import { type ExecFileSyncOptionsWithStringEncoding } from "child_process";
/**
 * Validate user-supplied kubectl flags and args. Throws an McpError if any
 * dangerous flag is present and the unsafe-flags escape hatch is not set.
 *
 * The check covers:
 *   - keys of the `flags` object (e.g. { server: "..." })
 *   - tokens in the `args` array, in both joined ("--server=x") and split
 *     ("--server", "x") forms, plus short aliases ("-s").
 */
export declare function assertNoDangerousFlags(flags?: Record<string, unknown>, args?: string[]): void;
/**
 * Validate a fully-constructed kubectl/helm argv. Unlike assertNoDangerousFlags
 * (which inspects only the free-form `flags`/`args` inputs of kubectl_generic),
 * this scans every token in the final argv — including bare positional slots
 * such as resource names, node names, and resource types that the individual
 * tools push directly. kubectl's pflag parser treats any token beginning with
 * "-" as a flag regardless of position, so a tool argument like
 * name: "--server=https://attacker" would otherwise redirect the API server
 * and leak the operator's bearer token. Throws an McpError on any dangerous
 * flag unless ALLOW_KUBECTL_UNSAFE_FLAGS=true.
 */
export declare function assertSafeArgv(args: readonly string[]): void;
/**
 * Drop-in replacement for child_process.execFileSync that scans the argv for
 * credential/target-redirecting flags before executing. Tool files import this
 * as `execFileSync`, so every kubectl/helm call site is guarded at one place.
 */
export declare function execFileSyncSafe(file: string, args: string[], options: ExecFileSyncOptionsWithStringEncoding): string;