/**
 * @fileoverview Collection of CSP evaluation checks.
 * @author lwe@google.com (Lukas Weichselbaum)
 *
 * @license
 * Copyright 2016 Google Inc. All rights reserved.
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *   http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

import * as angular from '../allowlist_bypasses/angular.js';
import * as flash from '../allowlist_bypasses/flash.js';
import * as jsonp from '../allowlist_bypasses/jsonp.js';
import * as csp from '../csp.js';
import {Csp, Directive, Keyword} from '../csp.js';
import {Finding, Severity, Type} from '../finding.js';
import * as utils from '../utils.js';


/**
 * A list of CSP directives that can allow XSS vulnerabilities if they fail
 * validation.
 */
export const DIRECTIVES_CAUSING_XSS: Directive[] =
    [Directive.SCRIPT_SRC, Directive.OBJECT_SRC, Directive.BASE_URI];

/**
 * A list of URL schemes that can allow XSS vulnerabilities when requests to
 * them are made.
 */
export const URL_SCHEMES_CAUSING_XSS: string[] = ['data:', 'http:', 'https:'];


/**
 * Checks if passed csp allows inline scripts.
 * Findings of this check are critical and FP free.
 * unsafe-inline is ignored in the presence of a nonce or a hash. This check
 * does not account for this and therefore the effectiveCsp needs to be passed.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  script-src 'unsafe-inline'
 *
 * @param effectiveCsp A parsed csp that only contains values which
 *  are active in a certain version of CSP (e.g. no unsafe-inline if a nonce
 *  is present).
 */
export function checkScriptUnsafeInline(effectiveCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const directiveName =
      effectiveCsp.getEffectiveDirective(Directive.SCRIPT_SRC);
  const values: string[] = effectiveCsp.directives[directiveName] || [];

  // Check if unsafe-inline is present.
  if (values.includes(Keyword.UNSAFE_INLINE)) {
    return [new Finding(
        Type.SCRIPT_UNSAFE_INLINE,
        `'unsafe-inline' allows the execution of unsafe in-page scripts ` +
            'and event handlers.',
        Severity.HIGH, directiveName, Keyword.UNSAFE_INLINE)];
  }

  return [];
}


/**
 * Checks if passed csp allows eval in scripts.
 * Findings of this check have a medium severity and are FP free.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  script-src 'unsafe-eval'
 *
 * @param parsedCsp Parsed CSP.
 */
export function checkScriptUnsafeEval(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const directiveName = parsedCsp.getEffectiveDirective(Directive.SCRIPT_SRC);
  const values: string[] = parsedCsp.directives[directiveName] || [];

  // Check if unsafe-eval is present.
  if (values.includes(Keyword.UNSAFE_EVAL)) {
    return [new Finding(
        Type.SCRIPT_UNSAFE_EVAL,
        `'unsafe-eval' allows the execution of code injected into DOM APIs ` +
            'such as eval().',
        Severity.MEDIUM_MAYBE, directiveName, Keyword.UNSAFE_EVAL)];
  }

  return [];
}


/**
 * Checks if plain URL schemes (e.g. http:) are allowed in sensitive directives.
 * Findings of this check have a high severity and are FP free.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  script-src https: http: data:
 *
 * @param parsedCsp Parsed CSP.
 */
export function checkPlainUrlSchemes(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const violations: Finding[] = [];
  const directivesToCheck =
      parsedCsp.getEffectiveDirectives(DIRECTIVES_CAUSING_XSS);

  for (const directive of directivesToCheck) {
    const values = parsedCsp.directives[directive] || [];
    for (const value of values) {
      if (URL_SCHEMES_CAUSING_XSS.includes(value)) {
        violations.push(new Finding(
            Type.PLAIN_URL_SCHEMES,
            value + ' URI in ' + directive + ' allows the execution of ' +
                'unsafe scripts.',
            Severity.HIGH, directive, value));
      }
    }
  }

  return violations;
}


/**
 * Checks if csp contains wildcards in sensitive directives.
 * Findings of this check have a high severity and are FP free.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  script-src *
 *
 * @param parsedCsp Parsed CSP.
 */
export function checkWildcards(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const violations: Finding[] = [];
  const directivesToCheck =
      parsedCsp.getEffectiveDirectives(DIRECTIVES_CAUSING_XSS);

  for (const directive of directivesToCheck) {
    const values = parsedCsp.directives[directive] || [];
    for (const value of values) {
      const url = utils.getSchemeFreeUrl(value);
      if (url === '*') {
        violations.push(new Finding(
            Type.PLAIN_WILDCARD, directive + ` should not allow '*' as source`,
            Severity.HIGH, directive, value));
        continue;
      }
    }
  }

