy.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p40–41 (Taleb attributes the parable of the turkey to Bertrand Russell, who originally wrote of a chicken.)',
  quote: 'Consider that the turkey\'s experience may have, rather than no value, a negative value. It learned from observation, as we are all advised to do (hey, after all, this is what is believed to be the scientific method). Its confidence increased as the number of friendly feedings grew, and it felt increasingly safe even though the slaughter was more and more imminent. Consider that the feeling of safety reached its maximum when the risk was at the highest!'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p127',
  quote: 'The casino is the only human venture I know where the probabilities are known, Gaussian (i.\ne., bell-curve), and almost computable.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p128',
  quote: 'Probability is a liberal art; it is a child of skepticism, not a tool for people with calculators on their belts to satisfy their desire to produce fancy calculations and certainties.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p142',
  quote: 'There is no effective difference between guessing a variable that is not random, but for which information is partial or deficient (...), and a random one (...). In this sense, guessing (what I don\'t know, but what someone else may know) and predicting (what has not taken place yet) are the same thing.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p149',
  quote: 'Cumulative errors depend largely on the big surprises, the big opportunities. Not only do economic, financial, and political predictors miss them, but they are quite ashamed to say anything outlandish to their clients — and yet events, it turns out, are almost always outlandish.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p161',
  quote: 'Don\'t cross a river if it is four feet deep on average.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p162',
  quote: 'Forecasting by bureaucrats tends to be used for anxiety relief rather than for adequate policy making.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p185',
  quote: 'The same past data can confirm a theory and its exact opposite! If you survive until tomorrow, it could mean that either a) you are more likely to be immortal or b) that you are closer to death.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p192',
  quote: 'One cannot assert authority by accepting one\'s own fallibility. Simply, people need to be blinded by knowledge - we are made to follow leaders who can gather people together because the advantages of being in groups trump the disadvantages of being alone. It has been more profitable for us to bind together in the wrong direction than to be alone in the right one. Those who have followed the assertive idiot rather than the introspective wise person have passed us some of their genes. This is apparent from a social pathology: psychopaths rally followers.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p198',
  quote: 'While in theory randomness is an intrinsic property, in practice, randomness is incomplete information.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p203',
  quote: 'Rank beliefs not according to their plausibility but by the harm they may cause.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p209',
  quote: 'This makes living in big cities invaluable because you increase the odds of serendipitous encounters — you gain exposure to the envelope of serendipity.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). p225-226',
  quote: 'Globalization creates interlocking fragility, while reducing volatility and giving the appearance of stability. In other words it creates devastating Black Swans. We have never lived before under the threat of a global collapse. Financial Institutions have been merging into a smaller number of very large banks. Almost all banks are interrelated. So the financial ecology is swelling into gigantic, incestuous, bureaucratic banks — when one fails, they all fall. The increased concentration among banks seems to have the effect of making financial crisis less likely, but when they happen they are more global in scale and hit us very hard. We have moved from a diversified ecology of small banks, with varied lending policies, to a more homogeneous framework of firms that all resemble one another. True, we now have fewer failures, but when they occur... I shiver at the thought.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Ten principles for a Black Swan-proof world (2009)',
  quote: 'The economics establishment (universities, regulators, central bankers, government officials, various organisations staffed with economists) lost its legitimacy with the failure of the system. It is irresponsible and foolish to put our trust in the ability of such experts to get us out of this mess. Instead, find the smart people whose hands are clean.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Ten principles for a Black Swan-proof world (2009)',
  quote: 'It is the asymmetry of the bonus system that got us here. No incentives without disincentives: capitalism is about rewards and punishments, not just rewards.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Ten principles for a Black Swan-proof world (2009)',
  quote: 'Only Ponzi schemes should depend on confidence. Governments should never need to “restore confidence.” Cascading rumours are a product of complex systems. Governments cannot stop the rumours. Simply, we need to be in a position to shrug off rumours, be robust in the face of them.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Ten principles for a Black Swan-proof world (2009)',
  quote: 'Using leverage to cure the problems of too much leverage is not homeopathy, it is denial. The debt crisis is not a temporary problem, it is a structural one. We need rehab.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Ten principles for a Black Swan-proof world (2009)',
  quote: 'Economic life should be definancialised. We should learn not to use markets as storehouses of value: they do not harbour the certainties that normal citizens require. Citizens should experience anxiety about their own businesses (which they control), not their investments (which they do not control).'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p3',
  quote: 'An idea starts to be interesting when you get scared of taking it to its logical conclusion.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p4',
  quote: 'Academia is to knowledge what prostitution is to love.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p4',
  quote: 'In science you need to understand the world; in business you need others to misunderstand it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p7',
  quote: 'Using, as an excuse, others’ failure of common sense is in itself a failure of common sense.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p8',
  quote: 'Procrastination is the soul rebelling against entrapment.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p9',
  quote: 'When we want to do something while unconsciously certain to fail, we seek advice so we can blame someone else for the failure.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p9',
  quote: 'It’s harder to say no when you really mean it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p17',
  quote: 'Asking science to explain life and vital matters is equivalent to asking a grammarian to explain poetry.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p17',
  quote: 'You exist if and only if you are free to do things without a visible objective, with no justification and, above all, outside the dictatorship of someone else’s narrative.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p19',
  quote: 'People used to wear ordinary clothes weekdays, and formal attire on Sunday. Today it is the exact reverse.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p20',
  quote: 'The book is the only medium left that hasn’t been corrupted by the profane.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p21',
  quote: 'Restaurants get you in with food to sell you liquor; religions get you in with belief to sell you rules.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p21',
  quote: 'To be completely cured of newspapers, spend a year reading the previous week’s newspapers.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p22',
  quote: 'Success is becoming in middle adulthood what you dreamed to be in late childhood.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p22',
  quote: 'Modernity needs to understand that being rich and becoming rich are not mathematically, personally, socially, and ethically the same thing.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p24',
  quote: 'Older people are most beautiful when they have what is lacking in the young: poise, erudition, wisdom, phronesis, and this post-heroic absence of agitation.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p24',
  quote: 'What fools call “wasting time” is most often the best investment.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p25',
  quote: 'Read nothing from the past one hundred years; eat no fruits from the past one thousand years; drink nothing from the past four thousand years (just wine and water); but talk to no ordinary man over forty.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p25',
  quote: 'A man without a heroic bent starts dying at the age of thirty.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p26',
  quote: 'Someone who says “I am busy” is either declaring incompetence (and lack of control of his life) or trying to get rid of you.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p26',
  quote: 'The difference between slaves in Roman and Ottoman days and today’s employees is that slaves did not need to flatter their boss.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p27',
  quote: 'You are rich if and only if money you refuse tastes better than money you accept.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p27',
  quote: 'Modernity: we created youth without heroism, age without wisdom, and life without grandeur.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p28',
  quote: 'You can tell how uninteresting a person is by asking him whom he finds interesting.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p29',
  quote: 'Preoccupation with efficacy is the main obstacle to a poetic, elegant, robust and heroic life.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p30',
  quote: 'Charm is the ability to insult people without offending them; nerdiness the reverse.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p30',
  quote: 'Those who do not think that employment is systemic slavery are either blind or employed.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p31',
  quote: 'They are born, put in a box; they go home to live in a box; they study by ticking boxes; they go to what is called “work” in a box, where they sit in their cubicle box; they drive to the grocery store in a box to buy food in a box; they talk about thinking “outside the box”; and when they die they are put in a box.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p31',
  quote: 'The twentieth century was the bankruptcy of the social utopia; the twenty-first will be that of the technological one.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p39',
  quote: 'You have a real life if and only if you do not compete with anyone in any of your pursuits.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p39',
  quote: 'Only in recent history has “working hard” signaled pride rather than shame for lack of talent, finesse and, mostly, sprezzatura.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p40',
  quote: 'What they call “play” (gym, travel, sports) looks like work.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p41',
  quote: 'Decomposition, for most, starts when they leave the free, social, and uncorrupted college life for the solitary confinement of professions and nuclear families.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p41',
  quote: 'A competitive athlete is painful to look at; trying hard to become an animal rather than a man, he will never be as fast as a cheetah or as strong as an ox.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p45',
  quote: 'Hard science gives sensational results with a horribly boring process; philosophy gives boring results with a sensational process; literature gives sensational results with a sensational process; and economics gives boring results with a boring process.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p45',
  quote: 'A good maxim allows you to have the last word without even starting a conversation.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p53',
  quote: 'The fool generalizes the particular; the nerd particularizes the general; ... the wise does neither.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p54',
  quote: 'You want to be yourself, idiosyncratic; the collective (school, rules, jobs, technology) wants you generic to the point of castration.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p56',
  quote: 'The sucker’s trap is when you focus on what you know and what others don’t know, rather than the reverse.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p57',
  quote: 'Mental clarity is the child of courage, not the other way around.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p60',
  quote: 'Wit seduces by signaling intelligence without nerdiness.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p64',
  quote: 'Greatness starts with the replacement of hatred with polite disdain.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p65',
  quote: 'The tragedy of virtue is that the more obvious, boring, unoriginal, and sermonizing the proverb, the harder it is to implement.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p66',
  quote: 'Ethical man accords his profession to his beliefs, instead of according his beliefs to his profession.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p68',
  quote: 'Just as dyed hair makes older men less attractive, it is what you do to hide your weaknesses that makes them repugnant.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p71',
  quote: 'When conflicted between two choices, take neither.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p72',
  quote: 'For the robust, an error is information.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p78',
  quote: 'It takes extraordinary wisdom and self-control to accept that many things have a logic we do not understand that is smarter than our own.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p78',
  quote: 'Intelligence consists in ignoring things that are irrelevant.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p84',
  quote: 'For the classics philosophical insight was the product of a life of leisure; for me a life of leisure is the product of philosophical insight.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p85',
  quote: 'We learn the most from fools ... yet we pay them back with the worst ingratitude.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p87',
  quote: 'The best test of whether someone is extremely stupid (or extremely wise) is whether financial and political news makes sense to him.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p94',
  quote: 'The weak shows his strength and hides his weaknesses; the magnificent exhibits his weaknesses like ornaments.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p95',
  quote: 'Social science means inventing a certain brand of human we  can understand.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p105',
  quote: 'Because our minds need to reduce information, we are more likely to try to squeeze a phenomenon into the Procrustean bed of a crisp and known category (amputating the unknown), rather than suspend categorization, and make it tangible. Thanks to our detections of false patterns, along with real ones, what is random will appear less random and more certain—our overactive brains are more likely to impose the wrong, simplistic, narrative than no narrative at all.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p106',