  return violations;
}

/**
 * Checks if object-src is restricted to none either directly or via a
 * default-src.
 */
export function checkMissingObjectSrcDirective(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  let objectRestrictions: string[]|undefined = [];
  if (Directive.OBJECT_SRC in parsedCsp.directives) {
    objectRestrictions = parsedCsp.directives[Directive.OBJECT_SRC];
  } else if (Directive.DEFAULT_SRC in parsedCsp.directives) {
    objectRestrictions = parsedCsp.directives[Directive.DEFAULT_SRC];
  }
  if (objectRestrictions !== undefined && objectRestrictions.length >= 1) {
    return [];
  }
  return [new Finding(
      Type.MISSING_DIRECTIVES,
      `Missing object-src allows the injection of plugins which can execute JavaScript. Can you set it to 'none'?`,
      Severity.HIGH, Directive.OBJECT_SRC)];
}

/**
 * Checks if script-src is restricted either directly or via a default-src.
 */
export function checkMissingScriptSrcDirective(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  if (Directive.SCRIPT_SRC in parsedCsp.directives ||
      Directive.DEFAULT_SRC in parsedCsp.directives) {
    return [];
  }
  return [new Finding(
      Type.MISSING_DIRECTIVES, 'script-src directive is missing.',
      Severity.HIGH, Directive.SCRIPT_SRC)];
}

/**
 * Checks if the base-uri needs to be restricted and if so, whether it has been
 * restricted.
 */
export function checkMissingBaseUriDirective(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  return checkMultipleMissingBaseUriDirective([parsedCsp]);
}

/**
 * Checks if the base-uri needs to be restricted and if so, whether it has been
 * restricted.
 */
export function checkMultipleMissingBaseUriDirective(parsedCsps: Csp[]):
    Finding[] {
  // base-uri can be used to bypass nonce based CSPs and hash based CSPs that
  // use strict dynamic
  const needsBaseUri = (csp: Csp) =>
      (csp.policyHasScriptNonces() ||
       (csp.policyHasScriptHashes() && csp.policyHasStrictDynamic()));
  const hasBaseUri = (csp: Csp) => Directive.BASE_URI in csp.directives;

  if (parsedCsps.some(needsBaseUri) && !parsedCsps.some(hasBaseUri)) {
    const description = 'Missing base-uri allows the injection of base tags. ' +
        'They can be used to set the base URL for all relative (script) ' +
        'URLs to an attacker controlled domain. ' +
        `Can you set it to 'none' or 'self'?`;
    return [new Finding(
        Type.MISSING_DIRECTIVES, description, Severity.HIGH,
        Directive.BASE_URI)];
  }
  return [];
}


/**
 * Checks if all necessary directives for preventing XSS are set.
 * Findings of this check have a high severity and are FP free.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  script-src 'none'
 *
 * @param parsedCsp Parsed CSP.
 */
export function checkMissingDirectives(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  return [
    ...checkMissingObjectSrcDirective(parsedCsp),
    ...checkMissingScriptSrcDirective(parsedCsp),
    ...checkMissingBaseUriDirective(parsedCsp),
  ];
}


/**
 * Checks if allowlisted origins are bypassable by JSONP/Angular endpoints.
 * High severity findings of this check are FP free.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  default-src 'none'; script-src www.google.com
 *
 * @param parsedCsp Parsed CSP.
 */
export function checkScriptAllowlistBypass(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const violations: Finding[] = [];
  const effectiveScriptSrcDirective =
      parsedCsp.getEffectiveDirective(Directive.SCRIPT_SRC);
  const scriptSrcValues =
      parsedCsp.directives[effectiveScriptSrcDirective] || [];
  if (scriptSrcValues.includes(Keyword.NONE)) {
    return violations;
  }

  for (const value of scriptSrcValues) {
    if (value === Keyword.SELF) {
      violations.push(new Finding(
          Type.SCRIPT_ALLOWLIST_BYPASS,
          `'self' can be problematic if you host JSONP, AngularJS or user ` +
              'uploaded files.',
          Severity.MEDIUM_MAYBE, effectiveScriptSrcDirective, value));
      continue;
    }

    // Ignore keywords, nonces and hashes (they start with a single quote).
    if (value.startsWith('\'')) {
      continue;
    }

    // Ignore standalone schemes and things that don't look like URLs (no dot).
    if (csp.isUrlScheme(value) || value.indexOf('.') === -1) {
      continue;
    }

    const url = '//' + utils.getSchemeFreeUrl(value);

    const angularBypass = utils.matchWildcardUrls(url, angular.URLS);

    let jsonpBypass = utils.matchWildcardUrls(url, jsonp.URLS);