  quote: 'There is a certain category of fool—the overeducated, the academic, the journalist, the newspaper reader, the mechanistic "scientist", the pseudo-empiricist, those endowed with what I call "epistemic arrogance", this wonderful ability to discount what they did not see, the unobserved.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p107',
  quote: 'We are robust when errors in the representation of the unknown and understanding of random effects do not lead to adverse outcomes —fragile otherwise.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p107-108',
  quote: 'I have respect for mother nature\'s methods of robustness (billions of years allow most of what is fragile to break); classical thought is more robust (in its respect for the unknown, the epistemic humility) than the modern post-Enlightenment naïve pseudoscientific autism. Thus my classical values make me advocate the triplet of erudition, elegance, and courage; against modernity’s phoniness, nerdiness and philistinism.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms (2010). p114',
  quote: 'To become a philosopher, start by walking very slowly.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p4',
  quote: 'I want to live happily in a world I don\'t understand.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p10–11',
  quote: 'We didn\'t get where we are thanks to the sissy notion of resilience.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p11',
  quote: 'Simplicity is not so simple to attain.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p15',
  quote: 'Modernity has replaced ethics with legalese.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p15',
  quote: 'If you see fraud and do not say fraud, you are a fraud.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p15',
  quote: 'Just as being nice to the arrogant is no better than being arrogant toward the nice; being accommodating toward anyone committing a nefarious action condones it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p16',
  quote: 'Compromising is condoning. The only modern dictum I follow one by George Santayana: A man is morally free when... he judges the world, and judges other men, with uncompromising sincerity. This is not just an aim but an obligation.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p20',
  quote: 'The fragile wants tranquility, the antifragile grows from disorder, and the robust doesn\'t care too much.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p33',
  quote: 'Half of life—the interesting half of life—we don\'t even have a name for.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p44',
  quote: 'It is all about redundancy. Nature likes to overinsure itself.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p46',
  quote: 'If humans fight the last war, nature fights the next one.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p49',
  quote: 'Information is antifragile; it feeds more on attempts to harm it than it does on efforts to promote it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p55',
  quote: 'Much of aging comes from a misunderstanding of the effect of comfort.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p62',
  quote: 'The best way to learn a language may be an episode of jail in a foreign country.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p63',
  quote: 'If I could predict what my day would exactly look like, I would feel a little bit dead.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p64',
  quote: 'Much of modern life is preventable chronic stress injury.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p72',
  quote: 'It is often the mistakes of others that benefit the rest of us—and, sadly, not them ... For the antifragile, harm from errors should be less than the benefits.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p74',
  quote: 'He who has never sinned is less reliable than he who has only sinned once.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p75',
  quote: 'It is painful to think about ruthlessness as an engine of improvement.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p79',
  quote: 'There is no such thing as a failed soldier, dead or alive (unless he acted in a cowardly manner)—likewise there is no such thing as a failed entrepreneur or failed scientific researcher ...'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p84',
  quote: 'This is the central illusion in life: that randomness is a risk, that it is a bad thing ...'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p101',
  quote: 'Injecting some confusion stabilizes the system.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p102',
  quote: 'When some systems are stuck in a dangerous impasse, randomness and only randomness can unlock them and set them free.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p103',
  quote: 'Randomness works well in search—sometimes better than humans.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p109',
  quote: 'Modernity widened the distance between the sensational and the relevant.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p116',
  quote: '[A] theory is a very dangerous thing to have.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p122',
  quote: 'Few understand that procrastination is our natural defense, letting things take care of themselves and exercise their antifragility.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p127',
  quote: 'Daily news and sugar confuse our system in the same manner.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p138',
  quote: 'What is nonmeasurable and nonpredictable will remain nonmeasurable and nonpredictable ... no matter how much hate mail I get.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p147',
  quote: 'A man is honorable in proportion to the personal risks he takes for his opinion.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p156',
  quote: 'My idea of the modern Stoic sage is someone who transforms fear into prudence, pain into information, mistakes into initiation, and desire into undertaking.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p171',
  quote: 'Our greatest asset is the one we distrust the most: the built-in antifragility of certain risk-taking systems.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p174',
  quote: 'The worst side effect of wealth is the social associations it forces on its victims, as people with big houses end up socializing with other people with big houses.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p176 (footnote)',
  quote: 'I suppose that the main benefit of being rich (over just being independent) is to be able to despise rich people (a good concentration of whom you find in glitzy ski resorts) without any sour grapes. It is even sweeter when these farts don\'t know that you are richer than they are.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (2012). p184',
  quote: 'An option hides where we don\'t want it to hide.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Skin in the Game (2018). Intro, p3.',
  quote: '[I]n academia there is no difference between academia and the real world; in the real world, there is.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Skin in the Game (2018). Intro, p4.',
  quote: '[I]t is about distortions of symmetry and reciprocity in life: If you have the rewards, you must also get some of the risks, not let others pay the price for your mistakes. ...If you give an opinion and someone follows it, you are morally obligated to be, yourself, exposed to its consequences.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Skin in the Game (2018). Intro, p4.',
  quote: 'In case you are giving economic views: Don\'t tell me what you "think," just tell me what\'s in your portfolio.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Skin in the Game (2018). Intro, p5.',
  quote: '[N]ever engage in detailed overexplanations of why something is important: one debases a principle by endlessly justifying it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Nassim Nicholas Taleb',
  mark: 'Skin in the Game (2018)',
  quote: 'You can be an intellectual yet still be an idiot. \'Educated philistines\' have been wrong on everything from Stalinism to Iraq to low-carb diets.'
}];

var Robert_Haugen = [{
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch1. Intro, p2',
  quote: 'Although efficient markets people still go around saying there is a "mountain" of evidence supporting their hypothesis, the truth of the matter is that it\'s a very old mountain that\'s now eroding rapidly into the sea.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch2. Estimating Expected Return with the Theories of Modern Finance, p16',
  quote: 'CAPM also makes use of what is called a "definitional identity." This is something that is automatically true, simply because of the way things have been defined.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch3. Estimating Portfolio Risk and Expected Return with Ad Hoc Factor Models, p29',
  quote: 'When you buy a lottery ticket, you don\'t know how tickets have been sold. But sold they have been. And there is an underlying distribution for the game.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch4. Payoffs to the Five families, p50',
  quote: 'The cheaper the stock, the better the outlook for future returns.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch5. Predicting Future Stock Returns with the Expected-Return Factor Model, p56',
  quote: 'A comprehensive list of factors brings predictive stability and predictive stability and predictive power.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch6. Counterattack-The First Wave, p63 (See also: Survival bias)',
  quote: 'If we observe the performance of only those funds that remain active, we will tend to find that the average performance of the surviving funds exceeds that of the market.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch10. The Positive Payoffs to Cheapness and Profitability, p105',
  quote: 'The cheapness family is the most powerful of the five.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch11. The Negative Payoff to Risk, p113',
  quote: 'Less volatile stocks tend to have negative abnormal profits; more volatile stocks tend to have positive abnormal profits.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch12. The Forces behind the Technical Payoffs to Price History, p121',
  quote: 'Behaviorists tell us that we tend to overweight and overreact to the most recently received information. If we do, we will find that the information that we thought was so important becomes tempered, and reduced in significance, by new and related information that follows.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch13. Counterattack - The Second Wave, p129',
  quote: 'In real-world Finance, they don\'t pay for elegance. They pay for power - predictive power.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch14. The Roads to Heaven and Hell, p139',
  quote: 'In going directly to Investment Heaven, you build your portfolio as you would build a wonderful company through a merger and acquisition program. You specify the way you want your portfolio to look, and then you assemble the profile piece by piece by bringing together companies that make their own individual contributions to the desired character.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch15. The Wrong 20-yard Line, p142',
  quote: 'The New Finance focused on the market\'s major systematic mistake. In failing to appreciate the strength of competitive forces in a market economy, it over estimates the length of the short run. In doing so, it overreacts to records of success and failure for individual companies, driving the prices of successful firms too high and their unsuccessful counterparts too low.'
}, {
  figure: 'Robert Haugen',
  mark: 'The Inefficient Stock Market - What Pays Off And Why (1999). Ch15. The Wrong 20-yard Line, p148',
  quote: 'So you see, in the end, it is nearly certain that the power of prediction must triumph over the arrogance of elegance.'
}];

var The_Wolf_of_Wall_Street = [{
  figure: 'The Wolf of Wall Street (2013 film)',
  mark: '',
  quote: 'Oh my God, the emperor of Fucksville came down from Fucksville to give me a pass! Hey, what are the citizens of Fucksville doing today when their emperor\'s gone? Is it, is it mayhem? Are people looting and raping? What are all the little fuckheads doing while you\'re here?'
}];

var Warren_Buffett = [{
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Interview in Forbes magazine (19741101)',
  quote: 'I call investing the greatest business in the world … because you never have to swing. You stand at the plate, the pitcher throws you General Motors at 47! U.\nS. Steel at 39! and nobody calls a strike on you. There\'s no penalty except opportunity lost. All day you wait for the pitch you like; then when the fielders are asleep, you step up and hit it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'On being dispassionate and patient in investments, in an interview in Forbes magazine (19741101); he is contrasting soft-drinks to intoxicating beverages in this example; Buffett eventually became a major investor in Coca-Cola.',
  quote: 'You\'re dealing with a lot of silly people in the marketplace; it\'s like a great big casino and everyone else is boozing. If you can stick with Pepsi, you should be O.\nK.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Interview in Forbes magazine (19741101)',
  quote: 'Draw a circle around the businesses you understand and then eliminate those that fail to qualify on the basis of value, good management and limited exposure to hard times. … Buy into a company because you want to own it, not because you want the stock to go up. … People have been successful investors because they\'ve stuck with successful companies. Sooner or later the market mirrors the business.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in "Should You Leave It All to the Children?" by Richard I. Kirkland Jr, in Fortune (19860929)',
  quote: 'Love is the greatest advantage a parent can give.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in Barbarians at the Gate : The Fall of RJR Nabisco (1989), by Bryan Burrough and John Helyar',
  quote: 'I\'ll tell you why I like the cigarette business. … It costs a penny to make. Sell it for a dollar. It\'s addictive. And there\'s fantastic brand loyalty.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Statement of 199101, as quoted in Of Permanent Value: The Story of Warren Buffett (2007) by Andrew Kilpatrick',
  quote: 'Someone\'s sitting in the shade today because someone planted a tree a long time ago.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist (1995), by Roger Lowenstein, p77',
  quote: 'Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist (1995), by Roger Lowenstein, p77',
  quote: 'I like thinking big. I always have. To me it’s very simple: if you’re going to be thinking anyway, you might as well think big.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'On the game of bridge, as quoted in Forbes (19970602); also quoted in The Warren Buffett Portfolio: Mastering the Power of the Focus Investment Strategy (2000), p112',
  quote: 'It’s a game of a million inferences. There are a lot of things to draw inferences from — cards played and not played. These inferences tell you something about the probabilities. It\'s got to be the best intellectual exercise out there. You\'re seeing through new situations every ten minutes.  Bridge is about weighing gain/loss ratios. You\'re doing calculations all the time.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in Warren Buffett Speaks: Wit and Wisdom from the World\'s Greatest Investor (1997) by Janet C. Lowe, p165-166',
  quote: 'I don\'t have a problem with guilt about money. The way I see it is that my money represents an enormous number of claim checks on society. It is like I have these little pieces of paper that I can turn into consumption. If I wanted to, I could hire 10,\n000 people to do nothing but paint my picture every day for the rest of my life. And the GNP would go up. But the utility of the product would be zilch, and I would be keeping those 10,\n000 people from doing AIDS research, or teaching, or nursing. I don\'t do that though. I don\'t use very many of those claim checks. There\'s nothing material I want very much. And I\'m going to give virtually all of those claim checks to charity when my wife and I die.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: '1997 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting, as quoted in Of Permanent Value : The Story of Warren Buffett, by Andrew Kilpatrick, Vol2. (2007), p1615',