    // Some JSONP bypasses only work in presence of unsafe-eval.
    if (jsonpBypass) {
      const evalRequired = jsonp.NEEDS_EVAL.includes(jsonpBypass.hostname);
      const evalPresent = scriptSrcValues.includes(Keyword.UNSAFE_EVAL);
      if (evalRequired && !evalPresent) {
        jsonpBypass = null;
      }
    }

    if (jsonpBypass || angularBypass) {
      let bypassDomain = '';
      let bypassTxt = '';
      if (jsonpBypass) {
        bypassDomain = jsonpBypass.hostname;
        bypassTxt = ' JSONP endpoints';
      }
      if (angularBypass) {
        bypassDomain = angularBypass.hostname;
        bypassTxt += (bypassTxt.trim() === '') ? '' : ' and';
        bypassTxt += ' Angular libraries';
      }

      violations.push(new Finding(
          Type.SCRIPT_ALLOWLIST_BYPASS,
          bypassDomain + ' is known to host' + bypassTxt +
              ' which allow to bypass this CSP.',
          Severity.HIGH, effectiveScriptSrcDirective, value));
    } else {
      violations.push(new Finding(
          Type.SCRIPT_ALLOWLIST_BYPASS,
          `No bypass found; make sure that this URL doesn't serve JSONP ` +
              'replies or Angular libraries.',
          Severity.MEDIUM_MAYBE, effectiveScriptSrcDirective, value));
    }
  }

  return violations;
}


/**
 * Checks if allowlisted object-src origins are bypassable.
 * Findings of this check have a high severity and are FP free.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  default-src 'none'; object-src ajax.googleapis.com
 *
 * @param parsedCsp Parsed CSP.
 */
export function checkFlashObjectAllowlistBypass(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const violations = [];
  const effectiveObjectSrcDirective =
      parsedCsp.getEffectiveDirective(Directive.OBJECT_SRC);
  const objectSrcValues =
      parsedCsp.directives[effectiveObjectSrcDirective] || [];

  // If flash is not allowed in plugin-types, continue.
  const pluginTypes = parsedCsp.directives[Directive.PLUGIN_TYPES];
  if (pluginTypes && !pluginTypes.includes('application/x-shockwave-flash')) {
    return [];
  }

  for (const value of objectSrcValues) {
    // Nothing to do here if 'none'.
    if (value === Keyword.NONE) {
      return [];
    }

    const url = '//' + utils.getSchemeFreeUrl(value);
    const flashBypass = utils.matchWildcardUrls(url, flash.URLS);

    if (flashBypass) {
      violations.push(new Finding(
          Type.OBJECT_ALLOWLIST_BYPASS,
          flashBypass.hostname +
              ' is known to host Flash files which allow to bypass this CSP.',
          Severity.HIGH, effectiveObjectSrcDirective, value));
    } else if (effectiveObjectSrcDirective === Directive.OBJECT_SRC) {
      violations.push(new Finding(
          Type.OBJECT_ALLOWLIST_BYPASS,
          `Can you restrict object-src to 'none' only?`, Severity.MEDIUM_MAYBE,
          effectiveObjectSrcDirective, value));
    }
  }

  return violations;
}

/**
 * Returns whether the given string "looks" like an IP address. This function
 * only uses basic heuristics and does not accept all valid IPs nor reject all
 * invalid IPs.
 */
export function looksLikeIpAddress(maybeIp: string): boolean {
  if (maybeIp.startsWith('[') && maybeIp.endsWith(']')) {
    // Looks like an IPv6 address and not a hostname (though it may be some
    // nonsense like `[foo]`)
    return true;
  }
  if (/^[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}$/.test(maybeIp)) {
    // Looks like an IPv4 address (though it may be something like
    // `500.600.700.800`
    return true;
  }
  // Won't match IP addresses encoded in other manners (eg octal or
  // decimal)
  return false;
}

/**
 * Checks if csp contains IP addresses.
 * Findings of this check are informal only and are FP free.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  script-src 127.0.0.1
 *
 * @param parsedCsp Parsed CSP.
 */
export function checkIpSource(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const violations: Finding[] = [];

  // Function for checking if directive values contain IP addresses.
  const checkIp = (directive: string, directiveValues: string[]) => {
    for (const value of directiveValues) {
      const host = utils.getHostname(value);
      if (looksLikeIpAddress(host)) {
        // Check if localhost.
        // See 4.8 in https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#match-source-expression
        if (host === '127.0.0.1') {
          violations.push(new Finding(
              Type.IP_SOURCE,
              directive + ' directive allows localhost as source. ' +
                  'Please make sure to remove this in production environments.',
              Severity.INFO, directive, value));
        } else {
          violations.push(new Finding(
              Type.IP_SOURCE,
              directive + ' directive has an IP-Address as source: ' + host +
                  ' (will be ignored by browsers!). ',
              Severity.INFO, directive, value));
        }
      }
    }
  };