  quote: 'If you understood a business perfectly and the future of the business, you would need very little in the way of a margin of safety. So, the more vulnerable the business is, assuming you still want to invest in it, the larger margin of safety you\'d need. If you\'re driving a truck across a bridge that says it holds 10,\n000 pounds and you\'ve got a 9,\n800 pound vehicle, if the bridge is 6 inches above the crevice it covers, you may feel okay, but if it\'s over the Grand Canyon, you may feel you want a little larger margin of safety...'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in The Money Adventure (1998) by Egbert Sukop, p128',
  quote: 'Wall Street is the only place that people ride to work in a Rolls Royce to get advice from those who take the subway.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: '1998 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting, as quoted in The Essays of Warren Buffett : Lessons for Corporate America (1998), p92',
  quote: 'Investors making purchases in an overheated market need to recognize that it may often take an extended period for the value of even an outstanding company to catch up with the price they paid.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: '1998 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting, quoted in Wait: The Art and Science of Delay (2012) by Frank Partnoy, p177',
  quote: 'We don\'t get paid for activity, just for being right. As to how long we\'ll wait, we\'ll wait indefinitely.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in Homespun Wisdom from the "Oracle of Omaha" by Amy Stone in BusinessWeek (19990605)',
  quote: 'Success in investing doesn\'t correlate with I.\nQ. once you\'re above the level of 125. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in "Wisdom from the \'Oracle of Omaha\'" by Amy Stone in BusinessWeek (19990605)',
  quote: 'If I was running $1 million today, or $10 million for that matter, I\'d be fully invested. Anyone who says that size does not hurt investment performance is selling. The highest rates of return I\'ve ever achieved were in the 1950s. I killed the Dow. You ought to see the numbers. But I was investing peanuts then. It\'s a huge structural advantage not to have a lot of money. I think I could make you 50% a year on $1 million. No, I know I could. I guarantee that.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: '1999 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting, as quoted in "Why Won\'t Buffett Invest in Tech Stocks?" at Motley Fool (20000306)',
  quote: 'We\'re more comfortable in that kind of business. It means we miss a lot of very big winners. But we wouldn\'t know how to pick them out anyway. It also means we have very few big losers - and that\'s quite helpful over time. We\'re perfectly willing to trade away a big payoff for a certain payoff.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Quoted in The Warren Buffett Portfolio: Mastering the Power of the Focus Investment Strategy (2000), p112, and Think, Act, and Invest Like Warren Buffett: The Winning Strategy to Help You Achieve Your Financial and Life Goals (2012), p22',
  quote: 'I wouldn\'t mind going to jail if I had three cellmates who played bridge. … The approach and strategies [of bridge and stock investing] are very similar. In the stock market you do not base your decisions on what the market is doing, but on what you think is rational. With bridge, you need to adhere to a disciplined bidding system. While there is no one best system, there is one that works best for you. Once you choose a system, you need to stick with it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting (2004), as quoted at The Buffett',
  quote: 'If you invested in a very low cost index fund — where you don’t put the money in at one time, but average in over 10 years — you’ll do better than 90% of people who start investing at the same time.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Interview with Lou Dobbs on CNN (20050525)',
  quote: 'It\'s class warfare. My class is winning, but they shouldn\'t be.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in  Corporate Survival: The Critical Importance of Sustainability Risk Management (2005) by Dan Robert Anderson, p138',
  quote: 'It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that, you\'ll do things differently.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in "The Heresy That Made Them Rich" by Joseph Nocera, in The New York Times (20051029)',
  quote: 'You couldn\'t advance in a finance department in this country unless you taught that the world was flat.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'To Barack Obama, as quoted in The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (2006), Ch5',
  quote: 'The free market’s the best mechanism ever devised to put resources to their most efficient and productive use. … The government isn’t particularly good at that. But the market isn’t so good at making sure that the wealth that’s produced is being distributed fairly or wisely. Some of that wealth has to be plowed back into education, so that the next generation has a fair chance, and to maintain our infrastructure, and provide some sort of safety net for those who lose out in a market economy. And it just makes sense that those of us who’ve benefited most from the market should pay a bigger share. … When you get rid of the estate tax, you’re basically handing over command of the country’s resources to people who didn’t earn it. It’s like choosing the 2020 Olympic team by picking the children of all the winners at the 2000 Games.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'To Barack Obama, as quoted in The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (2006), Ch5',
  quote: 'I happen to have a talent for allocating capital. But my ability to use that talent is completely dependent on the society I was born into.  If I’d been born into a tribe of hunters, this talent of mine would be pretty worthless. I can’t run very fast. I’m not particularly strong. I’d probably end up as some wild animal’s dinner.  But I was lucky enough to be born in a time and place where society values my talent, and gave me a good education to develop that talent, and set up the laws and the financial system to let me do what I love doing — and make a lot of money doing it. The least I can do is help pay for all that.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Speaking at a political fundraiser for Hillary Rodham Clinton in New York, as quoted in Henry Goldman, "Buffett, at Clinton Fund-Raiser, Says Congress Favors the Rich" in Bloomberg (20070627)',
  quote: 'The 400 of us pay a lower part of our income in taxes than our receptionists do, or our cleaning ladies, for that matter. If you\'re in the luckiest 1 percent of humanity, you owe it to the rest of humanity to think about the other 99 percent.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in "Bringing Back Bridge" at CBS News (20080216)',
  quote: 'You know, if I\'m playing bridge and a naked woman walks by, I don\'t ever see her — don\'t test me on that! … You know, I wouldn\'t mind going to jail if I had the right three cell mates, so we could play bridge all the time. … It takes some investment to play it … I mean, you cannot sit down and learn how to play it like most games. … There\'s a lotta lessons in it … you have to look at all the facts. You have to draw inferences from what you\'ve seen, what you\'ve heard. You have to discard improper theories about what the hand had as more evidence comes in sometimes. You have to be open to a possible change of course if you get new information. You have to work with a partner, particularly on defense.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in "My $650,\n100 Lunch with Warren Buffett" by Guy Spier, in TIME (20080630)',
  quote: 'People will always try to stop you doing the right thing if it is unconventional.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Interview with Charlie Rose, on PBS (20081001), also reported in "Warren Buffett: I Haven\'t Seen As Much Economic Fear In My Adult Lifetime - Charlie Rose Interview" at CNBC (20081001)',
  quote: 'You want to be greedy when others are fearful. You want to be fearful when others are greedy. It\'s that simple. … They\'re pretty fearful. In fact, in my adult lifetime, I don\'t think I\'ve ever seen people as fearful economically as they are right now.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'In a panel discussion after the premier of the 2008 documentary I.\nO.\nU.\nS.\nA.. Panel at the Premier, 0:\n05:\n42ff., DVD extras, I.\nO.\nU.\nS.\nA. (2008)',
  quote: 'I try to buy stock in businesses that are so wonderful that an idiot can run them. Because sooner or later, one will.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'As quoted in "Rules That Warren Buffett Lives By" by  Stephanie Loiacono at Yahoo Finance (20100223)',
  quote: 'Rule No.\n1: Never lose money. Rule No.\n2: Never forget rule No.\n1.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: '"My Philanthropic Pledge" at  The Giving Pledge (2010)',
  quote: 'More than 99% of my wealth will go to philanthropy during my lifetime or at death. Measured by dollars, this commitment is large. In a comparative sense, though, many individuals give more to others every day.  Millions of people who regularly contribute to churches, schools, and other organizations thereby relinquish the use of funds that would otherwise benefit their own families. The dollars these people drop into a collection plate or give to United Way mean forgone movies, dinners out, or other personal pleasures. In contrast, my family and I will give up nothing we need or want by fulfilling this 99% pledge.  Moreover, this pledge does not leave me contributing the most precious asset, which is time. Many people, including — I’m proud to say — my three children, give extensively of their own time and talents to help others. Gifts of this kind often prove far more valuable than money.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: '"My Philanthropic Pledge" at the  The Giving Pledge (2010)',
  quote: 'Some material things make my life more enjoyable; many, however, would not. I like having an expensive private plane, but owning a half-dozen homes would be a burden. Too often, a vast collection of possessions ends up possessing its owner. The asset I most value, aside from health, is interesting, diverse, and long-standing friends.  My wealth has come from a combination of living in America, some lucky genes, and compound interest. Both my children and I won what I call the ovarian lottery. (For starters, the odds against my 1930 birth taking place in the U.\nS. were at least 30 to 1. My being male and white also removed huge obstacles that a majority of Americans then faced.) My luck was accentuated by my living in a market system that sometimes produces distorted results, though overall it serves our country well. I’ve worked in an economy that rewards someone who saves the lives of others on a battlefield with a medal, rewards a great teacher with thank-you notes from parents, but rewards those who can detect the mispricing of securities with sums reaching into the billions. In short, fate’s distribution of long straws is wildly capricious.\nThe reaction of my family and me to our extraordinary good fortune is not guilt, but rather gratitude. Were we to use more than 1% of my claim checks on ourselves, neither our happiness nor our well-being would be enhanced. In contrast, that remaining 99% can have a huge effect on the health and welfare of others. That reality sets an obvious course for me and my family: Keep all we can conceivably need and distribute the rest to society, for its needs. My pledge starts us down that course.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Interview on CNBC (20110701)',
  quote: 'I could end the deficit in five minutes. You just pass a law that says that any time there\'s a deficit of more than 3% of GDP, all sitting members of Congress are ineligible for re-election.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: '"Buffett on Bridge" at Buffetcup.\ncom (2013)',
  quote: 'The approach and strategies are very similar in that you gather all the information you can and then keep adding to that base of information as things develop. You do whatever the probabilities indicated based on the knowledge that you have at that time, but you are always willing to modify your behaviour or your approach as you get new information. In bridge, you behave in a way that gets the best from your partner. And in business, you behave in the way that gets the best from your managers and your employees.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). Second annual letter to Limited Partners (1957)',
  quote: 'Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market … in a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 19591102',
  quote: 'I make no attempt to forecast the general market — my efforts are devoted to finding undervalued securities. However, I do believe that widespread public belief in the Inevitability of profits from investments in stocks will lead to eventual trouble. Should this occur, prices, but not intrinsic values in my opinion, of even undervalued securities can be expected to be substantially affected.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 19740329',
  quote: 'Management\'s objective is to achieve a return on capital over the long term which averages somewhat higher than that of American industry generally — while utilizing sound accounting and debt policies.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1978 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'An irresistible footnote: in 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% of net funds available in equities — at full prices they couldn\'t buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, they committed a then record low of 21% to stocks.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1979 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'The primary test of managerial economic performance is the achievement of a high earnings rate on equity capital employed (without undue leverage, accounting gimmickry, etc.) and not the achievement of consistent gains in earnings per share. In our view, many businesses would be better understood by their shareholder owners, as well as by the general public, if managements and financial analysts modified the primary emphasis they place upon earnings per share, and upon yearly changes in that figure.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1981 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat.  We have done well with a couple of princes — but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1982 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'It’s simply to say that managers and investors alike must understand that accounting numbers is the beginning, not the end, of business valuation.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1985 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn-more-by-putting-up-more record is no great managerial achievement. You can get the same result personally while operating from your rocking chair. Just quadruple the capital you commit to a savings account and you will quadruple your earnings. You would hardly expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet, retirement announcements regularly sing the praises of CEOs who have, say, quadrupled earnings of their widget company during their reign — with no one examining whether this gain was attributable simply to many years of retained earnings and the workings of compound interest.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1987 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Ben\'s Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today\'s investment world, in which most professionals and academicians talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas. Their interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising "Take two aspirins"?'