  // Apply check to values of all directives.
  utils.applyCheckFunktionToDirectives(parsedCsp, checkIp);
  return violations;
}


/**
 * Checks if csp contains directives that are deprecated in CSP3.
 * Findings of this check are informal only and are FP free.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  report-uri foo.bar/csp
 *
 * @param parsedCsp Parsed CSP.
 */
export function checkDeprecatedDirective(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const violations = [];

  // More details: https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5769374145183744
  if (Directive.REFLECTED_XSS in parsedCsp.directives) {
    violations.push(new Finding(
        Type.DEPRECATED_DIRECTIVE,
        'reflected-xss is deprecated since CSP2. ' +
            'Please, use the X-XSS-Protection header instead.',
        Severity.INFO, Directive.REFLECTED_XSS));
  }

  // More details: https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5680800376815616
  if (Directive.REFERRER in parsedCsp.directives) {
    violations.push(new Finding(
        Type.DEPRECATED_DIRECTIVE,
        'referrer is deprecated since CSP2. ' +
            'Please, use the Referrer-Policy header instead.',
        Severity.INFO, Directive.REFERRER));
  }

  // More details: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/327
  if (Directive.DISOWN_OPENER in parsedCsp.directives) {
    violations.push(new Finding(
        Type.DEPRECATED_DIRECTIVE,
        'disown-opener is deprecated since CSP3. ' +
            'Please, use the Cross Origin Opener Policy header instead.',
        Severity.INFO, Directive.DISOWN_OPENER));
  }
  return violations;
}


/**
 * Checks if csp nonce is at least 8 characters long.
 * Findings of this check are of medium severity and are FP free.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  script-src 'nonce-short'
 *
 * @param parsedCsp Parsed CSP.
 */
export function checkNonceLength(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const noncePattern = new RegExp('^\'nonce-(.+)\'$');
  const violations: Finding[] = [];

  utils.applyCheckFunktionToDirectives(
      parsedCsp, (directive, directiveValues) => {
        for (const value of directiveValues) {
          const match = value.match(noncePattern);
          if (!match) {
            continue;
          }
          // Not a nonce.

          const nonceValue = match[1];
          if (nonceValue.length < 8) {
            violations.push(new Finding(
                Type.NONCE_LENGTH,
                'Nonces should be at least 8 characters long.', Severity.MEDIUM,
                directive, value));
          }

          if (!csp.isNonce(value, true)) {
            violations.push(new Finding(
                Type.NONCE_CHARSET,
                'Nonces should only use the base64 charset.', Severity.INFO,
                directive, value));
          }
        }
      });

  return violations;
}


/**
 * Checks if CSP allows sourcing from http://
 * Findings of this check are of medium severity and are FP free.
 *
 * Example policy where this check would trigger:
 *  report-uri http://foo.bar/csp
 *
 * @param parsedCsp Parsed CSP.
 */
export function checkSrcHttp(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const violations: Finding[] = [];

  utils.applyCheckFunktionToDirectives(
      parsedCsp, (directive, directiveValues) => {
        for (const value of directiveValues) {
          const description = directive === Directive.REPORT_URI ?
              'Use HTTPS to send violation reports securely.' :
              'Allow only resources downloaded over HTTPS.';
          if (value.startsWith('http://')) {
            violations.push(new Finding(
                Type.SRC_HTTP, description, Severity.MEDIUM, directive, value));
          }
        }
      });

  return violations;
}

/**
 * Checks if the policy has configured reporting in a robust manner.
 */
export function checkHasConfiguredReporting(parsedCsp: Csp): Finding[] {
  const reportUriValues: string[] =
      parsedCsp.directives[Directive.REPORT_URI] || [];
  if (reportUriValues.length > 0) {
    return [];
  }

  const reportToValues: string[] =
      parsedCsp.directives[Directive.REPORT_TO] || [];
  if (reportToValues.length > 0) {
    return [new Finding(
        Type.REPORT_TO_ONLY,
        `This CSP policy only provides a reporting destination via the 'report-to' directive. This directive is only supported in Chromium-based browsers so it is recommended to also use a 'report-uri' directive.`,
        Severity.INFO, Directive.REPORT_TO)];
  }

  return [new Finding(
      Type.REPORTING_DESTINATION_MISSING,
      'This CSP policy does not configure a reporting destination. This makes it difficult to maintain the CSP policy over time and monitor for any breakages.',
      Severity.INFO, Directive.REPORT_URI)];
}