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1988 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Over the years, Charlie [Munger, Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman] and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with pen than small sums with a gun.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1988 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1989 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'For example: (1) As if governed by Newton\'s First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1989 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1990 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'The most common cause of low prices is pessimism — some times  pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It\'s optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1991 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1992 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'We\'ve long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in the market like children.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1993 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'The strategy we\'ve adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as "the possibility of loss or injury."'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1994 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Just because Charlie and I can clearly see dramatic growth ahead for an industry does not mean we can judge what its profit margins and returns on capital will be as a host of competitors battle for supremacy. At Berkshire we will stick with businesses whose profit picture for decades to come seems reasonably predictable. Even then, we will make plenty of mistakes.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1995 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the acquirer\'s management; and they are a honey pot for the investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But, alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer\'s shareholders, often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and "you are running a chain letter in reverse." ... The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological bias: Many CEOs attain their position in part because they possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1996 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Of course, Charlie and I can identify only a few Inevitables, even after a lifetime of looking for them. Leadership alone provides no certainties: Witness the shocks some years back at General Motors, IBM and Sears, all of which had enjoyed long periods of seeming invincibility. Though some industries or lines of business exhibit characteristics that endow leaders with virtually insurmountable advantages, and that tend to establish Survival of the Fattest as almost a natural law, most do not. Thus, for every Inevitable, there are dozens of Impostors, companies now riding high but vulnerable to competitive attacks.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1997 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'In a bull market, one must avoid the error of the preening duck that quacks boastfully after a torrential rainstorm, thinking that its paddling skills have caused it to rise in the world. A right-thinking duck would instead compare its position after the downpour to that of the other ducks on the pond.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1997 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect, they rejoice because prices have risen for the "hamburgers" they will soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1998 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Our future rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire\'s capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who can\'t).'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: An Owner\'s Manual (1999)',
  quote: 'Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. The calculation of intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: An Owner\'s Manual (1999)',
  quote: 'We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 1999 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Those who attended [the annual meeting] last year saw your Chairman pitch to Ernie Banks. This encounter proved to be the titanic duel that the sports world had long awaited. After the first few pitches — which were not my best, but when have I ever thrown my best? — I fired a brushback at Ernie just to let him know who was in command. Ernie charged the mound, and I charged the plate. But a clash was avoided because we became exhausted before reaching each other.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2000 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities—that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future—will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There\'s a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2000 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Instead, we try to apply Aesop\'s 2,\n600-year-old equation to opportunities in which we have reasonable confidence as to how many birds are in the bush and when they will emerge (a formulation that my grandsons would probably update to "A girl in a convertible is worth five in the phonebook.").'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2000 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'But a pin lies in wait for every bubble. And when the two eventually meet, a new wave of investors learns some very old lessons: First, many in Wall Street — a community in which quality control is not prized — will sell investors anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most dangerous when it looks easiest.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2001 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'After all, you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2003 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Most companies are saddled with institutional constraints. A company\'s history, for example, may commit it to an industry that now offers limited opportunity. A more common problem is a shareholder constituency that pressures its manager to dance to Wall Street\'s tune. Many CEOs resist, but others give in and adopt operating and capital-allocation policies far different from those they would choose if left to themselves.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2004 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Investors should remember that excitement and expenses are their enemies. And if they insist on trying to time their participation in equities, they should try to be fearful when others are greedy and greedy only when others are fearful.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2005 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work of genius. But Sir Isaac\'s talents didn\'t extend to investing: He lost a bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, "I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men." If he had not been traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the Fourth Law of Motion: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2006 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Size seems to make many organizations slow-thinking, resistant to change and smug.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2007 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2007 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'I\'ve reluctantly discarded the notion of my continuing to manage the portfolio after my death — abandoning my hope to give new meaning to the term "thinking outside the box."'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2008 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2008 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Putting people into homes, though a desirable goal, shouldn’t be our country’s primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be the ambition.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2008 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'We never want to count on the kindness of strangers in order to meet tomorrow’s obligations. When forced to choose, I will not trade even a night’s sleep for the chance of extra profits.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Letters to Shareholders (1957 - 2012). 2008 Chairman\'s Letter',
  quote: 'Upon leaving [the derivatives business], our feelings about the business mirrored a line in a country song: "I liked you better before I got to know you so well."'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepencies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market... through the medium of marketable stocks...'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'Our Graham & Dodd investors... do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model or covariance in returns among securities. ...[M]ost of them would have difficulty defining these terms. The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman [Partnership] in 1955... He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner. And that\'s all he does. ...He simply says, if a business is worth a dollar and I can buy it for 40 cents, something good may happen to me. And he does it over and over again.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'Tom [Knapp] was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war; when he came back... he was a beach bum. And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia. Tom took it on a non-credit basis, and he got so interested... that he enrolled at Columbia Business School where he got the MBA... He took Dodd\'s course again, and took Ben Graham\'s course. ...35 years later ...I found him on the beach ...he owns the beach!'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: '[T]he idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately with people or it doesn\'t take at all. It\'s like an inoculation. ...It doesn\'t seem to be a matter of I.\nQ. or academic training. It\'s instant recognition, or it\'s nothing.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'Stan [Perlmeter] was a liberal arts major... We happened to be in the same building... Again, it took five minutes for Stan to embrace the value approach.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'Very, very few pension funds are managed from a value standpoint.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'It\'s not like I am reciting... the names of a bunch of lottery winners. ...I knew what they had been taught and ...had some personal knowledge of their intellect, character and temperament. ...[T]his group has assumed far less risk than average; note their record in years when the general market is weak. While they differ greatly in style, these investors are, mentally, always buying the business, not buying the stock. ...[A]ll exploit the difference between the market price of a business and its intrinsic value.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'I\'m convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'When the price of a stock can be influenced by a "herd" on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are often nonsensical.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'The greater the potential for reward in the value portfolio, the less risk there is.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80 million in the market. ...[Y]ou could have sold the assets ...for not less than $400 million ...Now, if the stock had declined even further... to $40 million... its beta would have been greater. ...This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it\'s riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than for $80 million.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'You... have to have the knowledge to... make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: '[T]he secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis, yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in... 35 years... There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville (Fall, 1984)',
  quote: 'There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham and Dodd will continue to prosper.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Quotes from the press',
  quote: 'Risk comes from not knowing what you’re doing. "The Three Essential Warren Buffett Quotes To Live By" forbes.\ncom (20140420)'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Quotes from the press',
  quote: 'We\'re going to move a lot of crude (oil) in this country, and we have to learn how to do it very safely. "Buffett: Moving Oil By Rail Safely Is A Major Industry Concern" Investing.\ncom (20140424)'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Quotes from the press',
  quote: 'You can’t make a good deal with a bad person. "23 Quotes from Warren Buffett on Life and Generosity" forbes.\ncom (20131202)'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Quotes from the press',
  quote: 'Opportunities come infrequently. When it rains gold, put out the bucket, not the thimble. "25 Best Warren Buffett Quotes" The Motley Fool (20140928)'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Quotes from the press',
  quote: 'What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don\'t know. "The genius of Warren Buffett in 23 quotes" MarketWatch (20150819)'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Quotes from the press',
  quote: 'I insist on a lot of time being spent, almost every day, to just sit and think. That is very uncommon in American business. I read and think. So I do more reading and thinking, and make less impulse decisions than most people in business. I do it because I like this kind of life. "10 Brilliant Quotes From Warren Buffett, America\'s Second-Richest Person " entrepreneur.\ncom (20141113)'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Quotes from the press',
  quote: 'The best thing that happens to us is when a great company gets into temporary trouble... We want to buy them when they\'re on the operating table. "Homespun Wisdom from the \'Oracle of Omaha\'" Businessweek (19990705)[dead link]'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Rules for success',
  quote: 'Take the job that you would take if you were independently wealthy.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Rules for success',
  quote: 'Look for integrity, intelligence and energy.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Rules for success',
  quote: 'There\'s a whole bunch of things I don\'t know a thing about — I just stay away from those. So, I stay within what I call my circle of competence.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Rules for success',
  quote: 'I just read and read and read. ... I have always enjoyed reading.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Rules for success',
  quote: 'Capitalism is all about somebody coming and trying to take the castle. Now what you need is .... you need a castle that has some durable competitive advantage — some castle that has a moat around it.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Rules for success',
  quote: 'I like to study failure, actually. My partner says, "I want to know where I\'ll die so I\'ll never go there." We want to see what has caused businesses to go bad. The biggest thing that kills them is complacency. ... The danger would always be that you rest on your laurels.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Rules for success',
  quote: 'Warren Buffett\'s Top 10 Rules for Success – YouTube, uploaded by Evan Carmichael, 2015'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Other. "P2. — Billionaire Warren Buffett says GOP health reform bills are relief for the rich" PBS Newshour (20170627)',
  quote: 'I eat like a normal 6-year-old, but if you look at the mortality statistics, I mean, 6-year-olds don’t die very often.'
}, {
  figure: 'Warren Buffett',
  mark: 'Other',
  quote: 'Confidence comes back one at a time, but fear, is instantaneous.'
}];

const Quotes = {
  Aaron_Brown,
  Ben_Bernanke,
  Ben_Horowitz,
  Benjamin_Graham,
  Ed_Seykota,
  George_Soros,
  Henry_Kaufman,
  Henry_S_Haskins,
  Kenneth_Griffin,
  Mary_Meeker,
  Nassim_Nicholas_Taleb,
  Robert_Haugen,
  The_Wolf_of_Wall_Street,
  Warren_Buffett
};

FlopShuffleMaker.defineFlopShuffle(Quotes);
FlopShuffleMaker.defineFlop(Quotes);

export { Quotes };